The aim of the article is to develop a conceptual framework for the analysis of foreign policy paradigms. In order to develop such a framework, we review the wider literature on policy paradigms and adapt it to the field of foreign relations and diplomacy. Adaptation includes the explication of key concepts, such as identity, values, goals, means and principles. Importantly, we do not only explicate key concepts, but also, subsequently, outline methodological avenues for empirical research on foreign policy paradigms. In this fashion, the article offers a conceptual framework that analysts can apply in empirical studies of both national and transnational foreign policy paradigms, including the field of EU foreign policy.

For Henry Kissinger, a stable international order is not only based on a balance of power, but also on a balance of identities, of “visions of itself ”. How do our observational theories of international relations come to understand this practical maxim? This article shows that rationalist theories, methodological underpinnings fall short of satisfactorily addressing the issue, while constructivism’s and post-structuralism’s social ontology and relational understanding of identity provide a better starting point. And yet, when we return from the level of explanatory theory back to foreign policy practice, constructivist theorizing, precisely for its focus on identity, risks of being abused for the purpose of nationalist apologies of the very kind that makes a balance of identities impossible.

The problem of understanding when and how change happens in world politics is under-conceptualized. One potential source of change for further examination is the relationship between change and the leadership of states and international institutions. The decisions and actions of leaders are an immediate source of both peaceful and violent change. A change of leaders may simply be an endogenous marker for a shift in historical forces that explain change in world politics, or leaders may be indispensable in explaining change at state and systemic levels of analysis. Are leaders the pilots or simply passengers on states caught in the tides of history? Binary role theory offers a coherent account of “role change”specified by the interactions and outcomes between leaders and historical situations, which is a more nuanced “both/and”account than a simple “either/or”answer to this question. The interactions and outcomes that model role change are first presented in the abstract terms of role theory and then illustrated with two case studies of UK-Iran and US-Iran relations.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) has long studied leaders and individual decision makers. In contrast, international relations (IR) long favored the system level of analysis, treating the state as an abstract unitary actor. However, IR has begun to rediscover the individual level of analysis, making this an opportune time to consider the contributions of both FPA and IR to the study of leaders and decision makers. This article reviews how FPA and IR study individual decision makers, highlighting prominent approaches in each field, comparing these approaches –highlighting similarities, differences, and connections –and discusses appropriate applications of each in empirical research. The contribution ends with suggestions for integrating the FPA and IR approaches to the study of leaders and individual decision makers, highlighting how this integration benefits the ability of both FPA and IR to address interesting research questions regarding the role of leaders and individual decision makers in international politics.

This article raises the possibility of de- and reconstructing realist constructivism for the purpose of studying foreign policy, with an emphasis on explaining and forecasting change and continuity. I discuss why Samuel Barkin’s explication of realist constructivism has in my view struggled to take off as an IR perspective and which tenets appear problematic, especially when applying them to foreign policy. I suggest a way of revitalising realist constructivism across three layers of theorising: political ontology, explanatory theory, and praxis. Constructivism’s “open ontology”offers a meeting point with classical realism, together with its (less deterministic and more interpretivist) explanatory approach. Classical realism adds to the third layer with its focus on practice sensibility, including the choices actors make in highly uncertain contexts. Its strong interest in discovering the truth of politics is important here. I argue that such a synthesis, which is informed by Ned Lebow’s conceptualisation of causation as “inefficient”, could be well-suited to unpack the complex reality of foreign policy. I seek to make the case for realist constructivism as a dynamic thinking tool, among others when investigating the effects of material, intersubjective and subjective factors on foreign policy decisions and outcomes. While my propositions can only be sketched here, the goal is to encourage further debate about the value of realist constructivism, which has ebbed since the mid-2000s.

The objective of this article is to present possibilities offered by a combination of two theories, that is role theory (Holsti, 1970; Thies, Breuning, 2012; Walker, 1981; 1987; 2004; 2017; Wehner, Thies, 2014) and two-level games framework (Putnam, 1988). Although this ‘combining’may still cause considerable difficulties, because various IR theories are based on different ontological and epistemological assumptions, theoretical syntheses, however, are not impossible and, offer myriad research possibilities of developing middle-range ways of solving research puzzles (Jorgensen, 2018, pp. 250–252). The article consists of four parts. In the first one, the essential assumptions of role theory and the two-level game framework will be presented. The second part will present how to combine assumptions of these two theories by following the strategy of ‘domain of application’. In the third one, the results of the synthesis will be elucidated. It will be done by referring to the three factors that the two-level games framework is based on and by showing how previous studies focused on role theory could be supplemented by Putnam’s framework. The fourth, concluding part, will present final reflections as well as sketch the turf of the proposed theoretical synthesis.

This paper aims at problematizing this distinction between status quo and revisionist/imperialist states by creating a typology of four kind of states: imperialist, status quo, young and old narcist state. The text will proceed in three sections that: 1) problematises the contemporary realist theorising; 2) reconstructs Morgenthau’s notions of sources of national and political power, ideal types of foreign policy and the character of political community and its interest; 3) presents the four ideal types of states. This typology, based on analyticist metatheory and deeply inspired by Hans Morgenthau’s thought, aims at solving problems with neorealist, and neoclassical realist theorising. Based on such non-positivist metatheory, and thus closer to the classical realist roots, it omits the offensive/defensive neorealist assumption about states motivation. By explicitly combining the three historically bound qualities of states –their sources of national power, extraction capability and foreign policy behaviour it transcends the problems with weak causal linkages between state level variables present in neoclassical realism. Hence, it exemplifies the approach to general theory-building that is practically viable for explicitly exerting normative judgement, also from the perspective non great power state actors – the consistent weakness of mainstream, contemporary realist theorising.

Recent research in International Relations pays more attention to the role of individuals in world politics. The subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis, in contrast, has a long-standing record in advancing its explanation of individuals in foreign policy. Specifically, at-a-distance approaches to studying individuals have grown noticeably. New theoretical connections (for example, to role theory), an expansion of its subjects and linguistic capabilities beyond English promise a growing literature in years to come. To continue to exploit the exploratory promise and illustrate these approaches’ability to account for individuals’impact on decision-making, this paper investigates Turkish foreign policymaking into the 2003 Iraq War under the leadership of two prime ministers. It utilizes Leadership Trait Analysis to profile Gul and Erdoğan, reports from multiple elite interviews, and connects the two leaders’profiles with associated behavioral expectations in their engagement with the parliament. Based on its findings in leaders’profiles and case study discussion, the paper argues an individual focused analysis offers much insight to understanding foreign policymaking processes and outcomes.

It seems that the Indo-Pacific label has been deployed by India to validate its great power aspirations. Such operationalization of strategic region-building acknowledges that the positioning of any international actor emerges as a power in context –it is not entirely an intrinsic property of an actor, but depends on the kind of interactions it has in specific (temporal and spatial) contexts. This condition is one of the key sources of the awkwardness of India’s great power. It reflects simultaneously (i) the contested nature of India’s standing –jostling between an aspiring great power, a regional South Asian hegemon, and a begrudging middle power; and (ii) the neglect of Indian aspirations (and self-perception) of great civilizational state. The paper examines these dynamics by, firstly, deploying a discursive study on foreign policy making, whose framework then provides the analytical backstop to the assessment of Indian foreign policy making in the Indo-Pacific region. As such, the concluding section of the paper suggests that the case of India confirms the assumption that it is the complex interactions between contestation and neglect that frames the awkward status of power on the world stage.

The present paper examines the impact of personal characteristics of head of state on the foreign policy behaviour. The article is based on the assumption that during a crisis or war, compared to peaceful times, leaders are under a greater influence of their personal traits and cognitive determinants, including their biases and beliefs. The chosen method is the LTA coding system, as it allows obtaining measurable results showing which traits of the leaders are meaningful and how they determine leaders’actions in different situations (crisis and lack thereof). The aim of this paper is to analyse the personality-based decision-making determinants in foreign policy in the context of an international conflict based on the example of Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s presidency (1995–2005). The analysis focuses on the president’s decisions and their psychological background during over a year long period preceding the invasion of Iraq by the coalition forces (March, 2003) and his statements made between 1995 and 2001 with the objective of identifying potential differences in leadership style of an individual decisionmaker in two different situations, one of which meets the definition of an international crisis. The research proves that in the conditions of a crisis, the president trends a higher belief to be able to control events, reduced conceptual complexity, and enhanced the need for power. Using available evidence on Polish decision-making, the paper shows how Kwaśniewski’s personality and leadership style did indeed shape both the process and outcome of foreign policy toward the Iraq War. It allows identifying his leadership style in the period preceding the invasion of Iraq that started in March 2003.

The aim of the paper is to use international relations theories to explain the views of Polish elites in the field of foreign policy. The concept of political rationale in foreign policy, introduced by Fred Chernoff, is utilized to achieve this goal. The structure of the text is threefold. The first part introduces the theoretical approach. It is believed that it is possible to derive foreign policy mental maps from leading international relations theories such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The second part describes how foreign policy is understood by three groups of Polish elites. The third part compares decision-makers views identified in the second part with the theoretical models developed in the first part. In conclusion, the theory’s usefulness in explaining Poland’s foreign policy concepts is evaluated. The text presents an attempt to connect the issues of theory with observable political practice on the example of Poland’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. As a result, the paper shows the linkages between chosen International Relations (IR) theories and the state’s foreign policy. In this way, it incorporates the mainstream IR theories into the reflection conducted primarily in the Foreign Policy Analysis field.

The purpose of this paper is to characterize Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in post-Cold War Poland. The scope of this text is limited to FPA, understood as empirical research utilizing foreign policy theories by taking into account factors at the domestic level. “Polish FPA”is defined as research conducted by scholars employed in Poland. The text focuses on five aspects of Polish FPA: (1) historical context, (2) the teaching covering this subject, (3) the development of institutions doing research on foreign policy, (4) adaptation of ideas from global (mainly Western) science (in fact, westernization), and (5) the most important publications analyzing foreign policy and applying theoretical approaches. The paper is a response to the existing research gap as, so far, no work has been prepared strictly on the FPA’s development in post-Cold War Poland. The weaknesses of the existing literature on this subject are its (1) selectivity, (2) focus on mainstream international relations theories and (3) sketchiness.

The aim of the article is to develop a conceptual framework for the analysis of foreign policy paradigms. In order to develop such a framework, we review the wider literature on policy paradigms and adapt it to the field of foreign relations and diplomacy. Adaptation includes the explication of key concepts, such as identity, values, goals, means and principles. Importantly, we do not only explicate key concepts, but also, subsequently, outline methodological avenues for empirical research on foreign policy paradigms. In this fashion, the article offers a conceptual framework that analysts can apply in empirical studies of both national and transnational foreign policy paradigms, including the field of EU foreign policy.

For Henry Kissinger, a stable international order is not only based on a balance of power, but also on a balance of identities, of “visions of itself ”. How do our observational theories of international relations come to understand this practical maxim? This article shows that rationalist theories, methodological underpinnings fall short of satisfactorily addressing the issue, while constructivism’s and post-structuralism’s social ontology and relational understanding of identity provide a better starting point. And yet, when we return from the level of explanatory theory back to foreign policy practice, constructivist theorizing, precisely for its focus on identity, risks of being abused for the purpose of nationalist apologies of the very kind that makes a balance of identities impossible.

The problem of understanding when and how change happens in world politics is under-conceptualized. One potential source of change for further examination is the relationship between change and the leadership of states and international institutions. The decisions and actions of leaders are an immediate source of both peaceful and violent change. A change of leaders may simply be an endogenous marker for a shift in historical forces that explain change in world politics, or leaders may be indispensable in explaining change at state and systemic levels of analysis. Are leaders the pilots or simply passengers on states caught in the tides of history? Binary role theory offers a coherent account of “role change”specified by the interactions and outcomes between leaders and historical situations, which is a more nuanced “both/and”account than a simple “either/or”answer to this question. The interactions and outcomes that model role change are first presented in the abstract terms of role theory and then illustrated with two case studies of UK-Iran and US-Iran relations.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) has long studied leaders and individual decision makers. In contrast, international relations (IR) long favored the system level of analysis, treating the state as an abstract unitary actor. However, IR has begun to rediscover the individual level of analysis, making this an opportune time to consider the contributions of both FPA and IR to the study of leaders and decision makers. This article reviews how FPA and IR study individual decision makers, highlighting prominent approaches in each field, comparing these approaches –highlighting similarities, differences, and connections –and discusses appropriate applications of each in empirical research. The contribution ends with suggestions for integrating the FPA and IR approaches to the study of leaders and individual decision makers, highlighting how this integration benefits the ability of both FPA and IR to address interesting research questions regarding the role of leaders and individual decision makers in international politics.

This article raises the possibility of de- and reconstructing realist constructivism for the purpose of studying foreign policy, with an emphasis on explaining and forecasting change and continuity. I discuss why Samuel Barkin’s explication of realist constructivism has in my view struggled to take off as an IR perspective and which tenets appear problematic, especially when applying them to foreign policy. I suggest a way of revitalising realist constructivism across three layers of theorising: political ontology, explanatory theory, and praxis. Constructivism’s “open ontology”offers a meeting point with classical realism, together with its (less deterministic and more interpretivist) explanatory approach. Classical realism adds to the third layer with its focus on practice sensibility, including the choices actors make in highly uncertain contexts. Its strong interest in discovering the truth of politics is important here. I argue that such a synthesis, which is informed by Ned Lebow’s conceptualisation of causation as “inefficient”, could be well-suited to unpack the complex reality of foreign policy. I seek to make the case for realist constructivism as a dynamic thinking tool, among others when investigating the effects of material, intersubjective and subjective factors on foreign policy decisions and outcomes. While my propositions can only be sketched here, the goal is to encourage further debate about the value of realist constructivism, which has ebbed since the mid-2000s.

The objective of this article is to present possibilities offered by a combination of two theories, that is role theory (Holsti, 1970; Thies, Breuning, 2012; Walker, 1981; 1987; 2004; 2017; Wehner, Thies, 2014) and two-level games framework (Putnam, 1988). Although this ‘combining’may still cause considerable difficulties, because various IR theories are based on different ontological and epistemological assumptions, theoretical syntheses, however, are not impossible and, offer myriad research possibilities of developing middle-range ways of solving research puzzles (Jorgensen, 2018, pp. 250–252). The article consists of four parts. In the first one, the essential assumptions of role theory and the two-level game framework will be presented. The second part will present how to combine assumptions of these two theories by following the strategy of ‘domain of application’. In the third one, the results of the synthesis will be elucidated. It will be done by referring to the three factors that the two-level games framework is based on and by showing how previous studies focused on role theory could be supplemented by Putnam’s framework. The fourth, concluding part, will present final reflections as well as sketch the turf of the proposed theoretical synthesis.

This paper aims at problematizing this distinction between status quo and revisionist/imperialist states by creating a typology of four kind of states: imperialist, status quo, young and old narcist state. The text will proceed in three sections that: 1) problematises the contemporary realist theorising; 2) reconstructs Morgenthau’s notions of sources of national and political power, ideal types of foreign policy and the character of political community and its interest; 3) presents the four ideal types of states. This typology, based on analyticist metatheory and deeply inspired by Hans Morgenthau’s thought, aims at solving problems with neorealist, and neoclassical realist theorising. Based on such non-positivist metatheory, and thus closer to the classical realist roots, it omits the offensive/defensive neorealist assumption about states motivation. By explicitly combining the three historically bound qualities of states –their sources of national power, extraction capability and foreign policy behaviour it transcends the problems with weak causal linkages between state level variables present in neoclassical realism. Hence, it exemplifies the approach to general theory-building that is practically viable for explicitly exerting normative judgement, also from the perspective non great power state actors – the consistent weakness of mainstream, contemporary realist theorising.

Recent research in International Relations pays more attention to the role of individuals in world politics. The subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis, in contrast, has a long-standing record in advancing its explanation of individuals in foreign policy. Specifically, at-a-distance approaches to studying individuals have grown noticeably. New theoretical connections (for example, to role theory), an expansion of its subjects and linguistic capabilities beyond English promise a growing literature in years to come. To continue to exploit the exploratory promise and illustrate these approaches’ability to account for individuals’impact on decision-making, this paper investigates Turkish foreign policymaking into the 2003 Iraq War under the leadership of two prime ministers. It utilizes Leadership Trait Analysis to profile Gul and Erdoğan, reports from multiple elite interviews, and connects the two leaders’profiles with associated behavioral expectations in their engagement with the parliament. Based on its findings in leaders’profiles and case study discussion, the paper argues an individual focused analysis offers much insight to understanding foreign policymaking processes and outcomes.

It seems that the Indo-Pacific label has been deployed by India to validate its great power aspirations. Such operationalization of strategic region-building acknowledges that the positioning of any international actor emerges as a power in context –it is not entirely an intrinsic property of an actor, but depends on the kind of interactions it has in specific (temporal and spatial) contexts. This condition is one of the key sources of the awkwardness of India’s great power. It reflects simultaneously (i) the contested nature of India’s standing –jostling between an aspiring great power, a regional South Asian hegemon, and a begrudging middle power; and (ii) the neglect of Indian aspirations (and self-perception) of great civilizational state. The paper examines these dynamics by, firstly, deploying a discursive study on foreign policy making, whose framework then provides the analytical backstop to the assessment of Indian foreign policy making in the Indo-Pacific region. As such, the concluding section of the paper suggests that the case of India confirms the assumption that it is the complex interactions between contestation and neglect that frames the awkward status of power on the world stage.

The present paper examines the impact of personal characteristics of head of state on the foreign policy behaviour. The article is based on the assumption that during a crisis or war, compared to peaceful times, leaders are under a greater influence of their personal traits and cognitive determinants, including their biases and beliefs. The chosen method is the LTA coding system, as it allows obtaining measurable results showing which traits of the leaders are meaningful and how they determine leaders’actions in different situations (crisis and lack thereof). The aim of this paper is to analyse the personality-based decision-making determinants in foreign policy in the context of an international conflict based on the example of Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s presidency (1995–2005). The analysis focuses on the president’s decisions and their psychological background during over a year long period preceding the invasion of Iraq by the coalition forces (March, 2003) and his statements made between 1995 and 2001 with the objective of identifying potential differences in leadership style of an individual decisionmaker in two different situations, one of which meets the definition of an international crisis. The research proves that in the conditions of a crisis, the president trends a higher belief to be able to control events, reduced conceptual complexity, and enhanced the need for power. Using available evidence on Polish decision-making, the paper shows how Kwaśniewski’s personality and leadership style did indeed shape both the process and outcome of foreign policy toward the Iraq War. It allows identifying his leadership style in the period preceding the invasion of Iraq that started in March 2003.

The aim of the paper is to use international relations theories to explain the views of Polish elites in the field of foreign policy. The concept of political rationale in foreign policy, introduced by Fred Chernoff, is utilized to achieve this goal. The structure of the text is threefold. The first part introduces the theoretical approach. It is believed that it is possible to derive foreign policy mental maps from leading international relations theories such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The second part describes how foreign policy is understood by three groups of Polish elites. The third part compares decision-makers views identified in the second part with the theoretical models developed in the first part. In conclusion, the theory’s usefulness in explaining Poland’s foreign policy concepts is evaluated. The text presents an attempt to connect the issues of theory with observable political practice on the example of Poland’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. As a result, the paper shows the linkages between chosen International Relations (IR) theories and the state’s foreign policy. In this way, it incorporates the mainstream IR theories into the reflection conducted primarily in the Foreign Policy Analysis field.

The purpose of this paper is to characterize Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in post-Cold War Poland. The scope of this text is limited to FPA, understood as empirical research utilizing foreign policy theories by taking into account factors at the domestic level. “Polish FPA”is defined as research conducted by scholars employed in Poland. The text focuses on five aspects of Polish FPA: (1) historical context, (2) the teaching covering this subject, (3) the development of institutions doing research on foreign policy, (4) adaptation of ideas from global (mainly Western) science (in fact, westernization), and (5) the most important publications analyzing foreign policy and applying theoretical approaches. The paper is a response to the existing research gap as, so far, no work has been prepared strictly on the FPA’s development in post-Cold War Poland. The weaknesses of the existing literature on this subject are its (1) selectivity, (2) focus on mainstream international relations theories and (3) sketchiness.