Institutions and the Problem of Social Order. A Normative Approximation
cytuj
pobierz pliki
RIS BIB ENDNOTEChoose format
RIS BIB ENDNOTEInstitutions and the Problem of Social Order. A Normative Approximation
Publication date: 2019
Teoria Polityki, 2019, No. 3/2019, pp. 229 - 247
https://doi.org/10.4467/25440845TP.19.012.10295Authors
Institutions and the Problem of Social Order. A Normative Approximation
This paper discusses the effect of social structure in the development of cooperative behaviour. We will argue that structural conditions shape the scope of social interactions. Strategic exchanges among the members of society are built in the context of the parameters that are defined by the institutional framework in which social life develops. Cooperation is not the result of natural development, nor does it depend on altruistic behaviour; instead, it results both from the configuration of normative mechanisms of control and incentives systems, and from the evolution of moral foundations resulting from learning processes. We will use the Stag Hunt Metaphor to argue about the impact that context may have in determining the scope of human interactions and about the importance of defining moral mechanisms that favour the construction of a stable social order.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Barragan, J. (1998). “Ethical Issues in Public Decision Making”. Rechtheorie, 29, pp. 23–45.
Bicchieri, Ch. (1990). “Norms of Cooperation”. Ethics, 100(4), pp. 838–861.
Bicchieri, Ch. (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bicchieri, Ch. (2017). Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure and Change Social Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Binmore, K. (1989). “Social Contract I: Harsanyi and Rawls”. The Economic Journal, 99(395), pp. 84–102.
Binmore, K. (2011). Rational Decisions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Braithwaite, R.B. (1954). Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, A., Powell, R. (2018). The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, G.A. (2003). “Facts and Principles”. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31(3), pp. 211–245.
Forst, R. (2008). “Toleration and Trust: Comments on Steven Smith”. American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, 48, pp. 281–292.
Gauthier, D. (1986). Moral by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goodin, R., Tully, Ch. (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Güth, W., Ockenfels, A. (2005). “The Coevolution of Morality and Legal Institutions: An Indirect Evolutionary Approach”. Journal of Institutional Economics, 1(2), pp. 155–175.
Harsanyi, J. (1986). “Individual Utility and Utilitarian Ethics”. In: A. Diekmann, P. Mitter (eds.). Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport. Heidelberg–Wien: Physica-Verlag.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. London: Penguin Books.
Kühnelt, J. (2010). “State Legitimacy and Social Order”. In: J. Kühnelt (ed.). Political Legitimation without Morality? Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 15–33.
Lewis, D. (1969/2007). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Li, M. (2009). “Collection in Bargaining”. International Journal of Game Theory, 38, pp. 481–498.
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. North, D. (1994). “Economic Performance through Time”. The American Economic Review, 84(3), pp. 359–368.
Ostrom, E. (1998). “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997”. American Political Science Review, 92(1), pp. 1–22.
Peyton, Y. (1993). “The Evolution of Convention”. Econometrica, 61(1), pp. 57–84.
Rawls, J. (1977). “The Basic Structure as a Subject”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 14(2), pp. 159–165.
Rawls, J. (2004). Teoría de la Justicia. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Scharpf, F. (1997). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Oxford: Westview Press.
Schelling, T. (1956). “An Essay on Bargaining”. The American Economic Review, 46(3), pp. 281–306.
Schelling, T. (1964). La Estrategia del Conflicto. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos.
Selten, R. (2002). “What Is Bounded Rationality”. In: G. Gigerenzer, R. Selten (eds.).Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sen, A. (1999). “The Possibility of Social Choice”. The American Political Science Review, 89(3), pp. 349–378.
Sen, A. (2000). Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books.
Skyrms, B. (1996). The Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skyrms, B. (2001). “The Stag Hunt”. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 75(2), pp. 31–41.
Skyrms, B. (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skyrms, B. (2010). Signals, Information, Learning and Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wagner, E. (2012). “Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation”. Philosophy of Science, 79(1), pp. 81–94.
Information: Teoria Polityki, 2019, No. 3/2019, pp. 229 - 247
Article type: Original article
Titles:
Institutions and the Problem of Social Order. A Normative Approximation
Institutions and the Problem of Social Order. A Normative Approximation
Goethe University Frankfurt
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 6 60323 Frankfurt am Main Germany, Germany
Central University of Venezuela
Published at: 2019
Article status: Open
Licence: CC BY-NC-ND
Percentage share of authors:
Article corrections:
-Publication languages:
EnglishView count: 1241
Number of downloads: 718