%0 Journal Article
%T Institutions and the Problem of Social Order. A Normative Approximation
%A Latouche, Miguel Angel
%J Teoria Polityki
%V 2019
%R 10.4467/25440845TP.19.012.10295
%N No. 3/2019
%P 229-247
%K evolution, social contract, normativity, interest, equilibrium
%@ 2543-7046
%D 2019
%U https://ejournals.eu/en/journal/teoria-polityki/article/institutions-and-the-problem-of-social-order-a-normative-approximation
%X 
	This paper discusses the effect of social structure in the development of cooperative behaviour. We will argue that structural conditions shape the scope of social interactions. Strategic exchanges among the members of society are built in the context of the parameters that are defined by the institutional framework in which social life develops. Cooperation is not the result of natural development, nor does it depend on altruistic behaviour; instead, it results both from the configuration of normative mechanisms of control and incentives systems, and from the evolution of moral foundations resulting from learning processes. We will use the Stag Hunt Metaphor to argue about the impact that context may have in determining the scope of human interactions and about the importance of defining moral mechanisms  that favour the construction of a stable social order.