Axiological Involvement of Developmental Psychology

The paper focuses on the cognitive value of psychological knowledge about the human mind and personality development in children, adolescents and adults. It is argued that axiological engagement of developmental psychology means reference to its object of study with truth-value judgments about it. The understanding of human development entails an axiological engagement with it that is directed towards truth. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz wrote about the significance of the anti-irrational stance in our cognition and in our actions guided by cognition toward reaching planned desirable ends within our human social world. Ajdukiewicz has pondered the epistemic value of being true or false with our knowledge; any utilitarian or pragmatic considerations or uses of it notwithstanding. It is assumed by him that one should preserve an anti-irrational stance in order to decide on the difference between true and false beliefs. It is argued that the science of psychology reduces the value of cognition to utilitarian and pragmatic values and knows next to nothing about how to identify truth and falsity of beliefs. This assertion implies an urgent need to find out how children, youth, and adults learn to deal with epistemic values of their beliefs. One should put aside the positivistic and empiricist theory of human cognition in order to open a space for a new proposal in developmental psychology. It deals with the relation of reference of beliefs of human subjects to the objects of their cognition in their social world and argues for the return to the notion of ideals in psychology in order to investigate their indispensable role in human mind and personality development.

Truth and Values in Psychology

The paper refers to three issues: the effective way to reach the truth, the inconclusive and equivocal (interpretative) nature of truth, and the axiological involvement of developmental psychology. The first issue can be resolved by arguing for the need to connect a good theory with a thoughtful research program. The second thesis finds its confirmation in that the critique and reconsideration of what was previously established are the essence of scientific investigations. Finally, the issue of the role played by values in developmental psychology will be analysed on four levels: the first deals with theories and concepts of values; the second with values as the object of psychological investigations; the third points to how values enter the research process itself; and the fourth refers to how concepts and theories in psychology become filled with axiology.

Truth as the Basic Value in Science

The author argues that truth is the basic value in all sciences including psychology. Respecting this value requires understanding different theories of truth, including the Aristotelian classical theory, Russell’s correspondence theory, and Tarski’s semantic theory. This is further presented and discussed in the first part of the article. In the second part, the author discusses different epistemological approaches to the correspondence between perceptual experience and reality and identifies the one favouring understanding in the science of psychology. The author further discusses and emphasises the dangers of confusing beliefs and truth in science. In the next part of the article the consequences and dangers of relativizing truth and of multiplying its subjective types are discussed. The author then refers to an approach which proposes a break with ideals in the assessment of the adequacy of assertions made by social sciences. The author outlines the difference between the concepts of idea and ideal and their roles in psychology. Finally, the author discusses and opposes irrationalism in science, outlining the importance of safeguarding the value of truth in order to achieve the goals set by psychology.

The Significance of the Subject and Its Value

The article presents the answer to a number of questions concerning the axiological involvement of developmental psychology. One of the aspects of the answer is pointing to the problem of specifying the subject of psychology without losing its essence. The issue of discussion with the dualistic vision of the world adopted by scientist-oriented psychology is also raised. The importance of autonomy and subjective freedom is emphasized in the context of trying to understand the human being as a reference point in developmental psychology.

Towards Objectivity of Values. A Response to Comments

Beyond immediate references to the introductory paper, one may find in the commentaries a set of other interesting issues. They are left to another occasion, since the focus here is on remarks inviting further elaboration on the main theses’ clarification and grounding. It goes in three directions, to (i) clarify the difference between a rejection of British empiricism as a misleading theory of human cognition and a postulate to replace it with an adequate theory of cognitive reference to the truth of believes about the objects of experience in the world of human culture and civilization, (ii) dismiss from the theory of human knowledge the belief in the construction of mind-representations of the objects of cognition, and to focus instead on the relation of reference in judgments to the independent objects of knowledge within the human world, and (iii) to ground the objective status of the ideal of truth and the other values within the world of culture and civilization arrangements.