Truth as the Basic Value in Science

The author argues that truth is the basic value in all sciences including psychology. Respecting this value requires understanding different theories of truth, including the Aristotelian classical theory, Russell’s correspondence theory, and Tarski’s semantic theory. This is further presented and discussed in the first part of the article. In the second part, the author discusses different epistemological approaches to the correspondence between perceptual experience and reality and identifies the one favouring understanding in the science of psychology. The author further discusses and emphasises the dangers of confusing beliefs and truth in science. In the next part of the article the consequences and dangers of relativizing truth and of multiplying its subjective types are discussed. The author then refers to an approach which proposes a break with ideals in the assessment of the adequacy of assertions made by social sciences. The author outlines the difference between the concepts of idea and ideal and their roles in psychology. Finally, the author discusses and opposes irrationalism in science, outlining the importance of safeguarding the value of truth in order to achieve the goals set by psychology.

The author argues that truth is the basic value in all sciences including psychology. Respecting this value requires understanding different theories of truth, including the Aristotelian classical theory, Russell’s correspondence theory, and Tarski’s semantic theory. This is further presented and discussed in the first part of the article. In the second part, the author discusses different epistemological approaches to the correspondence between perceptual experience and reality and identifies the one favouring understanding in the science of psychology. The author further discusses and emphasises the dangers of confusing beliefs and truth in science. In the next part of the article the consequences and dangers of relativizing truth and of multiplying its subjective types are discussed. The author then refers to an approach which proposes a break with ideals in the assessment of the adequacy of assertions made by social sciences. The author outlines the difference between the concepts of idea and ideal and their roles in psychology. Finally, the author discusses and opposes irrationalism in science, outlining the importance of safeguarding the value of truth in order to achieve the goals set by psychology.