The Brandenburg policy of John III Sobieski

The Brandenburg policy of John III Sobieski was unfortunate and inconsistent. The Polish king, like his predecessors, did not have a political programmme towards the Hohenzollern monarchy. He took active steps in the Brandenburg direction only when a dynastic interest occurred. Such a stance was visible for the first time in the years 1675–1679. The change of policy towards Brandenburg-Prussia, conducted at the time by John III and based on his alliance with France and Sweden, did not bring him any benefits. It caused, however, many problems for Frederick William, the Brandenburg elector. After 1679, John III, as far as the Brandenburg direction was concerned, was in a clearly defensive position. He endeavoured to marry prince James with a rich protegee of the Hohenzollern family, Luisa Carolina of Radziwill. The efforts made in this regard ended in two humiliating defeats of the king: in 1681 and in 1688. The French diplomacy wanted to take advantage of the Berlin matrimonial affront of 1688 and tried to persuade John III to make a new attempt towards reclaiming the Duchy of Prussia. The king did not take up this idea anymore.

The Commonwealth’s policy towards Moscow, 1672–1699

A fundamental transformation of the Polish-Russian relationship occurred in the second half of the 17th century. The war begun in 1654 ended in 1667 with the Truce of Andrusovo, when the palatinates of Smolensk, Chernihiv and the Left-Bank Ukraine were ceded to Moscow. Andrusovo represented a major turning point in the Polish-Russian relationship. Not only did the Commonwealth irretrievably lose its eastern lands, but the outcome confirmed the Russian ascendancy in the field of bilateral relations. The danger from the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate to Central and Eastern Europe led to Russia becoming a major member of the anti-Turkish coalition. The issue of an alliance with Russia against Turkey became of particular relevance during the reign of John III Sobieski. This occasioned negotiations on the subject of a permanent peace treaty between the Commonwealth and Russia which were combined with an attempt to recover diplomatically at least some of the lost lands. Krzysztof Grzymułtowski represented the Polish side in the final stage of arduous negotiations. The treaty of 1686 closed the chapter of Polish-Russian military confrontations, with a political degradation of the Commonwealth as their ultimate result.

Searching for the allies? The role of the Crimean Khanate and Persia in the policy of John III Sobieski towards the Ottoman Empire (1674–1696)

This paper discusses the role of the Crimean Khanate and the Safavid Persia in Polish-Ottoman relations during the reign of King John III Sobieski (1674–1696). It is striking that the Polish ruler repeatedly invited the Crimean khan and the Persian shah to join the anti-Ottoman coalition. Notwithstanding numerous letters and envoys dispatched by Sobieski, the Crimean Khanate remained a loyal ally to the Sublime Porte, while Persia denied to take part in the conflict. Sobieski’s political plans in reference to Persia, which resulted in numerous embassies sent to the shah, increased opportunities of Polish missionaries to minister in this country. An especially interesting project of founding a Polish mission in Northern Persia in order to minister to the Caucasian tribes was created by a Polish Jesuit, Ignacy Zapolski. Yet, after the death of Sobieski, Zapolski’s idea, which gained very limited support of the Commonwealth, could not be turned into reality. 

Artykuł powstał dzięki fi nansowaniu z grantu NCN nr 2017/27/B/HS3/00151 pt. „«Wielka i Mała Rozbieżność» widziane przez szkła korporacji: mieszkańcy Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w Azji w XVII wieku”, kierowanym przez prof. dr. hab. Dariusza Kołodziejczyka.

John III Sobieski towards the Romanian principalities and the Hungarian uprising

John III Sobieski had a significant part in the development of the Hungarian uprising which led to the Ottoman attack on Vienna, and which, in this way, posed a threat to Poland and Europe. The involvement in defending Vienna and establishing the “Holy League” forced a change of policy towards the Hungarians and directed expansion towards Moldova and Wallachia. The King of Poland, after taking over Podolia, which took place at the beginning of the war, and after failing to capture Kamianets-Podilskyi, could fight with the Turks only on the Moldovan (and possibly Wallachian) territory. Expansion in this direction, however, was not welcome by Emperor Leopold I, who considered these territories to be the rightful countries of the Hungarian domain. It was not possible to maintain the Moldovan throne under Stefan Petru, imposed in early 1684 by Poland. The next Moldovan rulers, Dumitru Cantacuzino and Constantin Cantemir, were strongly opposed to conducting anti-Turkish military activities in their country. The hopes of the Polish king for Constantin Cantemir’s cooperation, despite some agreements, were not based on real grounds, and the political intentions towards the Romanian principalities were a factor here. Sobieski falsely assessed the mood prevailing in Moldovan society; while expecting general support, he met with resistance. Throughout the war, however, Imré Thököly tried to maintain the best possible relations with the King of Poland, persistently and yet unsuccessfully trying to lead to a separatist peace between the Ottoman state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

John III Sobieski’s domestic policies before 1679

John III Sobieski’s domestic politics was mostly subordinated to his foreign policy objectives. The king’s post-election course of action was strongly influenced by his past experiences. He deferred the coronation until a more favourable moment, although the political benefits of that decision failed to materialize. The new king’s politics was quite cautious. He did not put forward any major reform proposals, assessing the prospects of such reforms to be poor. He managed to end the war with the Ottoman Empire, but the king’s subsequent moves met with strong domestic opposition encouraged  by Vienna and Berlin. The failure of the Baltic politics led John III to return to the idea of a war with the Porte. Before that, the king had to resolve acute internal conflicts, doing so during the Diet of Grodno  in 1679. Only then could he undertake preparations for a new political course. However, the most important factor in the success of the new policy was the opportune development of the  international situation at the time. 

Parliamentary system during John III Sobieski’s time

The parliamentary system under John III Sobieski stands out against other eras and has many distinguishing characterstics. Initially, the parliament functioned more effectively at that time than during the reign of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, but its efficiency was steadilly falling. The successes of parliaments were bought at the price of several months of deliberation. The desperate nobility looked for legal solutions, but without violating the liberum veto principle they were not very effective. The increase in the importance of dietines meant that they gathered much more often than before. The limita (continuing the debate after a few weeks’ break) allowed for frequent dietine meetings without issuing a new royal document (uniwersał). However, dietines also experienced a period of political struggle, which can be seen in the increasing number of interrupted dietines. “Senatorial councils” functioned efficiently, but their competences were limited. The king’s attempts to replace parliaments with councils could’ not succeed. 

John III Sobieski towards the Orthodox Church and the Uniate Church

John III Sobieski had to deal with the problem of conflicted religious denominations, i.e. the Eastern Churches: the Uniate Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church, which had been in conflict for almost 80 years. The King’s actions were dependent on various aspects of international politics. Religious matters were an important part of shaping relations with Russia and the Cossacks and remained within the area of interest of the Holy See. Having established peace with Russia, the King left aside the concept of establishing an autocephalous Eastern Orthodox Church in the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and adopted a strategy of expanding the union in the Eastern Orthodox Church dioceses by trying to convince individual hierarchs to this concept. For bishops the king nominated individuals who favoured the union and enjoyed trust among the Cossack community, but most of all, who were experienced officials and soldiers holding high esteem among local nobleman elites. The policy-making of John III Sobieski contributed to expanding the Catholic Kiev Metropolis of the Eastern Rite (united with Rome) over the Przemyśl, Lutsk and Lviv bishoprics. The aim of Sobieski’s policies related to religious denominations was to lead to a change in religious attitudes by way of people identifying themselves with the state’s interests. 

Why could the political propaganda of John III Sobieski not be eff ective?

The article attempts to answer the question why King John III Sobieski (1674–1696) finally did not reach his main political goal and failed to create a new Polish royal dynasty despite his verbal and visual propaganda as well as diverse methods and means of this propaganda. The author tries to show that the reasons for his defeat did not depend only on the actions of John III as a propagandist but were deeply rooted in the specific political system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (monarchia mixta, elected king), in the developed system of clientelism (with domination of magnates’ courts as political and cultural centers under the Royal Court), in the poor condition of the state’s economy as a consequence of wars with Sweden, Turkey and Russia, in the underdeveloped civilization in comparison to Western Europe (a low degree of urbanization and inefficient system of communication) and in the international political situation (interference of France, Empire and  the papacy). At the same time, the author compares the royal propaganda of Sobieski to the propaganda of absolute monarchs like King of France Louis XIV, Emperor Leopold I and Elector of Brandenburg Frederick William. 

John Sobieski in the eyes of foreign diarists

The topic of this article is the way king John III Sobieski was presented by some foreign diarists in selected aspects: origin and education, interests in philosophy, command and military glory, participation in the Holy League, election and avarice, description and overall assessment.

John III Sobieski at Vienna in the literary testimony of the epoch (reconnaissance)

The Vienna campaign of King John III Sobieski was widely reflected in the literature: diaries, journals, letters and chronicles. The apologies of the victory of the Polish monarch occurred in many  occasional works. Most of them were panegyrical. According to the calculations of researchers (Bolesław Klimaszewski, Juliusz Nowak-Dłużewski), about a dozen or so tales were created. Most poetry on this subject is quite average in terms of artistic skill. It should be remembered, however, that the preserved literary texts (written in Polish and Latin) were meant to glorify the success of the Polish army at Vienna and especially John III Sobieski. His image is heroic, and sometimes sacred. Among the dozen or so poets, Wespazjan Kochowski deserves attention as the one who devoted several works to the subject of victory at Vienna. Apart from favourable evaluations, there were also a few voices criticizing Sobieski’s foreign policy (for example, Wacław Potocki). 

Prospects of military history research of the times of John III Sobieski

The article reviews the current status and prospects of the research in the field of the Polish military affairs and warfare in the times of John III. An analysis of the present literature leads to a conclusion that the most important needs in the field include the development of a synthesis of the Polish-Turkish war of 1684–1699, a history of the Polish cavalry and artillery corps in the second half of the 17th century and, above all, a full scholarly account of the generalship of John III Sobieski.

The John Sobieski’s military patronage in 1667–1696. Role, importance and research postulates

The article describes the mechanism of military patronage of John III Sobieski in the period of 1667–1696. It provides a synthesis of the current state of research, focusing mostly on the time when Sobieski held the hetman office (highest ranking military officer) and when he established a system of military patronage which gave him full control over the Crown (Polish) army and allowed him to use it in his political actions. Another objective of the article is to identify areas for further research, especially regarding the post-1683 period.

The hardest years of the great commander? John III Sobieski and the military effort of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1690–1696

The paper presents actions of John III as related to waging war against the Ottoman Empire in 1690–1696. It was arguably the most difficult period of his reign because of the constitutional and fiscal crisis of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. One of the main military duties of the king was the overall coordination of the military effort. The ruler mediated between military commanders and informed the public opinion about the course of warfare. He also vigorously acted within the Council of Senate for better garrisoning and provisioning of the frontier fortresses. Even though the result of the final years of John Sobieski’s reign cannot be regarded as positive (also because of the king’s political mistakes), his military activity in 1690–1696 probably exhausted all his possibilities within the frames of the constitution of the Commonwealth and he could do nothing more to support the Polish-Lithuanian military effort. 

Artykuł powstał w ramach projektu „Sądownictwo i dyscyplina wojskowa w Rzeczypospolitej końca XVII w.” Narodowego Centrum Nauki (nr 2014/13/N/HS3/04407) i jest zmodyfikowaną wersją tekstu już opublikowanego: https://sobieski1683.pl/2017/07/04/jan-jerzy-sowa-dzialalnosc-wojskowa-jana-iii-w-latach-1690-1696/ [dostęp: 3.05.2018]. Autor jest stypendystą Fundacji Augusta hr. Cieszkowskiego (edycja 2018).

The impact of Marie Casimire on the Polish-French relations in the reign of John III Sobieski

Queen Marie Casimire played an important role in the Polish-French relations. The article analyzes each stage of the political relationship between the two countries during Marie Casimire’s stay in Poland. She played a significant, and largely decisive, role during the election of 1674. The queen’s influence was also an important factor in the making of the treaty of Jaworów. The friendly relationship between the Commonwealth and France changed in 1678 due to a combination of reasons. The Commonwealth reoriented her foreign policy to adopt an anti-French stance, as ultimately confirmed by the Treaty of the Holy League. It is also important to take note of the personalities and actions of the French ambassadors in Warsaw. The last one, Polignac, acted in cooperation with the queen towards reorienting the foreign policy and assuring an election of a pro French candidate, but he was unsuccessful on both counts.