Indeterminacy of meaning, which has to do with vagueness of the underlying speaker’s intention, is a pervasive phenomenon in human communication, but researchers hardly ever address the issue, as it is notoriously difficult to account for. The relevance-theoretic notion of weak communication offers a viable explanation of how this phenomenon can be approached. This paper argues that weak communication and its satellite, that is, poetic effects, prove particularly useful to account for how aphorisms work. The focus is on showing that the process of aphorism comprehension, underlain by meaning indeterminacy, and certain intrinsic characteristics of the genre find a reasonable and comprehensive explanation when looked at through the lens of Relevance Theory.

The mind has developed vigilance mechanisms that protect individuals from deception and misinformation (Sperber et al. 2010). They make up a module that checks the reliability and believability of informers and information. Vigilance mechanisms may also comprise a sub-set of specialised mechanisms safeguarding hearers from interpretative mistakes conducive to misunderstanding by triggering an attitude of hermeneutical vigilance (Padilla Cruz 2014). This causes individuals to check the plausibility and acceptability of interpretative hypotheses appearing optimally relevant. Relying on empirical evidence, this paper characterises this sub-set of mechanisms and suggests some avenues for future research.

In this paper I argue that a unitary account of the modal and non-modal uses of the German particles ja and doch can be provided by appealing to essentially non-representational properties of the theory of procedural meaning in Relevance Theory (RT). According to Wilson (2011), procedural indicators such as ja and doch function by raising the activation level of cognitive procedures, increasing the likelihood that audiences following the RT comprehension heuristic will use these procedures. Partially following proposals by König (1997) and Blass (2000, 2014), I would like to posit that ja and doch trigger a procedure to raise the epistemic strength of the proposition conveyed. Doch triggers a second procedure in addition, a constraint on context selection to the effect that the proposition conveyed must be processed in a context containing its negation. Since raising the activation level of cognitive procedures can be done in degrees, I argue that the basic difference between modal and non-modal uses of ja and doch is a reflection of differences in the degree of activation level rise: non-modal uses of ja and doch raise the activation of the manifestness procedure to a high degree, giving rise to effects such as emphasis or contrast, whereas modal uses raise this procedure’s activation level merely to some degree. As a result, modal ja and doch are uniquely suitable to mark propositions that do not need much evidential strengthening but would benefit from some such effect. This is most typically the case in mutually manifest assumptions that the communicator intends to use as premises in arguments. However, in some discourse contexts assumptions that are not mutually manifest may also fit this description. The prediction of this analysis is that the modal uses of ja and doch do not form a clearly delimited class; rather, borderline cases exist defying generalizations. I will present data from a qualitative corpus study that confirms these predictions.

In this paper I argue that a unitary account of the modal and non-modal uses of the German particles ja and doch can be provided by appealing to essentially non-representational properties of the theory of procedural meaning in Relevance Theory (RT). According to Wilson (2011), procedural indicators such as ja and doch function by raising the activation level of cognitive procedures, increasing the likelihood that audiences following the RT comprehension heuristic will use these procedures. Partially following proposals by König (1997) and Blass (2000, 2014), I would like to posit that ja and doch trigger a procedure to raise the epistemic strength of the proposition conveyed. Doch triggers a second procedure in addition, a constraint on context selection to the effect that the proposition conveyed must be processed in a context containing its negation. Since raising the activation level of cognitive procedures can be done in degrees, I argue that the basic difference between modal and non-modal uses of ja and doch is a reflection of differences in the degree of activation level rise: non-modal uses of ja and doch raise the activation of the manifestness procedure to a high degree, giving rise to effects such as emphasis or contrast, whereas modal uses raise this procedure’s activation level merely to some degree. As a result, modal ja and doch are uniquely suitable to mark propositions that do not need much evidential strengthening but would benefit from some such effect. This is most typically the case in mutually manifest assumptions that the communicator intends to use as premises in arguments. However, in some discourse contexts assumptions that are not mutually manifest may also fit this description. The prediction of this analysis is that the modal uses of ja and doch do not form a clearly delimited class; rather, borderline cases exist defying generalizations. I will present data from a qualitative corpus study that confirms these predictions.

In this paper I argue that a unitary account of the modal and non-modal uses of the German particles ja and doch can be provided by appealing to essentially non-representational properties of the theory of procedural meaning in Relevance Theory (RT). According to Wilson (2011), procedural indicators such as ja and doch function by raising the activation level of cognitive procedures, increasing the likelihood that audiences following the RT comprehension heuristic will use these procedures. Partially following proposals by König (1997) and Blass (2000, 2014), I would like to posit that ja and doch trigger a procedure to raise the epistemic strength of the proposition conveyed. Doch triggers a second procedure in addition, a constraint on context selection to the effect that the proposition conveyed must be processed in a context containing its negation. Since raising the activation level of cognitive procedures can be done in degrees, I argue that the basic difference between modal and non-modal uses of ja and doch is a reflection of differences in the degree of activation level rise: non-modal uses of ja and doch raise the activation of the manifestness procedure to a high degree, giving rise to effects such as emphasis or contrast, whereas modal uses raise this procedure’s activation level merely to some degree. As a result, modal ja and doch are uniquely suitable to mark propositions that do not need much evidential strengthening but would benefit from some such effect. This is most typically the case in mutually manifest assumptions that the communicator intends to use as premises in arguments. However, in some discourse contexts assumptions that are not mutually manifest may also fit this description. The prediction of this analysis is that the modal uses of ja and doch do not form a clearly delimited class; rather, borderline cases exist defying generalizations. I will present data from a qualitative corpus study that confirms these predictions.