This article concentrates on the view of the soul-body compound as presented by Didymus the Blind in his Commentary on Genesis, and also on some characteristic traits of Neoplatonic psychology which can be found in this text. A closer inspection of Commentary on Genesis reveals that what Didymus presents as the soul-body compound can be understood equally well as the compound of the superior intellectual soul conceived as a transcendent essence of the soul, and the ensouled body which is already a compound of the material body and the inferior irrational soul acting similarly to the body’s immanent form. Therefore, it seems plausible to surmise that it is this kind of solution to the soul-body problem which Henry Blumenthal called the marriage of dualism and hylomorphism, and which left its mark not only on later Platonic tradition, but presumably also on Didymus.

With beginnings probably dating back to the end of the Middle Palaeolithic period, shamanism seems to be predominantly connected with the use of hallucinogenic agents and the experiences resulting therefrom. For this reason it is worth asking how the shamanistic cultural complex could function over such a long period of time in adaptive terms if the substance of its practice and ideology included the processing of information based on hallucinations. In the light of contemporary nomenclature, the latter are understood as inadequate erroneous perceptions. Accepting such a concept of hallucinations, it is possible to explain the long currency of shamanism on the basis of evolutionary cognitive error management theory, costly signalling theory, or evolutionary psychiatric group-splitting theory. However, the dominant approach to the phenomenon of hallucination may be questioned, and it is conceivable that at least some of its contents constitute a mediated projection of subliminal percepts preceding an experience of hallucinations or co-occurring with them. Transformations of hallucinations preceding their entry to the field of consciousness may be governed by the rules of association described by Herbert Silberer’s theory of self-symbolisation and those brought to light by such researchers on subliminal perception as Otto Pötzl, Charles Fisher, or Norman Dixon. From this new perspective, a new definition of hallucination must be developed – a definition that will take the actual cognitive value of this phenomenon into consideration and be more adequate for providing a description of the full cognitive dynamics of the shamanistic complex.

In this paper, I examine the relationship between social cognition and religious cognition. Many cognitive theories of religion claim that these two forms are somehow related, but the details are usually left unexplored and insights from theories of social cognition are not taken on board. I discuss the three main (groups of) theories of social cognition, namely the theory-theory, the simulation theory and enactivist theories. Secondly, I explore how these theories can help to enrich a number of cognitive theories of religion. The theories I discuss are Stewart Guthrie’s anthropomorphism, Justin Barrett’s hyperactive agency detection device, Jesse Bering’s existential theory of mind, Pascal Boyer’s minds with full strategic access and Tanya Luhrmann’s porous theory of mind. Finally, I look at how enrichment with insights from social cognition can help to combine different existing theories of religious cognition into a unified framework.

Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) suggests the naturalness of religion. Religious beliefs are viewed as natural because they are intuitive and cognitively effortless. They are also inevitable and more obvious than atheism. In consequence, atheism is an unnatural phenomenon which requires special cultural and social support. However, this naturalness of religion hypothesis seems overestimated. Here we show that atheism is more natural than religion and religious beliefs in the cognitive sense because it meets the criteria appropriate for natural selection in the sense of ultimate explanation. Religion and religious beliefs require cultural inputs. Without cultural support, they seem unnatural.

The aim of the paper is to discuss the possible role of sensorimotor synchronisation in Modern Postural Yoga (MPY) āsana ritual. The hypothesis is that such synchronisation contributes to the subjective efficacy of MPY practice and facilitates the transmission of doctrinal concepts related to it.

Grounding the discussion in the enactive paradigm, the author describes the phenomenon of sensorimotor synchronisation and the mechanisms responsible for its emergence. The ritual character of MPY āsana practice is then accounted for, based on McCauley and Lawson’s theory of ritual competence. A discussion of forms of synchronisation occurring during āsana ritual follows, with a special focus on Iyengar Yoga. The author then suggests the possible influence of such synchronisation on the perceived effectiveness of the practice and on the acceptance of certain religio-philosophical notions.

This study examines how Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554), the Eighth Karma pa of the Karma Bka’ brgyud lineage, articulates and defends a key distinction between consciousness (rnam shes) and wisdom (ye shes). The first paper focuses on the author’s clarification of the distinction both as an accurate account of the nature and structure of human consciousness and as an indispensable principle of Buddhist soteriology. Arguing that human beings have two “concurrent but nonconvergent” modes of awareness, conditioned and unconditioned, Mi bskyod rdo rje urges the practitioner to discern amidst the adventitious flux of dichotomic thoughts an innate nondual mode of awareness that is regarded as the ground and goal of the Buddhist path. That the recognition of their difference is the key to realizing their underlying unity is central to the Karma pa’s response to the perennial Buddhist problem of reconciling two divergent Buddhist models of reality: [1] a differentiation model based on robust distinctions between conventional and ultimate truths or realities (saṃvṛtisatya versus paramārthasatya) and their associated modes of cognition and [2] an identification (yuganaddha) model of the two realities (satyadvaya : bden gnyis) which emphasizes their underlying unity. This article concludes with an annotated translation and critical edition of a short text by the Karma pa on the subject entitled “Two minds in one person? A Reply to the Queries of Bla ma Khams pa” (bla ma khams pa’i dris lan mi gcig sems gnyis).

Rec. Elżbieta Przybył-Sadowska, Triuno. Instytucje we wspólnocie Lasek 1911–1961, Kraków 2015, Wydawnictwo Libron – Filip Lohner, ss. 277

Recenzja: Małgorzata Oleszkiewicz-Peralba, Fierce Feminine Divinities of Eurasia and Latin America: Baba Yaga, Kālī, Pombagira and Santa Muerte, wydawnictwo Palgrave Macmillan 2015, s. 188