Turkey’s foreign policy behavior in a given period can be understood by examining the ruling party and domestic relations, the interests and composition of the governing coalition and prevalent international dynamics. The aim of the article is to show, that paradigmatic shifts in foreign policy and the drivers of Turkey’s quest for autonomous policy space can be understood as an outcome of interrelated transformations at global, regional and domestic levels. After 2010, Turkish foreign policy was marked by a period of „autonomization”, in which the ruling party decided to fill the geopolitical vacuum created in the region after the failure of negotiations with the European Union in the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the local diplomatic chessboard.

In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in Türkiye and continued political, economic and legal reforms aimed at bringing the state closer to the standards and values of the European Union. Finally, in 2005, Türkiye managed to open accession negotiations, but without any guarantee of future membership. Over time, however, the original promises of reform gave way to increasingly serious violations of freedom of expression and human rights. With the slowdown of democratic changes and the increase in the authoritarian actions of the Turkish authorities, a deadlock in relations with the EU has become noticeable.

Football is an important tool of reproduction of Turkish national identity. The possibility of using sports in the nation‑building process was recognized by the Kemalists. In their view, the role of sport was to modernise Turkish society along the lines of European countries. Nowadays Turkish football is an integral part of the European competition system. On the one hand, the Turkish national team has become a showcase for the country – an element of creating a positive image. On the other hand, it is an institution around which the creation and recreation of national identity takes place. The identity‑forming impact of Turkish football extends beyond Turkey’s borders. Turkish football is of interest to the diaspora, who use it to manifest ethnicity. Football is part of the fundamental dilemma of Turkish identity. In the context of the games, the „Europeanness” or „Easternness” of the Turks is considered.

After the Justice and Development Party (Turkish Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002, Turkish external activity was remodeled. Since then, the deepening of Turkish‑Palestinian relations could also be observed. This change is related to the new doctrine of foreign policy as well as to the conditions of Ankara’s regional policy, which competes with other players for the role of a regional power. The intensity of actions towards Palestine is also influenced by tensions between Turkey and Israel, which are characterized by varying intensity. Despite the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 2016, the Republic has not abandoned its pro‑Palestinian stance. The purpose of this text is to analyze Turkish‑Palestinian relations in terms of the main principles determining Ankara’s external activity. Due to subjective disproportionality, it should be noted that Turkey, from the position of a regional player, is taking steps towards Palestine, which has lots of limitations when it comes to political steps. The areas of activity betwen Turkey and Palestine concerns issues such as humanitarian aid, cultural heritage, identity and historical ties, and trade. In its relations with Palestine, Ankara uses institutional soft power tools, which may also serve Turkish strategic aims. In the first part of the article, the main principles and mechanisms of Ankara’s foreign policy was presented together with the strategy that determines the directions of external activity. These principles are the basis for discussing the nature of political relations between the two sides as well as for analyzing economic relations, humanitarian aid and cooperation in the field of culture.

This paper aims at analyzing the evolution of the electoral strategies of the main oppositional political parties to the Justice and Development Party, which has been in power since 2002. Assuming that due to the increasing autocratization of Turkey’s political system, the opposition’s options for action remain limited, and any eventual victory depends on the ability to form electoral coalitions, the paper will trace the political path taken by the AKP itself and the political parties opposed to it until the elections in 2023. At the same time, the question will be asked about the reasons for the defeat of the opposition parties in 2023. The basic assumption here is that the internally diversified National Alliance failed to construct a comprehensive programmatic offer capable of attracting voters of the ruling party on a massive scale and at the same time it failed to deliver a sufficiently satisfactory offer to its own electorate.

The presented publication analyses two interrelated trends in international relations on the example of Belarus. The first trend is the crisis of international legitimacy of the authoritarian regime that blatantly rigged the 2020 presidential election and violently suppressed mass peaceful protests against the lawlessness of the authorities. The second is the aspiration of the democratic forces, led by President‑elect Svetlana Tikhanouskaya, to become a fully‑fledged representative of the Belarusian people in the external arena.

While in the first months after the rigged elections the Belarusian issue was present in the centre of world politics, the attention paid to the situation in and around Belarus decreased as protest activity inside the country decreased. This became particularly evident after Russia launched a large‑scale aggression against Ukraine, which was morally and materially supported by the dictatorship in Minsk.

The reduced attention of international actors on the eastern European country did not stop the active activities of Democratic Belarus. The main support of the opposition forces became the Belarusian emigration, which after the events of 2020 took on a mass character. Its main centres are concentrated in Lithuania and Poland. The main opposition structures are also active there.

Over the past three years, specific formats for the international activities of Democratic Belarus have taken shape, including the creation of foreign representations of the Joint Transitional Cabinet in other countries, support for the activities of so‑called people’s embassies and the accreditation of foreign diplomatic representatives to the Cabinet. Among the obvious diplomatic successes of the Office of Svetlana Tikhanouskaya and the Transitional Cabinet is the creation of the following in September 2022. Council of Europe Contact Group on Cooperation with Belarusian Democratic Forces and Civil Society, and the subsequent adoption by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly of a resolution on support for Belarusians in exile.

The article examines changes in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan during the transition period of the transfer of power from N. Nazarbayev to K. Tokayev. When analyzing the changes, internal and external factors of foreign policy were identified, relations with priority partners such as: China, Russia, the USA and the countries of Central Asia were characterized; changes in the perception of their foreign policy through the analysis of conceptual documents. The most important internal factors were identified: covid-19, protests in 2022, changes in the institutional design of the political system. The following determining external factors were identified: Russia’s war in Ukraine, sanctions against Kazakhstan’s allies (Russia and Belarus), competition between big actors. In conclusion, conclusions were drawn that the role of China in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan is playing an increasingly stabilizing role, in contrast to Russia and the United States, whose rivalry represents a risk factor.

This study was conducted between October 2022 and January 2023, aiming to elucidate and highlight changes in the political perceptions, concerns, assessments, and aspirations of Armenia’s youth. The main objectives of the study were to discover the concerns of Armenia’s youth regarding the expansion of the war in Ukraine, to find out the potential effects of the Russian‑Ukrainian conflict and the war in Ukraine on the region of South Caucasus, and on Armenia’s security, and to assess the changes that the war has brought about in the lives of Armenia’s youth and society. Armenia’s youth holds two distinct perspectives on the Russian‑Ukrainian conflict. The first group perceives the conflict primarily as a geographical issue, representing another historical phase of global division and a struggle for dominance among superpowers and alliances. This viewpoint considers certain post‑Soviet countries, including Ukraine and Armenia, and some Arab nations like Syria, to be undergoing a modern geographic transformation. In this context, the 2020 Karabakh War has also been viewed. Russia, the West (NATO, EU, USA), and Turkey compete to exert influence over these countries. From this standpoint, the war in Ukraine is viewed as a battleground, showcasing the broader Russia‑West conflict. Conversely, the second group attributes the Russian‑Ukrainian conflict and war to the personal qualities, aspirations, approaches, and issues of the leaders of Russia and Ukraine.

Despite a possible commonality of interests in several spheres (counter‑terrorism, cyber‑security, maritime piracy, confidence‑building and security issues), there are many indications that there will be no fundamental rapprochement between China and the North Atlantic Alliance in the near future. Potential cooperation is blocked mainly by the politics of China, which sees NATO as a tool for the expansion of the United States and its hegemony both in the transatlantic region and beyond. Despite the efforts of several NATO members to initiate dialogue and even cooperation with China in the area of declared common interests (the operation in Afghanistan), these efforts ultimately failed, and since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine the distance between the potential partners has widened even further. In the near term, the state of relations between China and NATO will be mainly a product of the attitude of the United States toward China, and these have entered a phase of fierce rivalry since the Trump era, as well as China’s expressed views on the US’ instrumental use of the North Atlantic Pact to achieve its own goals in security policy.

The dynamically changing international situation requires international relations actors to be ready to constantly change and adapt their strategies. This article aims to look at the relationship of the People’s Republic of China with the North Atlantic Alliance, taking into account the implications of a full‑scale Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022. NATO is increasingly actively pursuing its Strategic Concept, with the primary focus now on ensuring the security of allies within the treaty area. One of the different – but extremely important – challenges for the Alliance is the PRC, which is systematically pursuing its policy objectives, building its international position, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the Russian‑Ukrainian conflict. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether NATO’s response to current challenges and its capacity for an Allied response can affect the security strategies of both NATO and the PRC. The first part of the paper examines the theoretical approaches of Chinese scholars to the policy of non‑alignment (nonalignment). This will be followed by an analysis of the approach of NATO member states to the challenge posed by the PRC, as well as the significance of the existence and functioning of the alliance from Beijing’s point of view. Before pointing out conclusions, the author will highlight the impact of Russia‑PRC relations in the face of the ongoing war, as well as confront already existing ideas about potential cooperation or coexistence between NATO and the PRC in the region. It will conclude with conclusions on NATO’s actions and policy evolution, along with general recommendations, taking into account the most important challenges.

This article describes the possible course of the battle of Taiwan. The paper presents the Chinese policy towards Taiwan, conclusions drawn from the war games conducted by the Pentagon, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and civilian think tanks, the military potential of both sides, and the battle scenario. During the actual research, studies and articles published in Forbes, Business Insider, Taiwan News, Lowy Institute, War on the Rocks, NBC News, China Power, Military Times, Reuters, and Daily Guardian, along with reports of think tanks such as the Atlantic Council and RAND, reports of the US Congress, and reports of Military Ballance were used. The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, a book written by Ian Easton, turned out to be a particularly useful source of knowledge. According to the author of this article, a „forceful solution” for the Taiwanese issue by Beijing is possible in the future and the Western world should seriously analyze its possible course. This is evidenced by numerous statements of Chinese politicians, the desire to change the current global balance of power, the continuous growth of China’s economic power, the expansion of the PLA’s power projection capabilities in terms of an invasion of the „rogue province”, and regular war games and violations of the Taiwanese air defense identification zone. If there was a battle of Taiwan, from the point of view of the People’s Republic of China, it would be crucial to isolate the island, to quickly eliminate the enemy’s anti‑aircraft and anti‑missile defenses by means of missile and cyberattacks, to paralyze the command system, to gain air superiority, and then to land on the beaches from which operations would be then carried out inland. From the point of view of the Taiwan Armed Forces, the most important thing would be to survive the first days of massive air and missile attacks, to disperse their forces, and then to attack the enemy by exploring its weaknesses, i.e., shooting down selected planes and helicopters, sinking ships in the Taiwan Strait, interrupting supply lines, and then inflicting as much damage as possible during the ground combat.

The People’s Republic of China’s political and military involvement in East Asia has increased in recent years, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula have affected China’s security. This article examines China’s security strategy in the region with a focus on the Korean Peninsula. It focuses on contemporary threats to China’s national security that may come from the Korean Peninsula. It aims to analyze three major issues that threaten Chinese security: North Korea’s nuclear program, the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula, and tensions in inter‑Korean relations. All of these threats are intertwined and implicate each other.

There are many indications that China’s unquestionable successes in expanding its own reserve of economic and military power have simultaneously awakened the national pride and ambitions of the Chinese people. This, however, has led to an awareness of China’s limited ability to shape the international environment and to pursue its own interests in the international arena. As a result, the Chinese have adopted a revisionist policy with the aim of finally undermining the existing global order – after all, the ultimate goal is to achieve the position of hegemon (with all the benefits and responsibilities that implies). It should be noted, however, that a change of hegemon can only occur through a hegemonic war – which will result in the emergence of a new prestige hierarchy with a pretender as the new world leader. To prepare for a hegemonic clash, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is constantly expanding its economic and military influence (both internally and externally). Above all, China is trying to attract other dissatisfied states into its own coalition, forming the so‑called „revisionist coalition”. To do so, the Chinese offer other countries potentially lucrative trade deals, extensive investment, low- or no‑interest loans and development assistance. This paper intends to popularize the author’s perspective on hegemonic change within international relations – termed „hegemonic realism” as it best reflects the assumptions of the proposed theory. These theoretical assumptions and the author’s model of hegemonic change will be used in the rest of the article to analyze the dynamics of the relations between selected revisionist states and China as a contender for global hegemony. The author’s thesis is that states join the revisionist coalition in order to increase their own military and economic power. The case study will focus on China’s relations with Russia, Pakistan and Iran – all of which are seen by the author as key allies of the PRC on the Asian continent – due to their resources of power and revisionist policies. The study used secondary research sources, including academic publications and journalistic articles in Polish and English. Three methods were used in the research process: comparative analysis, historical‑critical method and desk research method.

The article is devoted to the issue of the classical Chinese view of diplomacy. Their consequence was the creation of the tributary system. The tributary system was developed during the Ming dynasty. The legacy of the tributary system influences China’s foreign policy today.

The article is divided into two parts. In the first part, the author discusses the functioning of the tribute system. It describes the stages of its formation and the imperial institutions responsible for the empire’s foreign policy. In the second part, the author analyzes the influence of old traditions on the foreign policy of the PRC after 1978. He describes the issue of Sinocentrism that still influences the Chinese view of the world. The author described China’s influence in selected Asian countries. It also talks about the most important Chinese initiatives in the international arena.

Contemporary China is perceived as a country that has effectively remodeled its economic system. It may seem that optimized control mechanisms over the economy effectively eliminate any possibility of abuse, including those of a financial nature. Nevertheless, the introduced facilitations for foreign capital transfers also resulted in an increase in the scale of money laundering, defined as the illegal process of making large amounts of money generated by criminal activity appear to have come from a legitimate source. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has made intensive efforts to implement financial crime prevention mechanisms and has tried to introduce tools functioning in this area in high developed countries. The article attempts to analyze the anti‑money laundering policy applied in the People’s Republic of China. The genesis, assumptions and goals of the reforms are presented. There is also an assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the implemented solutions.

This article explores the issue of demographic policy in People’s Republic of China in the context of social security. The article attempts to assess the impact of the demographic problems of the PRC on the social security of its citizens. The analysis is intended to answer the questions: whether and how reforms related to China’s demographic policies have affected the level of social security in the country.

In recent years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has pursued an increasingly active climate and energy policy at both the national and international level. The increased interest in environmental issues is reflected in the declarations that have been made and the investments that have been undertaken. The Chinese government is aware that the fight against climate change is crucial to ensure the security and well‑being of society. In this article, the author will present the measures taken by the PRC and indicate their impact on shaping security in the country.

Due to the largest number of Orthodox parishes in Ukraine compared to the post‑Soviet countries, Russia strives to maintain its influence there by all means through the functioning of the UOC MP, and religious conflicts have become an inseparable element of Ukrainian reality. There is a long‑term conflict between the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the supporters of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. Due to the propaganda of hatred against the UOC PK, and later KPU, parishioners of the UOC PM name people who attend masses in KPU dissenters and „strays”, and the church itself – non‑canonical, even after obtaining the tomos in 2019. On the other hand, supporters of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine nominate the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as an instrument of Russia’s propaganda policy. The Russo‑Ukrainian war reopened discussions about the status of the UOC PM in Ukraine.

The aim of the article is to expand knowledge about regional minorities in the Russian Federation. The subject of interest will be the characteristics of Cossacks, Pomors and Siberians as a potential threat to state security. The work will discuss models of taming these minorities, which should be understood as forcing them to obey, a type of active ethnic policy, as a result of which the sense of distinctiveness is limited to the cultural dimension, omitting the socio‑political aspect. Models of taming through division, taming through securitization and taming through identity disruption have been distinguished.

Terrorist organizations based on the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism are increasingly involved in various criminal activities in order to generate income for their own functioning and continuation of terrorist activity. These include: money laundering, human trafficking, drug and arms smuggling, cybercrime, illegal tax systems, extortion, robbery, trade in cultural monuments etc. Al‑Qaeda and the Islamic State are the most prominent examples of Islamist terrorist groups with extremely extensive and diverse financial systems. The aim of the article is to analyze the process of financing fundamentalist terrorist organizations of Al‑Qaeda and the Islamic State from the sources coming from organized crime. The study also attempts to describe and analyze financing of terrorist activities, its classification, as well as sources of financing of Al‑Qaeda and ISIS, with particular emphasis on criminal proceeds and their comparison in terms of similarities and differences.