The term ‘asymmetric threats’ functions, although under slightly different meanings, in contemporary strategic, international and political studies, and defines some phenomena which are characteristic of the world in the 21st century. Anyone who wants to find contemporary phenomena in previous epochs has to be aware of a great risk. Using simple analogies is even more dangerous, because it is easy to compare the incomparable. Conscious of the danger, the author decided to take up the topic. The longer he investigated, the more convinced he was that such a contemporary phenomenon as ‘asymmetric threats’ could be – obviously mutatis mutandis – not only applicable to the reality of the 5th-century Western Roman Empire, but also recognized as one of the factors of the collapse of the state. In the presented paper, he demonstrates his argumentation and proposes an answer to the question if one can observe ‘asymmetric threats’ in Late Antiquity and if so, which of them were the most dangerous for the state, how they influenced the functioning of the Empire and how Romans tried to confront them.

The series of wars against Moors in North Africa, which took place after capturing these pro­vinces by Justinian’s army in AD 533, is sometimes compared by historians to modern asymmetric conflicts. The present paper is an attempt at a closer look at both the military aspect of the mentioned conflict and its political determinants, in order to answer the question of whether present-day asymmetric conflicts can in fact be regarded as a an accurate key for its description. The answer is not unambiguous. On the one hand, what we find here is asymmetry on many levels, exerting heavy influence on the character of this particular war. On the other hand, the conflict can be seen as part of a centuries-long history of complex interaction between the Roman state and ‘Moorish’ political organisms in the region, thus it is impossible here to speak of any ‘strategic surprise’ characteristic of modern conflicts of this type. Neither of the parties had in mind to destroy the opponent or to dislodge it from the disputed area; in fact, the Moorish Wars with Rome could rather be regarded as specific, rather violent negotiations of terms and conditions for a peaceful coexistence of two very different political organisms.
 

This article deals with the significance of asymmetric warfare in the mountainous terrain during the Byzantine-Arab Wars in the 10th century. De velitatione bellica (the primary source) remains a unique kind of theoretical work which stems from the author’s own experience in minor engagements with enemy raids. The tactics described in the treatise are most likely the result of decades of evolution in frontier warfare on the mountainous Byzantine-Arab border. As such, they are an invaluable testament to the medieval understanding of asymmetric warfare. Thanks to the author of the treatise we know how the Romans/Byzantines repelled enemy invasions and halted the advance of large forces into their own territory. This makes De velitatione bellica a valuable resource, useful for the understanding of the 10th-century conflict between the Byzantine Empire and the Hamdanids.

Although the Eighty Years’ War has been a much-researched topic in Western European historiography, in Poland it still remains on the margin of interest of modern historians. In the present article, the initial stage of the Dutch Revolt against Spain, until the year 1574, was presented as an asymmetric conflict from the perspective of environmental history. As a result of the defeat of William of Orange’s regular army during the campaign of 1568, the main burden of the fighting was borne by the ‘watergeuzen,’ i.e. the captains and crews of frequently pirate ships equipped with letters of marque. Their actions kept the fire of revolt burning, and the capture of the port of Den Briel offered a sign for starting a new march into Brabant. The development of the events in the Netherlands and the military situation were influenced by climatic changes. The Little Ice Age left its mark on both the reasons for and particular events of the uprising. Cold winters or floods accompanying storms and thaws often determined the fate of cities and of the whole conflict.
 

This article presents the offensive of the Dutch West India Company conducted in Brazil in 1634–1636. The conquest by Sigismund von Schkoppe and Krzysztof Arciszewski of one of the biggest cities of the New World – Paraíba and the fortress Arraial Velho do Bom Jesus, as well as the battle carried on 17th and 18th January 1636 were described. The Dutch successes during the war were mostly the result of military reforms carried out by Krzysztof Arciszewski in cooperation with Schkoppe. The Colonel mainly adjusted the organization of the army to the unusual terrain which was Brazil. At first, huge areas were controlled by a small army of several thousand. For this reason, and because of the landform, he reduced the number of companies and introduced military units of 40 or 50 people. He also gave up pikemen formations and increased the number of musketeers instead. Furthemore, the Colonel tried to unite actions of the navy and infantry.

An analysis of military operations conducted by Tatar hordes in the 16th and 17th centuries reveals that they were basically shaped by asymmetric warfare. Their characteristic features were the secrecy of actions until the moment of attack, the use of instruments of information warfare and espionage, the total character of military operations directed against the civilians, their material resources and economic infrastructure involving terrorist tactics and psychological methods of influence aimed at intimidating assaulted communities. The actions of Tatar hordes basically focused on non-military environment with the use of not only classic military tools but also combinations of political and economic means in the form of various economical and demographic pressures. Conducting asymmetric military actions was, for the Giray dynasty, one of the most important tools for the successful achievement of their political goals as well as for supporting the economy of the Crimean Khanate through a stable transfers of slaves and supply of stolen material goods.   
 

The ‘war of harassment,’ or tactics used by Stefan Czarniecki in the campaigns against the Swedes during the Second Northern War 1655–1660, was based on the high mobility of the Polish cavalry and the element of surprise. Such actions brought very good results, and they began to be copied by the Swedish side. This is evidenced by the reports of cavalry raids by the troops under Rutger von Ascheberg. Such experiences laid the foundations for the aggressive tactics of the Swedish army in the second half of the 17th early 18th century.

The Swedish complex of the army of the Kingom of Poland resulting from the lack of experience in commanding troops with different kinds of weapon, as well as the lack of understanding of the changes in the battlefield at the beginning of the 18th century were the reasons why Polish cavalry officers, coming across a Swedish division, rarely decided to take up open battle. It was then when the basic action of the Polish cavalry became the hit-and-run attacks, based on the mobility of the troops and element of surprise. Such a situation had a place during the Tarnogród Confederation, when the enemy were the Saxon forces. As long as the hit-and-run tactics were applied, the confederates were successful, but whenever they decided to fight in the open field, they suffered defeat.

The Boer War seems to be a classic example of an asymmetric conflict, mainly because of the difference in the potential of the two sides. It is worth considering, however, if it can really be classified as such. If we thoroughly analyze the events and development of the conflict, especially its first stage, it will turn out that it is hard to speak of an asymmetric conflict in this case. The Boer War adopted characteristics of an asymmetric conflict with time, with its peak in the autumn of 1900, when the Boers finally started using typical guerilla tactics.

The term ‘asymmetric conflict’ is mainly used with reference to modern times to describe a conflict of two enemies whose resources differ significantly. However, it seems justifiable to use this term also to refer to confrontations which took place in the past. That is why an analysis was made of the Third Anglo-Afghan war as an example of an asymmetric conflict. At first sight it would seem that what we have here is a typical clash between a weaker opponent and a much more
powerful one. However, a more in-depth analysis of the characteristics of this conflict in the context of asymmetry questions the simplified assertion that the Third Anglo-Afghan War was this kind of confrontation.
 

The Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949 is treated as a typical example of an asymmetric war. The peasant guerilla, led by the Communists, weakly armed but fuelled by the hope for the division of landowners’ lands, was to defeat the regular army of Kuomintang (KMT), fully armed by the USA. The Nationalists were to be constantly supported by Washington. The Communists were to act alone. However, in light of the sources this image cannot be maintained. In fact, the war in China was a conventional conflict between two armies of comparable size. Both of them were formed as a result of compulsory draft. Both had been equipped with the help of an outside ally. However, the support of the USA for the KMT was all the time limited, and in the decisive period of 1946–1947 Washington put an embargo on the sale of weapons to China. It hit the KMT only, as the Communists were all the time supplied by Moscow, mainly from the Japanese stockpiles won in Manchuria. The agrarian question influenced the conflict in a negligible way, whereas the Communist secret service deeply penetrated the enemy’s command. It is not true that soldiers and officers of the KMT (apart from the mentioned agents) en masse went over to the Communist side. The fate of China was decided not by the political sympathies of the citizens, but by the results of battles.