Ramses II, in the king’s fifth regnal year, invaded Hittite territory intending to take the city of Kadesh on the Orontes. The Hittite king Muwatallis II, prepared to stop him with a large army, including allied contingents. Ramses’ army marched from Egypt and in one month had gathered perhaps as many as 20 000 men, composed of four divisions of 5000. Each of the divisions consisted of 500 chariots and infantry; they were named after the gods: Amon, Re, Ptah, Seth. King Muwatallis’ army consisted of 8000 to 37 000 men. The Hittite chariots numbered around 3500 machines in a force of about 10 000 men. Each of the 2500 Egyptian chariots were served by a crew of two and were a firing platform for archers; they were light and flexible. The Hittite chariots were heavier, crewed by three (a driver, soldier and shield-bearer) and presumably designed for shock attack. The Hittite king cunningly hid his army behind the mound on which the city of Kadesh was built. Assuming that the enemy had withdrawn, Ramses hurried towards Kadesh and set up camp. The 2500 Muwatallis’ chariots charged out from hiding, scattering two Egyptian divisions. Ramses led his bodyguard and chariots in a desperate charge (like the pounce of a falcon) in an attempt to halt the Hittites, who looted the Egyptian camp before being driven out by fresh Egyptian troops (Nearinu, Ptah division). Ramses had won the battle but lost the war.
 

Siege ladders which have been known from time immemorial, constituted one of the important siege engines. Relatively primitive and easy to construct and transport, they could be used instantly in the course of conquering the entrenched positions. The aim of the article is to present issues associated with the use of ladders as means of conquering the entrenched positions in the context of ancient military techniques and soldiers’ morale. In the narration, the author has chiefly made use of sources which describe the military art in the period from the 4th century BC to the 1st century A.D.; beside the historiographical accounts, an important group of sources is made up of military treatises which offer a certain insight into the military art and the issue of broadly-understood fighting spirit of the soldiers. On the basis of the gathered material, the author tries to outline the challenges which had faced the armies that made use of siege ladders and the possible benefits which could have been expected from their use.
 

The contemporary research on the psychology of the battle field should take into consideration the fact that the ancients did not approach the phenomena relating to the sphere of psychology thoughtlessly and unreflectively, yet they looked upon them in a slightly different manner than the contemporary scholars. It was already Plato who defined the difference between the unequivocally positive courage resulting from the decision of the mind, and audacity being the fruit of extra-rational or non-rational conditionings.  The latter appraised positively or else in an ambivalent way in military circles, is regarded as one of the most strongly criticized faults in the political discourse. This ambivalence is well visible in the work of Ammianus Marcellinus which having been written at the close of the ancient era, may be perceived as the epitome of the ancient viewpoint also as regards this issue. An analysis of the various uses of the term audacia with reference to soldierly bravado reveals both the distinction between this attitude and real fortitude (fortitude), as well as its ambivalent appraisal. It seems that the reason of such an ambivalent appraisal may be the ancient man’s fear of those aspects of the human psyche which elude the control of the mind.  
 

Since the very beginning of human civilization, warfare has always been associated with the history of mankind. As a consequence of wars, some empires were created and others disappeared. The decisions of great generals, the grand strategies of the armies and the spectacular battles have been of interest to historians ever since the beginning of historiography. The longer the time-interval from the described situations the more wars tended to be regarded exclusively as phenomena in macro-scale, where the individual human being seemed to be completely insignificant and deprived of any meaning in comparison with the mass of soldiers. In the course of the last few decades one can observe a change in that tendency. Scholars are more and more often interested in individuals and this trend is visible even in such a distant epoch as antiquity. Some detailed analyses have revealed that although so many years have passed, individuals on the battlefield aren’t completely anonymous, and our sources let us formulate some opinions about the behavior of individuals during battle. Focusing on the individual soldier may allow us to take a closer look at an ancient battle, see the reality through his eyes and ultimately perceive things we have never been aware of.
 

The multiethnic army of the Late Roman Empire generated a huge number of disciplinary problems. Reading the work of Vegetius we hear about serious negligence in the overall military discipline. Other sources inform us repeatedly about mutinies, desertions and self-mutilations of the soldiers who wanted to avoid being incorporated into the army. Very often the mentality of barbarians (e.g. the Huns) in the service of the Roman Army was completely contradictory to the requirements of the Roman law and military customs. A huge role in keeping discipline in army ranks was played by a commander. He was expected to look after his soldiers, build a manly spirit in the detachment, inspire his people by examples of personal courage and – what was truly no less important – have a good fortune on the battlefield. As an impact factor exerting influence on the soldiers, they tried to use not only the harsh punishments, but also some psychological methods e.g. if the signs from the gods were auspicious, they tried to spread the news as far and wide as possible; they took care of the sick and wounded; they supervised the supply of goods and an equitable sharing of the spoils. However whenever they considered it useful, they also resorted to blackmail, taking soldiers’ families hostage; they also threatened that the commander would resign or cut off the only way of escape without any hesitation. Understanding the psychological effects of such actions constitutes a real research challenge.

The purpose of the piece is to present an interdisciplinary analysis of the Early-Slavic military, particularly in the context of battlefield psychology. First, the text studies the behavior of the Slavs before, during and after military engagements, as presented by Early Byzantine authors (particularly the author of Strategikon). Next, the stratagems and schemes employed by Slavs are compared against the contemporary findings in the area of battlefield psychology and social psychology. The results clearly indicate that Slavic warriors were very much aware of their own strengths and weaknesses and could use them to their advantage. The „psychological warfare” practiced by the Slavs was developed by observing human nature and instinctively employing mechanisms described by contemporary science.
 

What seems to be especially interesting to historians undertaking research into the issue of the “culture of fear” in the 19th century is a confrontation of “traditional” fear associated with forces of nature with “civilization-based fear”, caused by a rapid development of industrial culture and a demographic revolution. Yet although the 19th c. literature devoted to the theory of fear seems to be quite prolific and varied, the topic of battlefield fear, or else fear experienced by soldiers, seems to be relatively unexplored. The image of an undaunted fearless soldier, which had been shaped by European Romanticism up until the end of the 19th c. had not been subjected to a fundamental verification.  It was only the studies carried out by psychologists at the turn of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th c., and especially the experiences of the First World War that had forced researchers to modify their views with regard to soldierly fear. The protracted trench war had caused reactions among soldiers which had by far surpassed the schematic conceptions of emotions experienced on the battlefield, inducing scholars to undertake more complex research devoted to the issue of soldierly fear.  
 

In this article I intend to focus on the presentation of how desertion was perceived in those times, and in particular, to trace the policies of the Confederacy relating to the growing number of desertions. During the Civil War in America, a soldier who walked away from his own unit without permission and intention to return was regarded as a deserter. On the other hand, the status of soldiers was enjoyed by all officers and soldiers who received a soldier’s pay or were duly enlisted in the service of the Confederate States. From the middle of 1862, efforts were made to solve the problem of desertion from the Confederate Army. Either amnesties were introduced or deserters were threatened with possible use of severe penalties. The policy on desertion was influenced to the greatest extent by: the CSA President Jefferson Davis, General Robert E. Lee, Secretary of War James A. Seddon and the Head of the Conscription Bureau, Brigadier General John S. Preston.
The southern authorities’ policy with respect to the problem of desertion was chaotic and inefficient. According to various estimates, during the war, at least one fourth of all Confederate soldiers deserted from the army.
 

One of the key factors during any war is the morale and discipline of the troops. Those two issues are closely interconnected. The same applies to the Anglo-Boer War. The case of the Boer forces, which were composed of irregular militiamen, is especially interesting. The latter did not know the European-style discipline. This was a problem during the regular phase of the war, but paradoxically it was less of a problem in the guerilla phase of war. In fact the high morale was an effect of self imposed discipline, which in turn was an effect of the high morale. The present text constitutes an endeavor to study the correlation between morale and discipline in Boer commandos; its goal is also to shed light on the issue of how the two had influenced one another.
 

Fear and panic were with soldiers on the battlefield from most ancient times. Alarming symptoms, leading to a collapse of morale, discipline and frequent desertions were often observed after battles. Even though already in the sixteenth century, there was a separate term which defined the state of fatigue and apathy among soldiers – namely Heimweh, which later gave way to Schweizer Heimweh, it is only the 19th century which will bring the first change in the treatment of soldiers suffering from stress. Nevertheless it took subsequent decades and the nightmare of World War I to subject the problem to proper medical research. The concept of shell shock or battle fatigue later became more and more precisely defined as psycho-somatic disorders. Slowly, specialized programs were created both at the level of diagnosis and therapy respectively – for example the works of the Yerkes Committee, those of William HR Rivers, Charles S. Myers or Frederick W. Mott. In our contemporary times, we are more and more precise in talking about the factors causing distressing symptoms among soldiers and veterans. We are seeking for the best ways to prevent and neutralize the effects of stress attaining as a result an increasingly evaluated interdisciplinary research studies which involve specialized teams of psychiatrists and psychologists.
 

The modern world is not a peaceful planet. In many places on earth there are still long-term ongoing military conflicts, exposing the huge crowds of soldiers and civilians to the horrors of modern warfare. Survivors retain the effects of these traumatic events in their minds for a long time. The world is not free from many natural disasters that despite impressive growth techniques are still unavoidable and unpredictable. People who have experienced an extremely traumatic event – participants of wars, survivors of concentration camps, prisoners of war, experiencing life-threatening  symptoms, victims of assault, rape, domestic violence, victims of traffic accidents, as well as victims of natural disasters (earthquakes, fires) for many years, sometimes till the end of their lives experience severe consequences of these traumatic events. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) involves a group of symptoms such as intrusive reminders of trauma, symptoms of depression and anxiety, loss of initiative, lack of perspective on life, social withdrawal, symptoms of uncontrolled arousal. In such groups, more likely than in those without PTSD, one is likely to come across somatic disorders, such as coronary heart disease, hypertension, glucose and lipid abnormalities, substance abuse.

The article discusses the problems associated with combat stress in the context of counter-insurgency US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The author analyzes how this phenomenon was defined historically as well as during the above-mentioned conflict; he tries to define how it could have shaped the behavior of the soldier on the battlefield, what precautions were undertaken to counteract it and what were the consequences of long-term stress on the soldiers.  The author of the article mentions the main factors which generated combat stress and presents the role of leaders in stress management.  Following the theoretical part of the article, the author shows the environment of combat stress on an example of a concrete combat situation and an effective reaction and conduct of the leader-commander in this situation.  American field manuals and literature relating to military medicine – psychiatry, as well as materials published by the US military and government institutions, have been used as source materials for the above publication.
 

Relying on his own experience, the author presents various elements and factors which exert an influence on the activity of a soldier in the course of a foreign mission. He tries to answer the question whether it is possible to fight with stress which accompanies one during the entire period of one’s stay on a mission. He also draws attention to a wide spectrum of stress causing factors and the  possibilities of opposing them by an individual soldier.