This research paper discusses the evolution of the attitude of Stefan Bathory (1576–1586), king of Poland, towards the University of Krakow. Being aware of the university’s obsolete structures and its functioning, the king planned to create an elite royal college, in which foreign scholars, especially Italians, were to provide education. Due to the failure of his plan, Batory changed his attitude towards the University, and became its important patron and benefactor. At the same time, however, he also contributed to the establishment of the Jesuit Vilnius University (1578/1579). The author analyses the monarch’s relations with the Krakow Alma Mater over ten years of his reign, trying to explain the circumstances and motives of his conduct towards Krakow’s university elites.

In 1939–1948, an important center of Polish pro-independence emigration emerged in Tel Aviv. In January 1945 2,291 Polish civilian war refugees resided there (6,718 in all of the Holy Land). Palestine was at the time a Mandatory Territory of the League of Nations, governed by Great Britain.
The refugees created a community which differed from the local one. It had clear distinguishing features – it included a large percentage of ill and lonely persons who required care; it had a high rate of feminization, an atypical social and occupational structure (a high percentage of intelligentsia and freelance professions), and a varied ethnic and religious composition. The refugees included many members of pre-war elites, people of culture and politicians.
The majority of the Poles declared their attachment to national values. However, this was also accompanied by negative phenomena – political divisions and internal feuds. The unlikelihood of returning home in the near future led to frustration. In some people, war experiences weakened ethical and moral standards; some came into conflict with the law.
The lot of the Poles from Tel Aviv showed all problems of pro-independence emigration: (1) an interest in politics pervaded their lives; (2) material concerns caused increasing worry; (3) awareness of having no say in changing the political situation in the homeland.

The article presents the brilliant military career of Wehrmacht officer Reinhard Gehlen, who led the intelligence of the German land forces on the eastern front from 1942 to 1945. He developed this intelligence and became Germany’s best expert in the Soviet Army, which made it easier for him to establish close cooperation with the CIA after the war and become head of West German Intelligence (BND ). During the war, General Gehlen’s intelligence was, among other things, involved in the development of the Polish resistance movement. For this reason, when in the last weeks of the war, the German leadership considered the creation of a major Nazi resistance movement after the Third Reich’s capitulation, Gehlen presented an extensive one in April 1945, The final report under the title Militärische und nachrichtendienstliche Kräfte im Gesamtrahmen der Polnischen Widerstandsbewegung [Military and Intelligence Forces within the overall framework of the Polish Resistance], because he considered the Polish underground to be the best resistance movement in Europe. The report contains, among others, positive opinions about the will to survive and the resistance of the Polish society, high professional evaluations of the Polish underground army and even words of admiration for the activities of Polish military intelligence

The article concerns the conflict between Tito and Stalin in 1948. The aim of the article is to define how the Belgian diplomacy perceived the split between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and, above all, how it diagnosed its causes and effects. Moreover, the analysis of Belgian diplomatic documents shows the great importance that Western countries attached to the first major breach in the Eastern bloc.

The article discusses the issues of transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe. The analysis took many factors into account: geographical, historical, political, political, social and economic. Internal and external premises decided about the course of political and political changes initiated at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. Classical political theories about the Transition to democracy were included. A research hypothesis was put forward that the traditions of democratic political institutions have a positive impact on the pace and extent of consolidation of the democratic system.

Contrary to the arrangements from Potsdam, the remilitarization of both German states began as early as 1950. In 1956 the East German army was officially created under the name of the National People’s Army. The NVA was organized into four branches: Ground Forces (Landesstreitkräfte), Navy (Volksmarine), Air Force (Luftstreitkräfte) and Border Troops (Grenztruppen). In the years 1956–1990 they were the third largest (after the Soviet and Polish army) armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. As in other armies of the Eastern Bloc, the NVA was subject to strict party control. However, when the Berlin Wall was overthrown, this army remained a passive observer of events. After the reunification of Germany, only a few of its officers and soldiers were taken over by the Bundeswehr.

The paper concerns the position of Polish MPs and senators on shaping the principles of German-Polish cooperation in a situation in which Poland regains full sovereignty in foreign policy. The position of Polish deputies was analysed on the basis of stenographic reports from plenary sessions of the Sejm and Senate concerning the preparation and ratification of treaties with Germany on confirming the border and on good neighbourhood. In particular, it was a question of examining whether MPs and senators supported the concept of a G erman-Polish community of interest, which was defined and presented in the Sejm by Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. During the ratification debate, supporters of both treaties pointed out that they enabled Poland to leave the Eastern Bloc, making Poland independent of the support of the USSR for the western border. They also provided an opportunity for German support on Poland’s way to the European Communities. MPs and senators understood that it was possible to build a G erman-Polish community of interest on the basis of supporting and expanding the integration process and thus completely change Poland’s geopolitical situation. This did not mean that the solutions adopted in the treaty on good neighbourhood, especially with regard to compensation, the status of Poles in Germany and the German minority in Poland, were fully accepted.

The Polish constitutional drafts from the 1990s were one of the source texts of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Some of them tried very hard to refer to the solutions of the Polish Constitution of 1921. The article carried out an analysis to what extent the individual constitutional drafts referred to the solutions of the 1921 Constitution. The analysis of constitutional drafts and their similarities to the solutions of the 1921 Constitution were carried out on the basis of comparisons regarding, among others, the parliament, the president of Republic of Poland and legislative initiative.

The fall of the deeply rooted communism in the countries of the Eastern Bloc in the 1980s has differed according to the level of achieved rights and freedoms, especially in Poland, as it was finalized with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The changes announced with the foundation of “Solidarity” – the first independent syndicate – which spread to the factories and enterprises across Poland beginning in the Lenin Shipyard. The staunch national pride and freedoms, empowered with the strength of the Catholic Church effectively eliminated the weak Soviet-imposed communism. The foundation of the first independent and free Polish syndicate in the strong Soviet Bloc catalyzed the initiation of abrupt and serious reforms in the countries of the Eastern Bloc. The fall of the Berlin Wall intensified the initiated processes of reintegration and independence from external political torture and poverty. The initiated processes intensified amplified changes in SFR Yugoslavia even though the breakup of this country in the early 1990s cost more than its establishment.

The article focuses on the ways of treating the monumental memory of the past in the states that were established after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. These examples, which are not exhaustive, show that the process of transformation in the symbolic sphere does not create a uniform image in all countries. It oscillates between the destruction of the monuments of the past period in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the different intensity of the events of the tragic war of the last decade of the 20th century. Breaking such a description, Serbia protects the monuments of the Yugoslavian era, while at the same time recalling the memory of the Serbian liberation struggle in the anti-Turkish uprising of 1804. The protection of the monuments of the NOB (struggle for national liberation) period in Montenegro not only proves the connection with the federal Yugoslavia, but also reflects a kind of Yugonostalgia. In turn, the monuments of this period on Macedonian territory, preserved in various states, gave way to a “flood of monuments” referring to the ancient and medieval history of this land. The changes in the monumental sphere in all countries, however, prove the willingness to justify the ideological existence of independent state entities embedded in the native tradition confirming their sovereignty.

In 2019, the thirtieth anniversary of the famous speech of Slobodan Milošević delivered on the day of St. Vitus (Vidovdan) on June 28, 1989, on 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, was marked. This speech was considered ominous and as an announcement of a future bloody war by many citizens of Yugoslavia and, above all, Albanians and Croats. The author of the article undertook to analyze this speech in terms of phraseology.

The article addresses the complex relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the neighboring countries formed after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. Several reasons behind said difficulties are discussed, namely: the dispute between Serbia and Macedonia concerning Belgrade’s lack of recognition of the Autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox church, the conflict with Albanians, who point out to human rights violations by the government in Skopje, and the contestations between North Macedonia and Bulgaria addressing Bulgaria’s suppression of Macedonian national identity and language in the province of Pirin Macedonia (Blagoevgrad Province). Finally, we discuss the conflict with Greece concerning the name of the Macedonian state and the rights of Macedonian immigrants.

After the SDSM (Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija – Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) took over the government in 2017, the party proposed reforms which, although fundamental for the future of the country, were difficult to accept by the majority of Macedonian society. Nevertheless, SDSM’s policy, approved and monitored by the European Union and the US, was to lead to Macedonia joining NATO and EU structures in the near future. It should also be noted that both the US and the EU are strategic partners of the Republic, which actively support the processes taking place there.
Having signed the agreement with Greece, on 17 June 2018 the Republic of Macedonia changed its official name. After the entry into force of the amendments to the Constitution and ratification of the Greek-Macedonian bilateral agreement by both parties, the country adopted the name of the Republic of North Macedonia (mac. Република Серверна Македонија). In February 2019, just after the parliaments of North Macedonia and Greece ratified the Prespa Agreement, the accession process of North Macedonia to NATO began. The condition for accession was the consent of the parliaments of all members of the Alliance for enlargement. Immediately after such approval, on 27 March 2020, the decision on membership was announced in Brussels by its chairman, Jens Stoltenberg.
Macedonia’s relations with Bulgaria and Serbia have also changed, and the Albanians have been granted further privileges and rights in this country – in the opinion of the Macedonians it is very difficult to accept and implement. The escalation of nationalist sentiment in the country’s internal relations is important, caused not only by foreign policy but also by concessions to the Albanians. The Law on the Use of Languages, also known as the ‘language law’, criticized not only by the Macedonian scientific elite, but also by the Venice Commission, which sees certain threats to Macedonia in granting such extensive rights to the Albanian population, strengthens the opposition.
On 26 March 2020, the EU gave its consent to start accession negotiations with Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia. Negotiations with Bulgaria are ongoing and it will be difficult to find a compromise. The biggest challenge for the government will be to convince the public that it is in the interest of its citizens to make compromises with both Greeks and Albanians and in the future with Bulgarians. In this case, the EU position will be very important, both in relation to the Albanian and Bulgarian demands.

The article begins with a re-evaluation of the often neglected importance of 1989 developments in Skopje that inaugurated the subsequent transition of Yugoslav Macedonia leading to its transformation into an independent republic. The text argues that the outcome of the often overlooked congress of the League of Communists of Macedonia in late November 1989 dismantled a small break out of the pan-European Berlin Wall that autumn.
After 1989 Bulgaria maintained a policy aimed at limiting and the non-proliferation of the conflict from the dissolving Yugoslav federation and contributed to the stabilization of the former Yugoslav and wider region. One of the most sensitive aspects of Sofia’s regional policy was that towards Skopje. The article offers evidence and argues that Bulgaria’s approach since 1989 went through different phases but nonetheless was based on three key constant principles: first, support for the independence and for the statehood of the new Republic of Macedonia; second, the countering and dismantling of Macedonianism (in its ‘Yugoslav’ and ‘antiquated’ versions alike) both as a provocative construct of history and as Skopje’s foreign policy practice; third, seeking of solutions within the wider EU and NATO framework and support for the Republic of /North/ Macedonia’s integration into NATO and EU structures.

In 1989, Romania belonged to the communist countries, which particularly strongly attacked communist Poland for carrying out democratic reforms. For many months the diplomacy of communist leader Nicolae Ceaşescu tried to organize a conference of socialist countries on the subject of Poland, but as a result of Moscow’s opposition it did not come to fruition. During the Gorbachev era, the Soviet Union rejected the Brezhnev doctrine, while Romania actually urged its restoration. This was in contradiction with the current political line of Ceauşescu in favor of not interfering in the internal affairs of socialist countries. However, in 1989 it was a threat to communism, which is why historians also have polemics about Romanian suggestions for the armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Poland. In turn, Romania did not allow Poland to interfere in the problems of the Polish minority in Bukovina.

In 1989, the diplomacy of communist Czechoslovakia watched the political changes in communist Poland moving towards democratization with care and concern. However, due to the passive attitude of the Gorbachev ruler in Moscow, Prague did not intend to take any practical steps towards creating a political bloc proposed by Romania that could stop systemic changes in Poland. Despite the announcement of support for Polish communists, Prague chose to isolate Czechs and Slovaks from Poland and Poles and limit her own reforms to the economic sphere. It also did not open the border with Poland closed in 1981 for individual movement.

The aim of this paper is to identify the individual political elements of the United Patriots’ coalition. The nationalist electoral alliance formed in 2016 by Attack, the IMRO -Bulgarian National Movement and National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria took a part of the third Boyko Borissov government. Starting this new partnership with the populist radical right, the GER B has resigned from promoting EU values, including minorities’ rights, much more than before. This coalition established xenophobia and making racists statements as a standard of Bulgarian parliamentary discussion. Its attitude towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the Republic of Turkey shows hostility and prejudice.