The article is devoted to the part of Matriculazione Università Legista Polona from the years 1591–1598, found in the book No. 30 in the Archivio Antico dell’Università degli Studi di Padova and published for the first time. It is one of the results of the in-depth analysis of the archive, which has been carried out by the author for five years now. The public register consists of 83 entries of people from areas of the former Reczpospolita and, additionally, 6 names of Austrians and Germans. The set of names is supplemented by the list, published by Blasio Brugi and Aloysio Andrich in 1892 in Rotulus et matricula. The hitherto unknown list, entitled Natio Polona, was produced in the years 1592–1593 and contains 62 names. the fact that the majority of scholars coming from the area of the former Rzeczpospolita made entries in this public register of lawyers, providing their distinguishing marks, including birthmarks, scars, gashes and warts located on their faces, arms and necks is interesting and puzzling. Thus far, this kind of information has not been seen in the analysed public registers of European universities. In addition, following the comparison of the names of persons entered in the Register of the Polish nation (“Metryka nacji polskiej”), published by Henryk Barycz, the author of the article identified 25 names of Polish scholars, not listed elsewhere. Hence, the important conclusion is that, in the years 1592–1600, not all Polish scholars from the University of Padua were registered in the official Register of the Polish nation, and so, the number of Polish students at this university may have been much higher than previously estimated.

John III Sobieski’s reign has been marked by a surge in the Commonwealth’s international activity. It was a direct consequence of the King’s political plans. First, he sought a prompt termination of the war with the Ottoman Port, but his attempts were ultimately unsuccessful. Later, in a secret alliance with Louis XIV, Sobieski tried to eff ectuate his grand plans in the Baltic, but the awaited favorable arrangement of international interests did not occur. This disappointment drove John III again towards the war with Port, with whom the Commonwealth had in the meanwhile concluded a highly unfavorable peace treaty. The king has made an eff ort to mobilize popular support among the gentry for his war plans. Realistically assessing the Turkish military power, he also recognized the necessity of fi nding allies. His concurrent attempts to convince other European rulers to join forces fi nally met with success in 1683.

Teschen was a serious problem after WW1 between Poland and Czechoslovakia. However a diplomatic solution was found on rational basis. On the contrary, problem of Spiš and Orava was more controversial although without strategic dimension. The acute knot was a little village at the border, Javořina/Jaworzyna. Why? Because divergence stood between Poland and Czechoslovakia, between president Masaryk and premier Beneš and between French officers on Polish side and French officers on czechoslovakian side. Thanks to his international links, Beneš earned a good border for his country. But the price was very high: for a while, Czechoslovaks and Poles had cold relations. In the 1930’s, Hitler took advantage of these cold relations.

The introduction focuses on the evolution of the number of students with a French government’s grant coming from central and eastern Europe between 1936‑1938. Aspects of this phenomenon are thus made apparent, among which is the will to revitalize intellectual influence.
The first part focuses on the present situation: specific characters of the French Institutes, their mission as pivots of an effective influence in central Europe, difficulties due to the ongoing economic crisis, limitations of their actions, open foreign competition potentially threatening the French alliances and positions: nazi Germany, fascist Italy. The following development presents the part given to the Institutes in the intellectual expansion program, as it was implemented by the Blum and Chautemps’s governments between 1936–1938. Here, one scrutinizes certain aspects of its modernization toward a more scientific, technical approach, and an action more open to an urban audience. The illustration of these evolutions lies on the case of the Warsaw Institute. This specific case and the study of new structures in Kraków and Poznań delineates a mutual will to cooperation and partnership. In the year 1938, the contrasts between two types of propaganda sharpen: nazi and french. Institutes contribute to the demonstration of the french power.

All the states of German-occupied Europe had their governments in exile during the Second World War. The main goal of the Central European states was to regain independence, but not to return to status quo ante, as all of them, with the laudable exception of Czechoslovakia, were autocratic before 1939. Acquiring allies required convicting them about the willingness to establish the democratic rule. One of the main arguments was the vision of Central European federation. The federation was not only a synonym of democracy, but also an opportunity to strengthen the entire area. Sikorski’s government was particularly active in this field, acquiring Western allies for its plans, but did not manage to convince Stalin with their help.

The Polish-Romanian cooperation which was established during the pre-bellum era, it developed on a political and economic stage in in the changed political environment. In terms of politics, the cooperation in the initial period was determined by the political agreement concluded in January 1949, while in terms of politics, the mutual relations were regulated by the COMECON concluded at that time. This organisation determined the economical contacts the economy within the member states and their foreign trade, in spite of gathering the socialist states it was in no way considered to be a monolith. Conflicts of interests arose among the industrialized countries (Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany) and the agricultural ones (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria). The attempt at clarifying the situation and pushing the organization towards closer cooperation was found in the proposal submitted in 1962 by Władysław Gomułka, to strengthen the cooperation within the organization. It wasn’t enthusiastically accepted on the part of the Romanian decedents, who wanted to maintain their own economical priorities. Apart from the easing of the Polish point of view, which was also backed by the USSR, Romanians perceived the proposal as an endangerment towards their own interests, which, in turn, became the catalyst for establishing the so called national communism, developed after 1965 by Nicolae Ceauşescu.

The events that took place in Poland in summer and autumn of 1980 drew strong interest from the Western countries. In the United States, the potential literal execution of the Gdańsk Agreement was considered an existential threat for the communist system in Poland. The British embassy in Warsaw indicated that Russians had a reason to see “anti-socialist elements” in Poland. There are
approximately, the British wrote, 32 millions of them, and if Poland were an island on the Pacific Ocean, it would not have a communist regime. It is not an island though. The Foreign Office estimated that the consequences of Soviet intervention in Poland would have been lower than in the case of Afghanistan, as the latter regarded a new area, posing a potential threat to the vital interests of theWest. Another subjugation of Poland would not disturb the strategic or political balance in Europe.
Russia would consider the consequences of intervention in Poland temporary and the risks of the lack of intervention permanent, as inactivity would be an incentive for other Warsaw Pact states. Russia planned to launch the manoeuvres of Soviet the military supported by Czechoslovakian and East German divisions on 8 December. Ryszard Kukliński immediately informed the USA about this fact. It was obvious that the manoeuvres could easily turn into an armed intervention. In his letter of 3 December 1980 to Leonid Brezhnev, President Jimmy Carter emphasised that the United States was utterly committed not to take advantage of the situation in Poland and not to threaten the justified interests of the Soviet Union in the region and that they cared only about letting the Polish nation deal with its internal problems, as imposing certain decisions would have had a negative impact on American-Soviet relations. On 5 December, the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau, wrote a similar letter to Brezhnev. He pointed out that Canada understood the interests of the Soviet Union, in particular regarding Central Europe and stated that the allegations that Western state wanted to use the events in Poland against the Soviet Union were unfounded.
The anticipated invasion on the night of 7 and 8 December did not occur indeed. President Carter was convinced though that Moscow would finally invade, as the Solidarność movement was wholly counter to the rationale of a totalitarian system. On 19 December, Zbigniew Brzeziński informed the president that the invasion had been postponed indefinitely. He believed that the basic cause was the effectiveness of Western propaganda, which convinced the Kremlin that Western countries would apply mass political and economic sanctions.
Whilst not undervaluing the importance of Western propaganda and actions aiming at discouraging
Russia, the root cause of withdrawing from immediate intervention in Poland were military considerations, including reluctance to engage in another armed conflict in addition to Afghanistan and concern about military cooperation between the United States and China announced by Brzeziński. Therefore, this time, unlike during the crises of 1956 and 1968, Russia decided to use more refined measures to protect its interests in Poland, leaving the task of dealing with the enormous Solidarność movement to local quislings, as the English called them.

Jan Kułakowski, Secretary General of the World Confederation of Labour, did not officially pursue the Polish national interest as a Polish immigrant and his activity on behalf of Solidarność was limited by the structures of his organisation. However, there is no doubt that his contacts with the Polish opposition and strong emotional bond with his native country made him successfully support the interests of Polish workers within the WCL. This is evidenced by the affiliation of NSZZ Solidarność (as the only Eastern European trade union) not only with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, but also with the World Confederation of Labour.

During the Cold War, economic relations of the European Communities and Central European states of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid were highly unstable. It was due to lack of institutional frameworks between integration structures of the two parts of the divided continent and the growing protectionism of EEC developing its common trade and agricultural policies. However, the doctrinal crisis of communism and gradual normalisation of East–West relations after concluding the Helsinki Final Act was for some Central European countries an opportunity to make bolder attempts at circumventing the informal prohibition of contacts with Brussels resulting from Soviet political imperatives. The paper is an attempt to demonstrate that it was to some extent in line with the statements of the representatives of political emigrants from Central Europe. They argued that taking advantage of natural interest differences occurring in relations between the Soviet Union and its satellite countries and cautious support of contacts, including economic contact, would lead to disintegration of the eastern monolith and expansion of the “freedom area”, paving the way for future unification of the continent.

In January 1991, an impasse in Polish-Soviet negotiations regarding the evacuation of the Soviet army from Poland and their transit from Germany through Polish territory occurred. Therefore, on 25 January 1991, the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate met to hear the government’s relation and decide on the role of the Senate in this crisis. The meeting was an opportunity for government members and senators to discuss the tactics of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the negotiations with the Soviet Union and evaluate it. The discussion revealed a critical assessment of the negotiations, including the fixed date of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and making the consent to transit the troops from Germany subject to their prior evacuation from Poland. During the meeting, the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate decided to organise an information campaign regarding the Polish position, particularly in Germany. In the following months of 1991, Poland gradually mitigated its position in its negotiations with the USSR, increasing its flexibility in the matter of both evacuation and transit.

The article deals with the relationship between two social actors, that is to say the French intellectuals and the French opinion, to Poland. This study is part of a work of crossed history, starting with the French context to show what circulates about Poland in France, and how. From there, the idea is also to see how the reception of Poland can modify or alter the interventions of one another. The study goes back to the origins of the representations on Poland which emerged either through old contacts established at the time of the Ancient Regime, or following the arrival of Polish immigrants in France, who have a very different understanding depending on their social background. If, for a long time, the relationship to these immigrants has forged the image of Poland in France, – a far less positive image than some stereotypes suggest – these representations have been slowly modified thanks to the possibilities to travel and the opening of the country in the late 1950s. The 1970s and the issue of socialism coming to power in France allowed opposing Polish intellectuals to became a reference in France, on the public opinion’s side, a whole Poland benefited a positive image, enhanced by the election of the pope. Finally, the Solidarność moment and the state of war showed how French intellectuals and French public opinion brought a different insight on this events and how the latter won over it thanks to the role of the collective emotion that then expressed.

The history of postage stamps was briefly presented in the paper. The focus of the paper, however, was put on the analysis of their visual contents. The main tendencies in the choice of contents presented on postage stamps both at the beginning of their history, i.e. in the 19th century, and in modern times were discussed. Political contents of the stamps, political aspects of their issues, and their social function were studied. The role of postage stamps in historical research as iconographic sources, which can be very important in certain cases, was determined. Political, social, and cultural functions of both issues and visual contents of postage stamps were also mentioned.

Ethnic relations in the Balkans determine their specificity. In the case of Montenegro, the issue is much more complicated. The range of recognised ethnic minorities in this country is the widest among all the post-Yugoslav countries. The paper analyses the problem of relations between Montenegrins and ethnic minorities, among which the most politically important is the attitude towards the Serbs, who constitute approximately 30% of the society. The key preliminary issue is to determine the identity of Montenegrins, who are commonly considered Serbs. Their mutual tribal relations are clear, but the territorial identity of the Montenegrins has shaped their separate nation-like identity through the ages. That is why the part of the society that declared Montenegrin nationality rejects the distant tribal bond with the Serbs as a basis of political concessions for the latter. Another problem are relations with the Albanians, whose votes allowed Montenegro to gain independence. This community feels disappointed and even marginalised by the Montenegrin authorities, as it expected a greater participation in public life as a recognition for its contribution to independence. The Bosnians have no alternatives: they do not want to cooperate with the Serbs more due to the ethnic purges they fell victim to, but the state of Montenegro seems to ignore them. This is why currently many of them decide to emigrate, which is additionally stimulated by the poverty of the areas they inhabit.

The formation of the Albanian identity and the development of an independent Albania from 1912 onwards was preceded by the Albanian national movement from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. It was at this time that the maximum program of the Albanian National Revival was born, which propagandized the unification of all Albanians in one state from the 1870s. This status quo of the Balkans, reached by the Versailles peace system, was destroyed in the course of the Second World War, when the created “Greater Albania” was a wartime creature. After the end of the Paris peace conference and the establishment of the new post-war order in Europe and the Balkans, the Albanian issue in Yugoslavia and the Albanian factor in the Yugoslav-Albanian relations experienced a difficult development.

Albania is a country with three dominant religions: Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism. The co-existence of the followers of these religions is harmonious with no or very rare incidents of a religious background. Despite the risks related to the radicalisation of certain attitudes, primarily among Muslims, one must say that Albania is a country where religious tolerance is observed. Individual Churches still face important tasks. In the case of the Albanian Muslim Community, headed by Haxhi Selim Muça since March 2004, key ones include, first and foremost, ensuring its financial security so as minimise the economic dependence from external actors. However, the most controversial at the moment is the restitution of property of the Eastern Orthodox Church and the fact that authority over the Orthodox Church in Albania is held by Archbishop Anastasios who is Greek. The structures of the Catholic Church in Albania – which during Enver Hoxha’s rule sustained major losses not just among the clergy but also lay Catholics – have been rebuilt from scratch. The Catholic Church cooperates with other faiths following the principles of ecumenism.

In 1991, Slovenia became an independent state and had to face the migration policy, sharing the situation of other European countries, struggling with a decreasing number of births. The main group, treated as immigrants, were representatives of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia living in Slovenia already before that date. Also, people emigrating to the area of the Slovenian state until 2010, came mainly from the region. Migration crisis in September 2015 was unprecedented for Slovenia. The text will concentrate on the multidimensional analysis of its policy towards the refugee crisis in Europe, including the demographic aspect, previous migration as well as the legal system and the main actors involved in the struggle with the crisis.

The current refugee crisis faces Bulgaria the clash between European values and humanity and fears of loss of security and violation of these very values. Data suggest that the rates of illegal migration through Bulgaria are relatively low, and the impact of refugee crisis on Bulgarian politics and society is relatively low (in comparision with other South and South-East Europe states). Bulgarian government undertook preventive measures to guard Bulgarian southern border (buill border fence, sent reinforcements from the Bulgarian Army), but as an external border of the UE, Bulgaria is tremendously interested in the adoption of a unifed all-European approach for a solidarity based solution of the problem.