It is easy to fall for a conceptual beauty and simplicity of the coherence theory of truth. But the texts in which its foundations were for the first time explicitly developed are rich in subtleties, defying a consistent interpretation and inviting various forms of criticism. That is why the following study will take one more look at the writings of Harold H. Joachim and Brand Blanshard, in order to prove that in the analyses which they proposed there is an additional, so far unrecognised element – namely the process of translation – which plays a crucial role in making their accounts valid and complete. Initially then, the article will specify how the notion of translation should be here understood. Next, key postulates of both theories will be recalled, with an indication of several potential inconsistencies which they might entail. Finally, the analysis exposes translative ground of each reconstructed model. 
What will be thereby underscored, is not only the interpretative depth of Joachim’s and Blanshard’s legacy, but also significance of translation for the philosophical enquiry into the nature of truth. 

Przekład Grzegorz Słowiński

"De incerti aestimatione" ("On the estimation of uncertain things") by G.W. Leibniz in 1678 is an attempt to derive a general method for the problem of points, that is, the division of the stake in any round of the game. The explanatory section contains a number of definitions and ideas appearing in Leibniz's writings in earlier years. Among them is a definition of the concept of probability (probabilitas) associated at the time with the still unfinished debate over moral-theological probabilism. This association is justified in this case by the fact that in his correspondence and later writings Leibniz proposes to consider probability in a mathematical sense as opposed to the meaning used in moral theology. "De incerti aestimatione" is Leibniz's second work, in which he devotes attention to games, the issue of their justice and expected value, which he calls hope. The article discusses the legal, moral and metaphysical contexts of the concepts of probabilitas, jus (law) and ratio, as well as the limitations of the moral application of probability. Leibniz's solution to the problem of points is also presented, which, although flawed, is an independent proposal from Pascal for applying the recursive method to this problem.

The present study examines the dialectical relationship between the two emblematic factors of human identity distinguished by Paul Ricoeur – character and keeping one’s word. The first part of the text will articulate objections to the philosophical significance of this distinction in the order of justification, as well as suspicions about its non-philosophical genesis and, consequently, regarding its philosophicality in the order of discovery. The second part of the article presents an interpretive proposal for another justification of the dialectic under consideration – a justification inspired by the post-secular thought of Jürgen Habermas, which, moreover, grows out of a different context of discovery, as it engages in the debate on freedom from the standpoint of naturalistic determinism and evolutionary theory. It seems, therefore, that invoking the position of a prominent Frankfurter can provide an interesting counterpoint to the indicated suspicions. 

This text aims to describe and analyse a figure of the third used by Emmanuel Lévinas in the three phases of the evolution of his concept. I interpret the term included in the title on an anthropological ground by analysing the transformations of terms: il y a and illeite, which I define as the third. On a social level, I explore the terms used by the French philosopher: troisieme homme and le tiers, defining them collectively as the third party. The basic thesis argued in the paper is the claim, absent in the Polish-language source literature, that Lévinas is most of all a philosopher of the third. I claim that the figure of the third is the starting point of the formation of subjectivity, defines the evolution of concepts and conditions metaphysics. On the socio-political level, the third defines the positive justification of society, influences the reformulation of the question of responsibility, and through this, in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, makes it possible to formulate an answer to the doubts related to the unlimited responsibility for the other versus the question of violence in the context of the ethical relation. I also propose a different interpretation from the popular one of the evolution of the concept as a search for a positive justification of social relations.

The following article is an exploration of the intellectual journey of the French philosopher Michel Foucault in its latest period, from the Will to Knowledge, first book of the History of Sexuality, up to the later idea of care-of-the-self. The idea of the care-of-the-self is treated here as the culmination of Foucault’s philosophy, as well as its most mature expression. Maturity here means that, according to this concept, the subject is not perceived as the passive outcome of games played between the forces of knowledge and power, as it was presented in the writings of Foucault from the 1960s and 1970s, but, thanks to his own actions, directed at himself, so called practices of the Self, the subject is able to create itself, in separation from the outside influences that bind him. In the context and in contrast to the idea of the care of self is the idea of self-knowledge, a solely intellectual perspective, for which – according to Foucault – the care of the self was abandoned by philosophers for many centuries. A part of the goal of this study is to demonstrate that the concept of the care of the self was introduced through a conceptual evolution, in which certain ideas, gradually changing their meanings, morphed into other ideas, to arrive at the point where the ancient Greek idea of epimeleia heautou, care of the self, was necessary to be introduced. The principal sources for Foucault’s analyses were the writings of Stoics and Epicureans from the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D., as well as the Plato’s dialogue The First Alcibiades. A method of close-reading of the published works of Foucault and the transcripts of his lectures from a period of 1976 to 1982 was used to prove the above mentioned argument. The central goal of this thesis was largely accomplished – it has been demonstrated that Foucault, by examining various Stoic and Epicurean practices of the Self, showed that the subject is not determined to be formed solely as a result of the games of knowledge and power. Thanks to the concept of care of the self, Foucault had drawn a much larger margin of freedom for the individual, than he did in his earlier works.

The article points out the elements of Karl Jaspers’ epistemological conception that cross out the possibility of a comprehensive account of being. The key issue here is the limits of cognition, which take the form of object cognition. The theme of limits points to the inadequacies of human thinking in the context of quantifiable and absolutist representations of reality. The impossibility of adequately grasping the totality of reality will be illustrated here by means of the criticism Jaspers levelled at absolutising metaphysics. In connection with the description of the structure of cognition proposed by Jaspers, the article points out the conceptual proximity of the issue of worldview and metaphysics in the light of the thought of the cited author.

Paweł Rojek, Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2019.