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Giulia Cirillo

Translation in the Coherence Theories of Truth; a Bridge Spanning over Idealist Islands

Summary

It is easy to fall for a conceptual beauty and simplicity of the coherence theory of truth. But the texts in which its foundations were for the first time explicitly developed are rich in subtleties, defying a consistent interpretation and inviting various forms of criticism. That is why the following study will take one more look at the writings of Harold H. Joachim and Brand Blanshard, in order to prove that in the analyses which they proposed there is an additional, so far unrecognised element – namely the process of translation – which plays a crucial role in making their accounts valid and complete. Initially then, the article will specify how the notion of translation should be here understood. Next, key postulates of both theories will be recalled, with an indication of several potential inconsistencies which they might entail. Finally, the analysis exposes translative ground of each reconstructed model. What will be thereby underscored, is not only the interpretative depth of Joachim's and Blanshard's legacy, but also significance of translation for the philosophical enquiry into the nature of truth.

Keywords: Brand Blanshard, Harold H. Joachim, coherence, translation, truth

No pleasure comes without a cost. On the one hand, the idea of coherence as a basis for the theory of truth continues to retain an irresistible appeal. Its nod towards the laws of logic coupled with recognising the importance of a wider community in the process of establishing truth seem to provide a highly promising recipe for a proper elaboration of the concept. Yet the beauty

of models based on coherence remains in a constant, hardly escapable shadow – an accusation of idealism, of uprooting truth from its desired stable ground, namely some form of objective, external reality, and instead leaving it lost among airy mists of ever-changeable system of judgements. Must such cost indeed always be paid?

The aim of the following work is to challenge the above conflict. By taking one more glance at two texts containing the first extended formulations of coherentism it will be pointed out that there is an element which they both have in common – arguably, present also in other versions of the theory – and which helps to understand how their apparent idealism might be anchored, as the authors of texts themselves argued. The element in question is translation process.

Additionally, the two articulations are of course subject to multiple objections and their postulates are far from unambiguous. On the one hand, they are viewed as chief competitors of correspondence (cf. Young 2018, Woleński 1996). At the same time it has been argued that they implicitly take basic assumptions of correspondence for granted (Walker 1989). Moreover, their reliance on logic might carry a threat of circularity, and specification of the system with which true propositions should cohere is also often a matter of dispute – to name but a few possible dilemmas. Therefore, it will be also shown how by accepting translation as a part of both theories, they can be made more consistent in themselves.

Yet before one attempts to apply the notion, the concept itself should be to some extent made clear. Initially then, may several fundamental features of translation be enumerated.

Characterising the process

To be able to legitimately describe a given activity as translative, it seems possible to distinguish at least a few of its relatively uncontroversial, characteristic features.

The process should be initiated by an active agent. This agent should be conscious, although the action as such does not have to be performed in their full awareness. It seems quite obvious that in translation studies, which centre around the practice of language and culture translation, the figure of a self-aware translator who can act knowingly and wilfully can be identified in the majority of theoretical approaches. From Schleiermacher, who spoke of a translator performing a movement either towards the author or the recipient of the translated material (1813), to Benjamin who insisted that the process consisted in the translator's finding an effect intended behind the original (1923); from the translator's 'happy and creative' acts in literary translation underscored already by Borges, to Ortega y Gasset who viewed the practice as distinctive and 'splendorous' precisely due to the 'historical consciousness' it required in manipulating and matching different cultural aspects (1937 [in:] Venuti 2000). Later studies such as the Skopos theory, showing translation as essentially purposeful action (Vermeer 1998), the polysystems theory which showed the process as a counter in a game of uneven relationships between communities holding different status (Even-Zohar 1990) or the recently developing cognitive approaches which analyse translation through a psycholinguistic framework (Halverson 2014, Risku 2012 et al.) seem to be more and more focused on the figure of a conscious translator.

Furthermore, the activity begins when the person is confronted with a set of data (the source text) which is believed to possess a certain meaning and interpretative potential – its sense can be recovered in various ways. In an attempt to extract this meaning, the agent forms another set of data (the target text), which is to a large extent a product of their creativity, and a result of making a series of decisions regarding the shape of their creation – these decisions are not governed by any universally definable set of rules.

There are two more, closely related features. The aim of activity is to achieve equivalence between the original and the target

structure. Yet simultaneously, obtaining such equivalence is impossible. The new text is created within another medium, which precludes the desired identity with the source. The process may be therefore continued interminably, and is concluded only when the translator reaches a sufficient level of satisfaction with their work.

Finally, the following study draws on the Jakobsonian classification, according to which translation may be understood not only as a change between two languages (interlingual), but also as a paraphrase (intralingual) or a transformation form one semiotic system to another (intersemiotic) (Jakobson 1959).

H.H. Joachim – idealism rooted in concreteness

Early traces of coherentism can be ascribed to the systems of German and British idealists, but the theory finds its extended formulation at the beginning of 20th century in *The Nature of Truth* by H.H. Joachim. It is towards his vision that Russell levelled what came to be considered standard objections against the coherentist approach. Although Joachim is classified as an exponent of late British idealism (Griffin, 1), both his metaphysical system and the account of truth built upon it are nuanced and resist a straightforward categorisation, hence his thought should be recalled with due precision.

The analysis opens with criticism of the correspondence view. From the very beginning it is clear that Joachim recognises how essential is the role of subject in establishment of truth. He directs his criticism primarily towards the basic assumption of correspondence, namely the view that 'experiencing makes no difference to the facts' (Joachim 1906, 39). The mind which forms certain beliefs and the facts which it perceives cannot be considered two separate entities, as the advocates of correspondence would maintain. In the spirit of neo-Hegelian thought, he claims that the relation which binds these two elements is internal (it constitutes an intrinsic part of their nature, and any change within one of them necessitates a change in the other (Moore 1919–1920).

'Experience, we have insisted, is a unity of two factors essentially inter-related and reciprocally involving each other for their being and their nature' (Joachim 1906, 60). Therefore, much as the external medium would be providing perceptual material for the subject, at the same time the subjects themselves would be its active architects. Consequently, 'Truth and Falsity do not attach to one of those factors in itself, if only for the reason that neither factor is, or can be, in itself' (Joachim 1906, 61).

Such a perspective enables him supposedly to ward off a potential accusation of propounding subjective idealism. Solipsistic minds, 'self-contained and exclusive entities' are mere 'fictions'. What he was advocating, was precisely the opposite; a universe where each constituent is essentially bound with all others and whose nature remains highly attuned to everything that it is surrounded by (Joachim 1906, 62). He seemed to be suggesting that the existence of externality is as if inscribed in the very essence of each subject, and together they constituted an indissoluble whole. His vision would be therefore a form of absolute idealism, a characteristic inherited from the thought of Hegel.

A metaphysical landscape thus sketched bears directly on Joachim's model of truth, which is an attempt at reconciling what appears to be the exact opposites. It involves a specific merge between the individual and the universal, wherein the individual serves as a starting point and an anchor.

For an initial feature of truth as coherence Joachim chooses to be 'conceivability'. It is not to be understood as a possibility to visualise; it means rather to think logically, presenting to oneself many elements, neither part of which excludes the rest. In the interpretation of Griffin, this means that 'intrinsic properties of each part determine the intrinsic properties of all the others' (4). All these elements constitute what Joachim calls a 'significant whole' (Joachim 1906, 66).

The Joachimian holistic nature of truth meant that all its elements 'reciprocally involve one another' building up a meaning which was 'single' and 'concrete'. From the fact that the 'whole'

was to be 'significant' one might infer that the character of elements themselves was composite, similarly to the entire system they constituted. If meaning were to be present, the system had to be multi-layered; its 'meaningfulness' could be interpreted as a potential for action, a cue that sparks a problem-solving process, inviting an attempt to single out the 'sense' and understand it. Hence the suggested multidimensionality – the 'sense' had to be a property laid upon a certain foundation.

The semanticity of the 'whole' entails a certain dynamism, inasmuch as the meaning had to be both initially applied to it, as well as later uncovered and understood. Joachim further writes that all its internal parts were constantly adjusting themselves to one another. Given this property of truth as a dynamic whole, it seems only natural that the philosopher also accepts various degrees of truthfulness; each element was as if a step on the way towards conception of the perfect entirety.

One should now ask what was the status of truth as a 'whole' with regard to the individual. The subsequent remarks reveal how Joachim imagined the combination between particularity and universality. Elements of the system were to be specific human judgements, each of which would be true to some degree. They would be made about and on the basis of experience. This experience was in Joachim's words 'self-fulling and self-fufilled' (Joachim 1906, 76). It meant that the individual was constantly expanding their knowledge and organising it. They acquired new information and simultaneously reworked the incoming data, so that they could create a consistent unity. What Joachim kept emphasising though, was that he had in mind something more than logical consistency. He argued that reasonings of logic could remain consistent and valid, and yet at the same time not be true. Truth as he envisioned it was to be on the one hand rooted in and verified by the concrete perceptual environment of the subject, and simultaneously, in a quasi-platonic manner, participate in the overarching 'Ideal', which could be only one and all-embracing.

Finally, it should be also pinpointed what exact account would Joachim provide of the nature of entity to which the term 'true' would pertain. Disowning traditionally understood idealism, he says that 'systematic coherence is the Truth as a character of the Real (Joachim's capitalisation)' (Joachim 1906, 69). In his criticism of the correspondence idea he categorically denied that individual experience and facts could be considered two separate phenomena. They were inseparably tied and mutually influenced by each other (Joachim 1906, 56). Consequently, truth would have to be extending to cover both the entirety of what was being experienced (the Real) as well as the experience itself, in its numerous particular occurrences, where it would manifest itself as true knowledge. Importantly, there was one more logically following property of such a bipolar unity. Although he rejected the notion of 'proposition' as anything more than an 'unreal abstraction' (37), he postulated that 'the truth, […], emerges in its perfect completeness as an individual meaning with an internal logical connectedness and articulation'. Hence 'its articulate connexion demands discursive expression as a system of judgements' (109). So ultimately the quality of trueness would be describing 'judgements' – 'ideal developments of facts in the medium of thought' (Joachim 1948, 262).

Joachim's model does possess a certain tempting appeal – it aspires to incorporate perhaps all the desired elements and accommodate all the intuitions one might have regarding truth. Yet is the model actually providing a satisfying account of how all these elements could be squared together?

Naturally, there is a set of standard objections raised against coherentism. Russell asked about the status of truth of propositions which seem to possess a determined truth value, yet nobody believes in either their truth or falsity (Russell 1907). He pointed also that a mere coherence with a set of propositions cannot guarantee the truth of a given judgement, since there may equally exist such a set for false statements (Russell 1907). The objection however has already been refuted; the theory does

not demand coherence with any abstract system, but such that is actually believed (Young 2001). Russell then also observed that resting upon the notion of consistency, the theory seemed to be tacitly assuming the truth of the laws of logic (Russell 1912). Joachim's model appears to fend off the accusation as well. He insisted after all that the notion of 'conceivability' involve more than logical consistency.

Russelian arguments were recently developed into a more menacing criticism by Walker, with similar line of reasoning proposed earlier by Davidson (1986). Walker maintains that the theory leads either to regress or has to fall back on the notion of correspondence. Coherentists namely must hold that a certain set of judgements is believed. But this claim as such requires its own verification; if its truth consists in coherence with other beliefs, then one arrives at a regress. If in turn the claim is made true by facts, then at the theory seems to be ultimately superseded by the idea of correspondence (Walker 1989). Joachim's unusual account of facts does not seem to be providing a straightforward answer to the objection, however it is difficult to see how his vision could avoid the regress.

Apart from such general criticism, one may formulate a number of objections exclusively against the Joachimian model. Optimistically, he claims that the degrees of truth which the subject would be apprehending through experience constituted parts of the 'Real', universal truth. But at the same time, he maintains that all individual experience is mediated by thought (Joachim, 43), which seems to lead unavoidably to relativism. It is difficult to imagine universality of thus apprehended partial truths, if they were to be held in an individualised, human thought. Moreover, if the ties that bind particular elements of the entire system were to rest upon something more than abstract rules of logic, grounded in the unity of rich, concrete experiential environment of the subject, would not the criterion of consistency be inevitably subjective? And what would be the actual nature of the relation between the concrete and the ideal ends of the truth-spectrum?

This subjectivised thought was to be actively bound with facts, playing a crucial role in their constitution – how then these facts would become the basis for a system of knowledge developed and agreed upon by a wider community?

Furthermore, there is also a problem expression. As Joachim himself admits, creating of a common system of truth demanded its articulation. Yet clearly, even if exact sciences expressed in universal, formal languages constituted a substantial part, still some of its elements would need to be formulated in natural languages. Is one allowed to dismiss the problem of linguistic differences among communities, in the face of which an agreement on certain truths would forever lack any objectively shared ground? This problem may be narrowed down even to the discourse remaining within the same language; is not the dilemma of interpretative discrepancies inherent in any communication threatening the way in which the system would be understood?

As regards the postulate of dynamism, one should finally enquire what was the movement that characterised the 'whole'. How exactly would the constant 'reciprocal adjustments' be carried out? How truth could be an ideal and at the same time subject to the process of such constant change?

Truth as translation from and into the 'Ideal'

Doubts expressed above were not intended to undermine the theory, but to point towards the way in which it might be more satisfyingly completed. Hopefully, the above reconstruction itself already turned the reader's thought to the concept of translation.

In the philosopher's view, truth is to be a concrete-universal, a dynamic and articulated system. As Joachim demands, individuals are bound with facts through an internal relation. That is how the Ideal – external reality in its universal shape – is rooted in particularity. There must be therefore an active subject, exposed to the data given in experience of facts. The data become for them a form of source text. This text however does not

preserve its universality, just as for the translator, who approaches the original already through the lenses of their knowledge of the source language and their own interpretation. Since whatever the subject apprehends 'is mediated by thought', the data immediately becomes reworked, in such a way that any information is subjectivised. Obtaining such a particularised source text (roots of the universal) becomes the first step of translation process. That is how the system is 'self-fulfilling', providing material for its own further transformation.

Subsequently, the person deepens their involvement in the apprehended data. Their consciousness allows them to realise particular nature of the acquired perceptions – since they may become aware of the role of their own thought in manipulating the information, its individuality may also become acknowledged. This means that they are able to change perspective; conceive of a different features their perceptions might have, such that not necessarily remain in agreement with experience they themselves gained. So the data becomes problematised – the person gains an incentive to start solving them. And at this moment the process of 'reciprocal adjustments' may begin, which could be viewed precisely as a form of translation.

Why should the activity be considered translative? Upon recognising 'interpretative potential' of the data, the subject will be now attempting to universalise it. This means that, as in the process of translation, they try to make the text understandable beyond themselves and accessible to others. They analyse a given instance of experience, identifying and separating those elements which might be proper exclusively to themselves, such as for example memories or personal associations. Similarly to what takes place within translation process, the practice must involve a number of choices regarding what aspects of experience would have to be severed and which ones preserved. That is how one might explain Joachim's 'conceivability' – as imagining other perspectives, the array of which would be constantly

growing together with the subject's development within the world. As modifying individual perceptions, so that they could be comprehensible, conceived of from other angles and consistent with them.

These are not the only translative elements of the model. Another one is an act of creation. Holding in their mind their own specific interpretation of the source text, the translator subsequently goes on to create the target one. By analogy, modifications with which the subject shapes the obtained data result in creating a new mental construct.

In both cases, the goal of creative process is to produce a message which would retain as much of the source experience as possible – so both the translator and the subject attempting to establish truth aim at reaching certain equivalence. Furthermore, the target construct has to be formed in such a medium as to be expressible, conveyable to other individuals ('truth demands discursive articulation'). Hence the target text of cognising subject would assume a linguistic form, to be included in the continually expanding system of judgements. That is how the system becomes 'self-fulfilled'.

Again, in a translative manner, the person is making a series of decisions as to which of the available linguistic structures should be applied, in order to best reflect the perception they obtained. Much as the target text is intended as universally acknowledgeable, the choices themselves are essentially indeterminate, since they remain proper to what the subject personally considers as distinctive of a given experience.

On the basis of one original text an infinite number of translations can be made, and each one can be endlessly worked upon. In this sense one could understand dynamism of the Joachimian 'whole' – 'reciprocal adjustments' continue interminably, with an ever growing body of information acquired by the subject and multiplying perspectives with which the target structure should agree. Similarly, an endless number of new translations may be appearing to make the source text understandable for

communities of people whose language, culture, level of awareness and worldview is still changing.

The translational framework enables perhaps also to clearly incorporate an interesting Joachimian postulate of 'meaningfulness'. In the section above, a question was posed regarding the significance of the system, the origins of its meaning and its impact on the absolute nature of truth. Indeed, significance implies complexity; it also seems to implicate the necessity to decipher, and together with it the relativism of understanding, which would necessarily occur in those parts of the system which were not formulated in formal languages. But such complexity and relativism need not affect the ideal nature of truth and its 'oneness', demanded by Joachim. If it is acknowledged that there is a process of translation taking place from the particular, individual experiences into the universal judgements making up the 'whole', then the bridge between two poles of the system would be translational equivalence. In such case, truth as one end of the bridge might remain stable, with certain relativism pertaining to the status of equivalence. Relativism of this bridge would however be acceptable. Each of the countless acts of translation strives to return to the source in its own way, declaring validity of its own equivalence with the source, and thereby turns relativity into variety.

Let it be summarised what was gained by exposing an additional element in Joachim's theory. It allowed one to account for coexistence and mutual connection between the concrete and the ideal. It explained simultaneous completeness and dynamism of truth as a 'whole' and made it possible for the individuals to communicate with each other in the co-creation process. Truth as an ideal entirety was then constantly providing people with translational material, which they subjectivised (problematised), built significance around, and realised thereby its meaning potential. Then they remained in interminable process of reapplying their creation to newly gained experiences in further confrontation with reality as well as with target constructs of others. A possible

burden of relativism was taken over by translational equivalence, which turned it into ever-legitimate creativity.

Brand Blanshard – linking the nature of truth with its criterion

A more widely recognised version of coherence theory was proposed by Brand Blanshard in the second volume of *The Nature of Thought* (1939). The American philosopher proposed a model closely related to the Joachimian one. He was also influenced by the British idealism, so expectedly, his vision would inherit several key features found already in the previous account, such as the doctrine of internal relations or a merge between concreteness and universality. His articulation may appear still more convincing, thanks to systematicity of its exposition, its 'clarity, rigor and persuasiveness' (Fogelin 1967). Moreover, it should be analysed here, for it includes elaboration on an essential problem involved in the coherence project, which was absent from the Joachim's scheme, and which will possibly allow one to recognise even better the necessary links between coherentism and translation process – it is the question of coherence theory of justification, coherence as a test for truth.

Let us begin by outlining Blanshard's own view of coherence. With a disclaimer that no fully satisfactory account of the notion can be provided, he defines it in strongly logical and causal terms. A coherent system would be composed of strictly interdependent judgements, each of which entailed and was entailed by the remaining parts (Blanshard 1939, 264). They are not to be merely non-contradictory, but necessitated by one another. Such an ideal system would be identified with the universe as a whole – a certain Absolute – and with the totality of knowledge.

It is a challenge to specify exactly the ontological status of Blanshard's model; what remains certain however, is that he did not go as far as to postulate the substance of the world to be purely mental. Thought must have had its continuation in some

sort of external reality. This transpires for instance in the importance he attached to causality as another argument in favour of coherence (Dimech, 27). Illustrating how each fragment of the universe influences others, he argues that the slightest change in an individual's mind would have its bearing even on the most distant galaxies (Blanshard 1939, 293) – thus within the system there appeared to be a distinction into what was mental and what went beyond, providing the mind with objects of perception and experience. And as it will be shown, the distinction provides a valuable key to recognising translational ground of his system.

Blanshard's subsequent strategy was to prove that coherence must be accepted as the ultimate criterion, because this idea was what all other methods of verification must in the end inevitably fall back on. Having dealt briefly with such insufficient tests as those appealing to authority or mystic insight, he focuses on validation through correspondence and self-evidence.

Correspondence, he claims, occurs between facts and judgements. Yet facts themselves consist in nothing but further judgements. For instance, when spotting a cardinal, one immediately and implicitly needs to grasp an idea of a bird, the notions of flight, song, animal kingdom, etc. What one may assume to be a 'brute fact' is in reality always 'mixed with theory' (Blanshard 1939, 228). Consequently, because the 'substance' of judgements and facts is no longer different, what holds between them should not be considered correspondence, but coherence.

His reasoning with regard to the criterion of self-evidence proceeds along similar lines. When referring to the axioms of mathematics and science he points that with time, they also very often turn out to be questionable. Moreover, it is impossible to accept them without 'leaving their meaning unanalysed', and going 'beyond them' to find their significance within a larger system (e.g. in order to assert that 2 + 2 = 4, one needs to understand the notions of number, equation, etc.). As for the laws of logic, their apparent self-evidence involves in fact an implicit reliance on the entire system within which they operate. Consequently,

their validity appears to be resting on a more fundamental idea – that of coherence.

This is how the concept is defended as the ultimate criterion of truth. For Blanshard, what necessarily follows is that the same notion must constitute also truth's nature. When asking about its essence, one may posit that this essence is something other than coherence, for instance correspondence with external reality – yet in such case one would have to reject coherence as its final test, because from the fact that a given judgement might cohere with a system of beliefs it does not necessarily follow that this judgement in any way matches the external world (Blanshard 1939, 271–272). Echoing evidently his remarks on the criterion of truth, he also states that in order to identify the nature of truth with correspondence, one would have to deal with a thought and a fact as two separate entities, which could only then be compared and their similarity acknowledged. Since such separation is impossible, it seems unfounded to define their relation as correspondence.

Unquestioningly, the argument hinges on accepting coherence as the ultimate truth criterion. It has already been argued by Resher that Blanshard fails to take into account a possibility that coherence might be a good, but not absolutely reliable test of truth. What transpires even more clearly, is that both his choice of the criterion and its subsequent determination of the nature of truth remains, as Blanshard himself admits, a corollary of the way he characterises the relation between thought and reality. And this relation, although clearly idealist, turns out to be rather difficult to precisely interpret (Kirkham, 111). So it is that element of his system which one should subject to scrutiny, in search of any further tacit assumptions.

Self translation from the subject into an object

Blanshard's description of how thoughts are connected with the external world is often replete with metaphor. He stresses that

the primary objective of mental activity is to seek understanding, which makes this activity incessantly dynamic. It is aimed at 'building a bridge of intelligible relation from the continent of our knowledge to an island we wish to include in it' (261). Thought is further said to have 'two ends, one immanent and one transcendent' (262); the goal of any cognitive activity is for these two ends to coincide. The relation of thought to the world is that of a 'partial to complete fulfilment of a purpose', as consciousness is gradually 'identifying itself' (264) with reality. In that process it is like a seed, growing to break into a full flower.

In the end, Blanshard stresses that although this goal of complete identification and fulfilment is never achieved, it is not impossible, since nature has intelligible character. If thought and reality were indeed in the process of becoming one and the same, as if two merging substances, then just as reality would be imparting thought with content, the world itself would emerge as transformed by creative influence – a product of mental activity. By virtue of such transformation there would no longer be a subject-object distinction, with the dividing line between them melting away.

Now it is certainly difficult to resist the impression of similarity which the described process would bear to translation, understood analogously as it was in the case of Joachim. The subject seems to be carrying out a specific, inconscient self-translative act from a lower to a higher state of awareness.

In his model, Blanshard acknowledges that the data which the subject experiences are always already combined and transformed by their own judgement (Vol. I, 181). Such an individualised perception becomes an original text, a starting point for the translative activity. Then, in an attempt to understand and make sense of the data, the subject is drawing on a wider, already established system of knowledge trying to incorporate in it the newly acquired data, so that it gains validity. They are changing and adjusting the judgement, making decisions as to how its elements should be modified and which of them should be discarded

as inconsistent with the system. As long as their final outcome is suited to the established rules, decisions made along the way remain arbitrary, in a sense of being specific for each person.

Next, in order to incorporate their perception in the system, the data has to assume a specific form – become formulated in one of the languages through which the system itself is expressed. So the person is again adjusting the judgement, choosing suitable equivalent terms in their repository of knowledge, making decisions determined only by how far they themselves consider the chosen structures to be accurately reflecting their original experience.

Furthermore, Blanshard wants to show the process as a gradual identification of thought with its object. Yet as it was pointed above, in his model there was still a distinction between the mental sphere and the external reality, about which the subject would be gaining knowledge. So it seems that the identification does not involve here actually becoming the system, as if blending with it – this would preclude 'approximating' stressed by Blanshard as characteristic of truth. Rather, it meant constructing a personal representation of the system. In this way, one could be dealing with two 'islands' and an attempt to bridge the gap between them. 'Approximation' was creating a target text whose similarity to the original would always remain a matter of degree.

Here it is easy to see another translative feature of the process – a bridge built towards the system is analogical to translation equivalence. Being a matter of degree, it is never complete. Its reliability is ultimately determined and acknowledged by the individual; even though the judgement they hold is being adjusted to the external rules, what is subjected to change and the outcome of modification depends ultimately on a given person. The process aims to disclose the original which, interpreted through their lens, is proper and unique exclusively to themselves. So incorporation of a personal belief into the body of knowledge is, just as establishing equivalence, a fine interplay between the use of pregiven principles and creativity.

Blanshard himself notices that when articulated as such – in terms of a relation connecting two separate entities – his vision comes suspiciously close to the correspondence model (Blanshard 1939, 267). But the translational framework makes it possible to avoid the risk. When it is accepted that both the initial data (the original) and their ultimately reshaped version (the target text) are an outcome of the subject's creation, they remain within the dimension of their own consciousness and as such, in accordance with Blanshard's intuition, they should be viewed as a form of personal evolution.

Blanshard's idea of truth was coherence understood as a bond which, through the relation of mutual entailment, cemented together a growing system of judgements. Now it turns out to be a dynamic translative process through which individuals are developing, a mechanism they employ to creatively expand their comprehension of the world by increasing self-awareness and in constant attempt to render this comprehension accessible and acceptable by others. They are elevating their judgements from the subject-level of individual perceptions up to the point when they become more fully realised objects of thought, consistent with the systemic principles and therefore possible to be shared. Through the increasing self-realisation, they are gradually objectifying themselves.

The translational framework allows one to address the primary objection levelled against the theory by Resher. If one interprets Blanshard's coherence as underpinned by translation process, it seems logical to maintain that the concept would have to be an infallible test for truth. If a judgement successfully proved to be coherent, it must be considered true – for it would have to pass through the process of translation as specified above. It means that it would be created on the basis of an original text – the data reliably acquired from the external reality and individualised by the subject – then later reformulated into a new language of the target text, in such a way as to agree with other theses of the system. And so its truth did not need

to be questioned, with its concordance approved both by individual person and the other creators of the system. The subject would naturally validate their own final judgement, and the rest of the community would also view it as legitimate (since it was produced by observing language principles of the system). Having such a double anchor, the truth of a given belief was successfully safeguarded.

When coherence is explained through the concept of translation, it seems inevitable to recognise it as constitutive of the nature of truth. It would not be merely a feature of judgement, but instead it would signify an act of producing it in a specific way. Truth is 'approximation' in a sense of articulating such a belief that via translational equivalence links the original reality of subjective experience with its target collective representation.

Conclusion

The authors of both recalled accounts argued that the search for truth involved development of the individual. Using the term 'self-fulfillment' Joachim viewed it as a dialectic between the particular and the ideal, while Blanshard's 'self-realisation' was described more in terms of subject-object transition. Against appearances, both thinkers disavowed ontological idealism; the translational framework enabled to explain how their models managed to defend themselves against this accusation.

Inscribing the translative element into the notion of coherence emphasised its processuality, with an outcome of establishing truth being a work in constant progress – just as in the case of producing a translated text. Next, similarly to the translator's task, unavoidable creativity involved in asserting truth could be recognised. At the same time, defining the initial experiential data as an original text allowed one to view it as a combination of what was externally given and an individual interpretation of it. Inclusion of externality – that which was given to the

translator – though transformed inevitably by their personal perspective, enabled to anchor truth outside the individual, saving the intuitively desired stability of the notion, defending it against relativism. Furthermore, the concept of translation equivalence provided a possible explanation for how the concrete and the ideal, thought and reality were to be connected. Presenting this 'truth relation' as analogical to equivalence revealed its two desirable features – on the one hand it was established by the individual, yet at the same time created for other subjects, to be approved by them and stay in accordance with commonly accepted principles.

From a wider perspective, the following study raised awareness of how closely the two concepts remain intertwined, prompting thereby to take a fresh look also on other theories of truth in search of their translative foundation.

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Giulia Cirillo
Wydział Filologiczny
Uniwersytet Jagielloński
giulia.cirillo1@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6292-2842