The method of appointment and responsibilities of the President of the Republic of Poland in the perspective of emergence of the Prime Minister’s government system

One should postulate far-reaching constitutional changes in terms of the political position and competences of the President of the Republic of Poland but without undermining the way he has been appointed so far. For now, all those rules must remain as they were decided on 27th September 1990. Only this way a non-conflict governance structure can be created in Poland. After some time, when this model of exercising public authority will became established, one can return to the question of how to elect the President of the Republic of Poland. In short, the efforts visible both in the Constitutional Act of 17th October 1992 and the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997, aimed at evolutionary limiting the scope of competences of the head of state, need to be continued.

Even if the mode of election of the President of the Republic of Poland cannot be changed at this time, at least a few de lege ferenda postulates can be formulated that would lessen the political effects of universal presidential elections, bringing us closer to the emergence of the Prime Minister’s government system. These postulates concerns, inter alia, lowering the majority needed to reject the presidential legislative veto, resigning from the legislative initiative on amending the Constitution, specifying the procedure for ratifying and terminating international agreements, limiting independence in conducting foreign policy, and some restrictions on the nomination of certain categories of public officials.

Formation of the right to court in Polish law before the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997

The article presents the formation and evolution of the right to court (right to fair trial) in the Polish law from medieval times to the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997. The development of the right to court in Poland has evolved under the influence of solutions adopted in the European legal systems, to which also Polish regulations have made a significant contribution. Thus, the bilateral reception of the models of the right to a fair trial took place, whereas the directions of this reception were changing over time. The achievements of Polish legislation in the historical development of a right to fair trial are significant on a world scale. In particular, in the period between the end of the Middle Ages and the mature phase of the Enlightenment, the documents forming the foundations of the European right to court were adopted (respectively: Jedlnia-Kraków privilege of 1430–1433 and the Constitution of May 3, 1791). The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland of 1952 did not provide for a subjective right to court indicating only which courts exercise justice in the People’s Republic. However, it was not possible to derive the right to court from these provisions and, in fact, the possibility to protect infringed rights before courts were often excluded. Between 1989–1997, when the democratic state of law was shaped in Poland after the fall of the Polish People’s Republic, the right to court was derived by the Constitutional Tribunal from the principle of a democratic state ruled by law.

Freedom of artistic expression in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights

The main topic of this work is the analysis of the freedom of artistic expression with the focus on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The article discusses the basic components of freedom of expression such as the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas. This work indicates the subjective criteria (features of the author’s speech and the specifics of hers/his statement ) and the subject (field, content, form, medium, and type of expression) which determine the scope of protection of freedom of expression. Article defines the criteria for restricting the freedom of expression and legitimate aims contained in the limitation clause in Article 10 section 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The considerations coveres the specificity of freedom of artistic expression. The analysis takes into account the position of artistic expression in the hierarchy of particular types of speech and the historical evolution of protection of these contents in international acts and ECHR jurisprudence. The key issues are the role of artistic expression in a democratic society, the limits of freedom of artistic expression stemming from the European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the ECHR, as well as current trends in the case-law of this Court.

Expressing consent for ratification of an international agreement – constitutional model and conditions for its implementation

Every political and legal system must have settled procedures for incurring international obligations, that is, besides indicating the authority responsible for signing international agreements, rules determining who and when (in what mode) agrees to ratification and who carries out the act of ratification. Parliament’s participation in ratifying or terminating international agreements, and in particular certain types of such agreements, falls within the standards of a democratic state organizing its system according to the principle of separation of powers. It takes, depending on the will of the particular constitution-maker and legislator, various forms, but as such it is a common phenomenon in the countries of Western democracy, and also embraced by post-socialist states, called the states of the new democracy.

Commentary on the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s Judgment of 25th March 2019, Case No. K 12/18 (the election of judges to the National Council of the Judiciary by the parliament)

The subject of the commentary is the recent judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, in which the Tribunal opted for the admissibility of the election of judges to the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) by the parliament. The paper questions the validity of such a decision indicating that it does not correspond to the constitutional regulation of the composition of the NCJ and the standards worked out in the existing Tribunal jurisprudence and legal literature. The author makes a critical assessment of the changes adopted by the legislator as inconsistent with the constitutional principles of independence of courts and judges and the separation of powers.