The article presents the working assumptions and methodology of carrying out a constitutional survey. The survey concerned legal assessment of the norms of the current Constitution and its practical application. Some questions also referred to the need to amend the Constitution and possible directions of the substantive adjustment of its provisions. The survey covered representatives of the science of constitutional law from all over Poland and had exclusively scientific objectives, in particular was not aimed at supporting any political legislative initiatives or pending legislative efforts. The article presents statistics of responses to individual questions of the survey commented briefly by the authors. It discusses inter alia the adequacy and effectiveness of the principle of separation and balancing of powers, regulations concerning constitutional responsibility, advantages and disadvantages of the current Constitution as well as the purposefulness of introducing unamendable provisions therein.

This paper is an extended version of my address at the conference held to summarise the Constitutional Survey on 16 June 2018 at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. It is devoted to proposals for amendments to the Polish Constitution of 1997 contained in the answers to the open questions from the Constitutional Survey we conducted in 2017 among constitutionalists (full professors, doctors habilitated and doctors).

The broad and rich set of proposals for amendments put forward by constitutionalists may lead to the conclusion that such amendments are needed in the Polish Constitution of 1997. Many respondents held that the numerous deficiencies found in Poland’s recent constitutional practice did not result from the contents of the Constitution, but from a certain way in which it was applied, or rather not applied, or even violated. A constitutional amendment cannot remedy problems caused by insufficient legal or political culture. One of the most important conclusions from our survey, supported by the vast majority of respondents, is that whereas the Polish Constitution of 1997 does require amendments, they should, firstly, be only partial amendments, rather than a new constitution, and, secondly, that they should not be introduced in the current political and systemic situation.

This text is an extended and modified version of the paper presented by the author during a scientific conference held on 16 June 2018 at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. It presents the merits of the current Constitutional regulations as pointed out by respondents to the Constitutional Survey conducted in 2017 amongst representatives of the science of constitutional law in Poland. The analysis of the results of this Constitutional Survey leads to the conclusion that the Constitution is generally positively evaluated by those who have been researching it for a number of years. It was pointed out that its merits outweigh flaws and that it is not so much the content or axiology of the Constitution, but rather the practice of its application, that can be assessed in a negative way. The Constitution is being used instrumentally at the moment and amended through ordinary laws. An analysis of the answers to the questions in the open part of the Constitutional Survey shows that constitutional law experts see a need to strengthen the guarantees of rigidity and stability of the Constitution and to increase the effectiveness of measures for protection of constitutional rights and freedoms. Representatives of the Polish science of constitutional law came to an almost unanimous conclusion that at present we are not having the so-called constitutional moment and inasmuch it is necessary to discuss the need to amend the Constitution and to propose different alternative solutions, yet there are no conditions for its amendment.

The Polish Constitution introduces the principle of division and balancing of the authorities. In Poland, we have a parlamentary system of government with a strengthened position of the president. The Constitution introduces tools for balancing of the authorities. They guarantee the deconcentration of power. We are currently dealing with abusive constitutionalism, which, contrary to the constitution, undermines the division of power.

In the middle of the Polish constitutional 2015–2018 crisis, references to a ‘constitutional moment’ concept had suddenly and unexpectedly appeared in the Polish public debate. This article aims to confront fundamental conditions and implications of constitutional moment theory with the Polish constitutional framework. Firstly, I will argue that it may be controversial to refer directly to the constitutional moment in an interpretive sense due to the scope of current Polish constitutional regulation and its historical development. Secondly, I will argue that according to the fundamental findings of Bruce Ackerman’s theory its application during the constitutional crisis in Poland is also impossible both in a descriptive as well as interpretive sense. Then, with references to Sujit Choudhry’s interpretation of Ackerman’s ‘higher lawmaking,’ the article will conclude that Poland may have a constitutional moment (in a descriptive sense only) at the end of constitutional crisis and the need to restore the rule of law.

On the Constitution as interpreted and applied by the “constitutionally sensitive” lawyer

The article attempts to answer the question of what the necessary qualities and the requirements are that a constitutional judge must fulfill to perform his judicial duties. The point of reference for these considerations is the figure of Professor Andrzej Mączyński, a retired judge and former vice-president of the Constitutional Tribunal. The author proceeds from the assumption that the methodology of constitutional interpretation has unique features that distinguish it from other forms of judiciary interpretation and application of law. The corner stone of that methodology concerns the concept of the so-called autonomous legal notions which are construed with respect to basic constitutional values and principles. Constitutional interpretation requires a comprehensive legal background covering all areas of law, a good understanding of the nature of a multi-faceted contemporary legal system, as well as a large historical knowledge on the evolution of law and the impact exerted by the legal tradition. A modern constitutional judge must not only have precise and wide knowledge, but also an imagination and an appropriate “constitutional sensitivity” especially in the field of the application of fundamental rights and constitutional values. His first imperative is to be obliged to look for what is called by the famous Polish lawyer Fryderyk Zell (junior) as the “righteous law”. In the second part of the article, the author analyzes the threats to the independence of the constitutional court, resulting from violations by the legislative and executive authorities, of the principles of a democratic state of law. The author refers to examples related to the activities of the legislative and executive powers undertaken against the Polish Constitutional Tribunal from autumn 2015.