The Treaty of Versailles, the details of which were ironed out at the Paris Peace Conference, officially brought to an end World War I. The Conference represented the first international debate on the problem of peace. Twenty-seven victorious nations participated. The defeated states of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria were not allowed to take part in the deliberations –  their only role was to sign separate versions of the treaty put before them. Bolshevik Russia was also not invited to the peace conference. On March 3, 1918, the latter signed its own peace accord in Brest with Germany and Austria, Hungary and their allies - Bulgaria and Turkey - thus violating its commitments to the Entente. This was because attendance at the peace conference depended not only on the attitude of the participants to the warring central states, but also on the moral norms recognized as binding in achieving peace.  The Treaty was a testament not only to the expectations of its signatories towards their defeated opponents, but also to their intellectual and ethical aspirations with regard to attaining peaceful coexistence. It established many new borders on the map of Europe and introduced a new order on the continent, one that was not only political in form, but also cultural and civilizational. Its foundations were to be built on the values of peace and justice. Therefore, there are grounds for describing the new order created on their basis as the civilization of peace.

There are many books and articles on the nationalist and fascist critics of Europe at the Versailles Conference, whereas there are no works in contemporary literature about conservative and aristocratic critics of this political model. The purpose of this text is to present the critics of the conservative side from the point of view of the elite of the Habsburg Empire. We have three social groups that defend the old empire: the aristocratic and cosmopolitan elites of the Austrian land-holding gentry, the Hungarian nobility and the Jews. These three groups do not understand the ideas of nation, nation-state, and nationalism. After the fall of the empire in 1918, only the Hungarian aristocracy and nobility retained their political role, running the Hungarian nation-state. Austria's traditional elite is cosmopolitan and in radical opposition to the new republic. Their political, international, supranational point of view represents the Paneuropean movement.

The fall of monarchy in Russia and two revolutions – February and October one – forced the National Democratic camp to change its policy on the Russian question. At Paris Peace Conference Roman Dmowski and his collaborators concluded that the Russian Civil War  has created an opportunity which might be used in the interest of Poland. There was an opinion, that Russia’s international position will stay weak for several years – thus, the acceptance of fait accompli policy in the East and the endeavor to make Russia agree for the new eastern border, according to the so called line of Dmowski. Remaining neutral in the conflict between Bolsheviks and the White movement was preferred, however – due to the proposals  by western countries – contacts with the representatives of White Russia and discreet talks with them were held in Paris. Roman Dmowski was ready to work on an agreement with White Russia on Polish conditions in spite of his disbelief that they will manage to defeat the Bolsheviks.

After some time Dmowski accepted the fall of White movement and started to think about finding a modus vivendi with new, Bolshevik Russia. This evolution began in Paris in 1919. One cannot say, that nothing was done then to reach an agreement with falling White Russia. However, all endeavors seemed to be deprived of any beliefs they might be successful.

This article discusses relationships between various ethnic and national groups that were characteristic for the North-Western part of region called Eastern Borderlands at the turn of XIX century. Vast literature on this subject is available, but it should be noted that the subject itself remains under strong political and ideological influence, it is also surrounded by many myths and common beliefs; and last but not least, there are historical sources that still have never been used in the discussion. One of such sources, not yet being used for research on ethnic divisions within the Polish-Lithuanian borderland at the beginning of XX century, are data gathered by Warsaw Statistical Committee in volume II (Ethnic Statistics for the Congress Poland) of the book Territorial Development of Polish Nationality(1917), by Włodzimierz Wakar. This work includes information on headcount of Polish and Lithuanian populations in years 1910 and 1914, divided by all communes and towns in the Suwalki Governorate. These statistical data are of exceptional scientific value, as they were gathered and aggregated at the commune level, showing detailed characteristics of ethnic transformations. By comparing the information regarding populations’ headcount in 1914 and 1910, it is possible to assess which of the two populations grew within this 4-year period. Thorough knowledge of dynamics and direction of ethnic (nationalistic) transformations taking place within the Suwalki Governorate, might bring us some interesting answers. It might help us find out if just before the World War I other regions inhabited by both Polish and Lithuanian populations, such as Vilnius, Grodno and Kaunas provinces, were under the process of polonization or lithuanization.

The purpose of the article is to explore the current trends in the development of the historiography of Soviet-Polish relations in 1921–1933 in Russia and is based on  the sources that have only recently been made available. The main trends in the development of Russian historiography at the beginning of the XXI century are: the development of a geopolitical approach to the analysis of Soviet-Polish relations and focus on the mutual influence of domestic and foreign policy of the two countries. Particularly noteworthy is the problem of the Russian-Ukrainian community in interwar Poland and anti-Bolshevik emigration. The research on the history of the interwar period and the history of secret services is very popular and is conducted with wider access to documents and taking into account new scientific methods.

The subject of the qualitative analysis are Russian and Polish programmes devoted to the 100th anniversary of the Versailles Treaty. Four television programmes from Russian and Polish television, which show similarities and differences, were analysed for the purpose of this article.

As the result of the Treaty of Versailles, Poland regains independence and Poles from the three partitions become full citizens of the Polish state. Such strong political changes had a significant influence on the culture of the reborn state. Polish culture of the 1920’s is not unified and homegeneous, which was demonstrated by literature. Various concepts of artistic activity and literary disputes appeared on its outskirts. A famous Skamander group, Cracow avantgarde, and the catastrophic philosophy represented by Witkacy are all worth mentioning. However, the element that connects these artists is that they wrote in the new political situation. Independent Poland and the changing world in which culture gains the status of a popular one, pose new challenges for the creators of culture. Culture’s task is to unite Poles.

The author reviews and sums up areas of research focused on the centennial of the Russian Revolution, Civil War and the end of World War One. Special emphasis is put to the Russian question at the 1919 Paris Peace (Versailles) Conference. The article presents both new and little known data revealing the differences among the Allied Powers regarding the Russian Revolution, the Bolshevik regime, support to the White Movement and the integrity of the Russian territory. It also studies some scarcely researched aspects of W. Wilson's program and US secret diplomacy, including the role of the'Inquiry', the American study group at Versailles Conference; Bullitt's mission to Soviet Russia; negotiations between M. Litvinov and W. Buckler; plans to recognize the Bolsheviks on the territory they were controlling in 1919.

In his article, the author discusses the reasons for the conclusion of peace treaties by the Central Powers with the Ukraine and Russia in February and March 1918. The article analyses the war goals of the Central Powers, especially Germany, and Austria-Hungary. It also depicts the situation of Russia and the Central Powers in the years 1917-1918. Furthermore, it describes the reasons that led individual countries to the Brest negotiating table, and presents the goals that these countries tried to achieve as the result of peace talks. An extensive part of the article constitutes a description of talks with the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, a description of the peace agreement concluded with the Ukraine on February 9, 1918 and its significance. It led to far-reaching consequences as it resulted in breaking the concept of the so-called the Austro-Polish solution and in the decisive turn of Poles against the Habsburg monarchy and the Ukrainians. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary failed to obtain supplies, grain and raw materials granted by  this agreement. The Ukraine was to supply 1 million tons of grain and a number of other resources. It was not viable as the country did not possess them. Nevertheless, it was the first international treaty to which the Ukraine was a signatory, and hence its great importance. It constituted international recognition of the Ukraine. A month later, on March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed with Soviet Russia. That was a confirmation of Russia's defeat in World War I. The country was unable to continue the war and had to sign it. The Soviet government signed a peace treaty knowing that they would break it at the first opportunity and did so immediately after the surrender of Germany on November 11, 1918. The author of the article presented the content of this treaty, the subsequent Soviet-German agreements of 1918 and their consequences - including details of the agreements with Turkey, as a result of which, on the one hand, Turkey tried to become the proverbial "regional power" in the Caucasus, and on the other, German troops entered Georgia.

Subcarpathian Ruthenia was a relic of the East Slavic world which survived in the hermetic conditions of the influence of the Hungarian political tradition. Connected with other Ruthenian lands by religious tradition, the language of the Church, speech similar to the folk language of other Ruthenian regions on the other side of the Carpathians, under the rule of the Polish Crown, this piece of Rus was not linked by political or cultural tradition with other regions of Ruthenian lands referring to the common Kiev heritage . During political emancipation, conservative influences were clashing here, on the one hand – those combining attachment to the archaic tradition and political orientation towards Hungary, and on the other: progressive popular democratic influences seeking unity with the Ukrainian national movement. As a result of complicated diplomatic efforts, Subcarpathian Ruthenia was included in the Czechoslovak Republic after World War I. The interwar period did not bring any noticeable economic and civilization progress to these lands.

This paper discusses sociohistorical factors and syncretic ideological sources of the Serbian anarchistic thought (from 1860’s) as well as its evolution and gradual disappearing in 20th century. Especially such specific elements as ties with local fraction of the Narodnikism, agraristic egalitarianism, criticism of the monarchistic state institutions and syndicalism are underlined. Also the reevaluating of these views (particularly antietatism) in the conditions of constructing of the new Yugoslav state after 1918 is investigated. The examples presented here confirm the thesis that after initial popularity of the anarchistic slogans (among others Mita Cenić and Krsta Cicvarić) in post-Versailles Yugoslavia this ideology was disarmed (except for Rodoljub Čolaković’s case ) and absorbed by the centralised communist movement.

In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS), established in 1918, yugoslavism as a political idea of the integration of the nations was correlated by the Serbian intellectuals with another kind of the idea of community which only preserved terminological appearances of connection with the initial conception. In the interwar reality, unprecised „integral yugoslavism” gradually became the indication of the ethnic exclusivism of the Serbs and their leadership ambitions in the new state (philosophical ground for such a vision layed Miloš Djurić, whereas nationalisation of the community project was continued by Vladimir Dvorniković). The radicalisation of this programme ensued thanks to the ideologists of so called Christian nationalism (above all  Dimitrije Ljotić) and led to the affirmation of the values of the native traditionalism. Such a thought with a fascist indication, supported with the politicised Orthodoxy and taking shape of the Serbian national idea from the nineteen-thirties, will be constituted as a primary factor of the disintegration of the (imaginary) community of the Yugoslavs right into the nineteen-nineties.