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Volume 25

Diplomacy and Inter-State Relations in the Hellenistic World

2018 Next

Publication date: 06.12.2018

Description

Digitalizacja czasopisma naukowego (rocznika) „Electrum” w celu zapewnienia otwartego dostępu do nich przez sieć Internet - zadanie finansowane w ramach umowy nr 606/P-DUN/2018 ze środków Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.

Licence: CC BY-NC-ND  licence icon

Editorial team

Editor-in-Chief Orcid Edward Dąbrowa

Issue content

Omar Coloru

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 9 - 12

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.001.8921
This contribution discusses the location of Baiseira, where Seleucos II, during his campaign against the Parthians, gave an audience to a delegation from a group of villages involved in horse breeding. The article challenges the assumption that the epistle comes from Drangiana and suggests that it better fi ts the context of appeals to the king from Media.
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Tomasz Grabowski

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 13 - 26

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.002.8922
Attalus III based the position of his state in Asia Minor mostly on his military successes. Nevertheless, he skilfully enhanced these successes with diplomacy. His most important tools in this respect became euergetism, philhellenism, as well as making appropriate use of the popularity that was brought by his victories over the Galatians. Establishing relationships with the Greek states of Asia Minor was of considerable importance for the Attalids’ state. In this respect, Attalus’ achievements are indisputable.
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Maciej Piegdoń

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 27 - 46

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.003.8923
Rome’s expansion in the Hellenistic world had an impact on the use of various instruments of diplomacy by the Romans, including arbitration, commonly used by and popular among the Greeks. The Romans did not have the desire to become arbitrators of the Greek world, but it was important to them to take advantage of the situation they encountered there and to achieve their goals. The Greeks, who had been used to employing various, more or less sophisticated, diplomatic instruments, saw the Roman Republic, a new player in their world, in the same way as the other large and mighty powers which could be appealed to as arbitrators. Rome did not become an arbitrator in Greek matters of its own will, but due to the fact that the Greek world itself appointed it to this role when it replaced the Hellenistic monarchies. The Romans became involved in solving disputes in the Greek world only when they had to. Despite being offered this role, the Senate had no intention of being an “arbitration court” for the confl icted Greek states. Roman arbitrators acted on the basis of the authority given to them by the Senate (senatus consulta), which fi rst became familiar with the cause of the dispute. Disputes were usually solved by Roman offi cials (proconsul, governor) or specially delegated legates and decemviri with prepared instructions which gave them the authority to solve the matter on the spot and to enforce the decisions they made. The procedure applied both to the Greek world and to the western part of the Mediterranean Sea, where Rome held power (North Africa, Italy). However, what differentiated the arbitration in Italy and the western part of Rome’s dominion from the one in the Greek world was the Republic appointing other Greek states (poleis or leagues) to arbitrate on its behalf. When deciding to arbitrate, the Romans were usually not interested in the history of the dispute, but solved the disagreement or confl ict on the basis of the status quo, without going into the details of who had been right previously. This was different from the rules of arbitration in the Greek world, where earlier mediation was taken into consideration. Perhaps this was a result of the difference between the Roman and the Greek worlds in terms of property right. The Roman law of property had an important distinction between legal ownership of a thing (dominium or proprietas), called property right, and the actual possession of a thing (possessio). For the Republic, this approach made it easier to side with their allies participating in a dispute, even if they were wrong. This attitude mainly protected the interests of the allied state, unless it was benefi cial to Rome to act against them.
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Panagiotis P. Iossif

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 47 - 72

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.004.8924
This article proposes a quantitative reading of the hoard evidence concerning the coin production of Antiochos IV. The “Seleucid Hoard Database” (SHD) is used as the starting point for addressing the question of coinage as “tool of diplomacy or legitimacy” of the king’s reign. The demonstration, following a recent comparable analysis on the coinage of Antiochos III, is meant to serve as a methodological manifest of the usefulness of large datasets, statistical analyses and quantifi cations when considering historical issues. The role of Antioch as a major mint is examined, as well as the westward circulation patterns of Antiochos’ issues, while the quantitative analysis of obverse and reverse types serves as a reference point for the divinization of the king and the political messages transmitted through his numismatic production.
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Edward Dąbrowa

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 73 - 83

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.005.8925
Dynastic marriages in the Hellenistic world were an important diplomatic tool that provided distinct political benefi ts to one or both of the parties involved. The Parthian rulers from the Arsacid dynasty also engaged in such unions with other ruling houses. Surviving sources contain information on such marriages with the members of the Seleucid family, the Artaxiad dynasty, which ruled in Armenia, but also ruling houses in Commagene and Media Atropatene. Not all of these links resulted from a bilateral agreement, however; some were the result of imposition of the Arsacids’ will. The author attempts to demonstrate the circumstances in which each of the known dynastic marriages of the rulers of Parthia came about, as well as the objectives they hoped to achieve as a result.
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Altay Coşkun

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 85 - 125

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.006.8926
Linda Zollschan promises a highly interdisciplinary study of the report on the first Roman embassy to Rome under Judas Maccabee in 1Macc 8. In part, she argues that the Senate did not grant the requested alliance, but only informal amicitia; in part, she claims that not even amicitia was granted but only a declaration of liberty; in part, she proposes that the ambassadors misunderstood the result of their mission, since it meant subjection under Rome without effective protection. Further results include the views that the embassy was undertaken in 162 BCE, and that the account and treaty text is based on the Aramaic report of the ambassadors Eupolemus and Jason. The contradictions and misunderstandings of Zollschan’s book are plentiful and serious. The present study engages with the questions she asks and with the answers she gives, adds substantially to the recent bibliography in the addressed areas and concludes with very different assessments: namely, that we should maintain the traditional date of 161/60 BCE for the Judaean embassy, that the Senate granted a treaty of friendship and alliance, that the Continuator of 1Macc inserted the (highly edited) version he found on a bronze inscription in Jerusalem, and that success was largely denied to the mission, since the ambassadors returned after Judas had died in battle. 
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Julia Wilker

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 127 - 145

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.007.8927
During the reign of Alexander Jannaeus (103–76 BCE), Judea underwent a number of significant changes. This article explores one of them: the fundamental shift in foreign policy strategy. This shift becomes most apparent in the king’s decision to not renew the alliance with Rome, which had been a hallmark of Hasmonean foreign policy since the days of Judas Maccabaeus. However, a close analysis of Alexander Jannaeus’ policy regarding other foreign powers demonstrates that the end of the Judean-Roman alliance did not happen in a vacuum. It is shown that under Alexander Jannaeus, the Hasmonean state adopted a different strategy towards imperial powers by focusing on deescalation and ignorance rather than alliances. In contrast, interactions with other rising states in the vicinity, such as the Nabateans and Itureans, increased. This new orientation in foreign policy refl ected changes in Hasmonean identity and self-defi nition; Judea did not need imperial support to maintain its independence anymore but strived to increase its status as a regional power. 
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Andreas Zack

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 147 - 185

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.008.8928
The key thesis of this essay is that, in the documentary excursus of the 14th book, Josephus took the offi cial titles of Caesar from the text of his sources. The titles of Caesar were perfectly understandable to the contemporaries of the original documents in respect of their chronological statement. If one approaches the texts of Josephus with this perspective, then the documents can be put into a chronological order that gives a conclusive historical and political sense. 
 
Only from the backward point of view of Josephus (and also of today reader) the titles of Caesar confusing. As a result, Josephus presented the documents in a chronological, confused order because he had the documents as a loose collection of deeds, and because he did not understand their datings. But this was negligible with regard to Josephus’ apologetic intention, as he was concerned not with a historically accurate arrangement of the documents in their correct chronological order, but with proof that the Romans had in the past repeatedly granted the Jews special privileges.
 
For this purpose, Josephus’ chosen manner of presenting the documents was perfectly adequate. With this result, a further argument for the latest interpretation – elaborated by Miriam Pucci Ben Zeev (1998) – is now obtained, that Josephus’ direct or indirect sources for the documents in the 14th book of the antiquitates Iudaicae were authentic documents. A systematic overview of the reconstructed chronology and sequence of documents and the individual titles of Caesar 48–44 BCE can be found in the chronological table at the end of the article. 
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Victor Parker

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 187 - 208

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.009.8929
The article traces the see-sawing fortunes of the Galatian ruler Deiotarus, how he gained and lost and regained control over various territories (the three Galatian tetrarchies; Lesser Armenia; and an unnamed coastal strip of land between Galatia and Lesser Armenia) from 63 BC until his death in ca. 40 BC. It also examines Cicero’s rhetorical strategy in his speech in Deiotarus’ defence before Caesar and argues that much in the speech cannot be taken at face value – many remarks of Cicero’s about Deiotarus are two-edged and should not be used uncritically in reconstructing Deiotarus’ career.
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David Engels

ELECTRUM, Volume 25, 2018, pp. 209 - 241

https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.18.010.8930
All too often, the modern political sciences attribute the development of a purely pragmatic, non-idealistic state theory to Machiavelli, perhaps with some fl eeting allusions to the importance of Plato, Aristotle or Polybius. However, a closer examination of our sources shows that many other civilisations have developed similar approaches, generally in periods experiencing political and social transformations not dissimilar to the complex evolutions of the European 16th century. In this paper, we will try to critically compare a series of authors in order to demonstrate the interest of a cross-cultural approach to the subject of state-theory, namely Sūn Zǐ, Kauṭilya, Aineias Taktikos and Machiavelli.
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