Following the recent attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of Ctesias and the information given in his works, this paper proposes to understand certain of the seemingly fanciful details that were associated with the physician and his writings. It tries to shed some light on several uncertainties connected with Ctesias (i.e., his sojourn in Persia) and the Persica (i.e., date, original style and sources of imagery). It argues that the pedestrian lists included in the work might have been later interpolations and that the minor works circulating under Ctesias’ name might have been either sections of the Persica that were taken out to be presented as stand-alone volumes or else falsely attributed to him. The paper addresses the Indica and puts forward several possibilities concerning its relation with the Persica. The influence of Ctesias on the author Deinon is examined, and in the appendix the impact of the Persica on Xenophon’s Anabasis is analyzed.

The Daochos Monument at Delphi has received some scholarly attention from an art-historical and archaeological perspective; this article, however, examines it rather as a reflection of contemporary Thessalian history and discourse, an aspect which has been almost entirely neglected. Through its visual imagery and its inscriptions, the monument adopts and adapts long-standing Thessalian themes of governance and identity, and achieves a delicate balance with Macedonian concerns to forge a symbolic rapprochement between powers and cultures in the Greek north. Its dedicator, Daochos, emerges as far more than just the puppet of Philip II of Macedon. This hostile and largely Demosthenic characterisation, which remains influential even in modern historiography, is far from adequate in allowing for an understanding of the relationship between Thessalian and Macedonian motivations at this time, or of the importance of Delphi as the pan-Hellenic setting of their interaction. Looking closely at the Daochos Monument instead allows for a rare glimpse into the Thessalian perspective in all its complexity.

The identification of Aeneas Tacticus has always been a matter of dispute. Most often he is supposed to have been a mercenary officer, probably from Stymphalus, to whom Xenophon makes reference in Hellenica, 7.3.1. Accordingly, one may find the views that in Aeneas’ treatise a mercenary perspective is adopted, a claim also supported by the observation that the author records the phenomenon of the ubiquitous popularity of paid soldiers in the Greek warfare system of the fourth century BC. In this paper it is argued that Aeneas’ outlook in fact had little in common with mercenary ethics; instead, it is the writer’s deep commitment to civic values (explicitly stated in the Preface) that is stressed. Especially worth pointing out remains Aeneas’ belief that during siege civic patriotism still matters. It is a value on which success in overwhelming the invaders depends: all the steps and preventive actions of the city’s dwellers leading to a successful defense of a native polis must be rooted – according to him – in the conviction that polis in its material (territory, estates, shrines, temples, walls) and spiritual dimension (religion, gods, respect for the parents) constitutes the best framework for life. By the same token, a relatively high importance is given by Aeneas to hoplite troops, usually consisting of yeomen and farmers who were the owners of land. In the author’s conviction they could provide the best possible protection to a polis. Looking from a purely military point of view, hoplite forces – together with auxiliary troops (the light-armed and cavalry, if possible) – were also useful at the time when the enemy entered the city’s territory and ravaged it before attempting a direct assault on the walls.

In the 250s and 240s continental Greece found itself in a particularly complicated situation. The growth of the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, as well as Sparta’s awoken ambitions, presented the Ptolemies with favorable conditions to actively pursue efforts to weaken the Macedonian influence there. Initially, the partner of the Ptolemies became the Achaean League. In this way, the Ptolemaic fleet gained important footholds, including both Corinthian ports, Kenchreai in the Saronic Gulf and Lechaion in the Corinthian Gulf. This strengthened the position of the Lagids at sea, and it was the islands on the Aegean Sea and the coasts of Asia Minor that were in the centre of the Ptolemies’ interest. However, the Aetolian League could continue to be seen as one of their possible partners in Greek politics. We should not exaggerate the Achaean-Aetolian conflict. After the death of Antigonus Gonatas in 239, the two conflicted federations were joined by an alliance. It cannot be excluded that Sparta also cooperated with the coalition, and the king of Egypt could have been a convenient link in this cooperation. There is no information whatsoever to suggest an Egyptian initiative to form the coalition. After the defeat of the Egyptian fleet at Andros in ca. 245, the position of the Lagids in the Aegean Sea was not as strong as it had once been. This was all the more reason for Ptolemies to closely observe the Aetolians’ intense activity on the Aegean Sea. The Ptolemies and Aetolians concluded symmachia. Ultimately, however, alliances were reversed: Aratus pushed the Achaean League towards a coalition with Macedonia, but earlier, having learned about the Achaean-Macedonian negotiations, Ptolemy decided to cancel his financial support for the Achaeans and hand it over to Sparta. It is very likely that the situation in the whole Aegean region (especially the expedition of Antigonus Doson to Caria in 227) played a role in changing the Ptolemies’ policy. The contacts which the Aetolian League established in the region were all the more reason for Ptolemy III to choose Cleomenes and the Aetolians at the expense of the Achaean League. At that time, the beginning of closer relations between the Aetolians and the Attalids could also be observed. It cannot be ruled out that the Ptolemaic diplomacy was a mediator, since up until then the Aetolians had no common interests with Pergamum. For the Lagids, on the other hand, the Attalids were a force worth supporting against the Seleucids, just as the Aetolians were a valuable partner in the rivalry against Macedonia.
 

This preliminary study of the so-called ‘Pistiros Inscription’ challenges the dominant interpretation of the document that has crystallized in the years since its preliminary publication, namely, that the inscription somehow guarantees the rights of traders operating within Pistiros. A reexamination of the rhetorical structure of the inscription and a reconstruction of the inscription’s relationship with preexisting documents on this subject, which are not extant, raises the possibility that the function of the inscription was somewhat different than the communis opinio: the Pistiros Inscription appears to have supplemented earlier regulation concerning Pistiros and to have attempted to limit the authority of an official, possibly a Thracian royal, who exercised dramatic power within Pistiros.
 

The view that the successes of Macedon in the fourth century marked the failure, or the end, of the Greek polis is increasingly being abandoned, and some scholars are abandoning also the view that Athens was great and glorious in the fifth century but degenerate in the fourth. However, the successes of Macedon meant for Athens the loss of that ultimate freedom which it had aspired to and had often enjoyed between the early fifth century and the late fourth, freedom not merely from receiving orders from others but to give orders to others, and in this paper I explore the reasons for that change. Some scholars believe that fourth-century Athens was led astray by “the ghost of empire;” others believe that the Athenians were unwilling to pay for a response which could have defeated Philip; I argue that except in the years after Leuctra the ghost of empire did not have malign effects, and even with more expenditure Athens could not have defeated Philip. There was nothing fundamentally wrong with Athens in the fourth century, but Sparta’s success in the Hellespont in 387 and the resulting King’s Peace, the rule in Macedon of Philip II, who was too clever diplomatically and became too strong militarily for the Athenians, and Alexander’s succession in 336 and his success and survival in his campaigns, placed Athens in situations which it could not overcome.

This paper deals with a famous passage by Theopompus concerning the hetairoi of Philip II. Athenaeus, one of the three authors who transmitted this fragment to us, states that Philip had 800 hetairoi in 339, which seems to be too low a number for the last years of the reign. In search of a solution which would match Athenaeus’ quotation from Theopompus with other data about Macedonian cavalry under Philip and Alexander, I consider a textual corruption in Athenaeus.

This article attempts to make a critical assessment of the preserved fragments of Thettalon politeia as a source on the history of early Thessaly. The traces of the existence of this text come from the second half of the 2nd century CE at the earliest, but even then it was seen as one of the Politeiai recorded by Aristotle. As a result of this attribution, information from this text is treated as a reliable source of knowledge on the koinon organization of the Thessalians and their joint army. There are, however, important reasons to treat this source with the greatest caution: we have only six short quotations from the work available, and the part which refers to Aleuas’ supposed reforms is very much damaged and has been subjected to a number of emendations by its various publishers. The description of the system of mobilization of the Thessalian army from Thettalon politeia seems anachronistic, and probably arose under the influence of information about the reorganization of the army conducted in the 370s BCE by Jason of Pherae and the propaganda that accompanied these changes.

There is a certain difficulty in attempts to describe the period in Syracuse between the death of Timoleon and the coming to power of Agathocles. It was a time of great turmoil and political instability – Syracuse would reappear after 317 BC as a tyranny. This article is a review of the events and causes that shaped the final outcome. The main points of interests are: an attempt to describe a type of government present in the given period, especially the function of the group of the so-called “Six Hundred Noblest,” and the career of Agathocles, an exemplary one considering the political realities of the time.

Proper understanding of Iphicrates’ stratagem at Polyaenus 3.9.38, marred by a lacuna, can be derived from Leo Tact. 20.196, where anchoring a fleet off a harborless coastline is described. Emending Polyaenus’ text from the reading of a later MS also clarifies the anecdote’s meaning. Leo knew the full text of Polyaenus, since Polyaenus 3.9.38 does not occur in the abbreviated Excepta Polyaeni, which some recently suggest replaced the Strategica in Byzantine use of Polyaenus.