Karol Łopatecki

The Lithuanian Convocation of 1615. Research on the Procedure for Adopting Convocation Resolutions

The article presents the circumstances of the convening of the Lithuanian convocation of 1615, along with the course of the event and the resolutions it considered, with special consideration of the procedure for enacting law in this form of parliamentary assembly. Before the convocation could be convened, deputies had to be elected at pre-convocation sejmiks. Then, the deputies and the senators had to assemble at the time and place specified in the royal legacja. The sessions of the 1615 convocation lasted from May 21^st to June 5^th and took place in two chambers. There were at least 6 senators and more than 50 deputies. The resolutions passed during the convocation can be divided into 31 issues. They were recorded, and messengers were appointed at the convocation to carry their contents to the king. It was only after the monarch expressed his consent that the tax resolutions and legal standards became the applicable law. Sigismund III rejected three resolutions, modified two, and approved eighteen. The article presents in detail the output of the convocation, both in terms of passing tax laws and enacting other entirely new laws. 

* Artykuł powstał w ramach projektu badawczego Narodowego Centrum Nauki SONATA, nr 2016/23/D/HS3/03210 pt. „Rewolucja militarna jako czynnik modernizacyjny skarbowości i organizacji państwa polsko-litewskiego na tle europejskim”.

The Use of Maps in the Planning of Operational Activities of Polish and Lithuanian Armies until the Beginning of the Rule of Stephen Báthory

As per the 16th and 17th centuries, operational activities should be understood as military activities conducted by independent groups (usually regiments). They may also be termed the art of manoeuvre. One may place them between strategic decisions and specific tactic actions related to fi ghting a battle or conducting a siege. The first mid-16th-century theoreticians to have observed the importance of this art were Albrecht Hohenzollern and Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski. Some 16th-cenutry authors (e.g. Jan Tarnowski, Albrecht Hohenzollern, Marcin Bielski) concordantly postulated the introduction of a preceding manoeuvre action that would last one day. This assumption survived until  the early 18th century.

As early as in 1551, Modrzewski proposed to follow the Turkish example and make special maps for the purposes of the moving army. Apart from the Turks, caesarean experiences were also mentioned. Bartosz Paprocki and Andrzej Gostyński quoted mainly the example of Charles V (1500–1558). Bartosz Paprocki and Stanisław Sarnicki, in turn, writers active at the beginning of the rule of Stephen Báthory, opted for the necessity of having a cartographer in the army who would make march route maps au courant. The cartographic turn in manoeuvre activities took place in 1567–1577, during the war fought against the rebellious Gdańsk. According to our knowledge, five different maps and plans were made in this period. The production of march route maps required measuring distances with steps, which greatly facilitated reconnoitring. Uniform march step enabled even the determination of the distance covered on the basis of the time lapsed. Engineers could have used an aid in the form of pedometers that counted the number of steps of a man or a horse. T ese assumptions were disseminated in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by Marcin Bielski who quoted an ancient Roman concept of a double step (passus – 148 cm).  

On the Need to Supplement the “Akta zjazdów stanów Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego”: The Edition of Documents Concerning the Lithuanian Convocation

The article is the edition of two sources supplementing the publication series “Akta zjazdów stanów Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego” [Records of Conventions of the Estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania] edited by Henryk Lulewicz. Both documents refer to the Lithuanian Convocation of 1615. One of them is “Punkta postanowiene na Convocatiey” [Resolutions Adopted at the Convocation] (Vilnius, 5 VI 1615), prepared for the deputies who were to present the resolutions of the general convocation to Sigismund III Vasa. The other one is the king’s response to the resolutions and the above-mentioned decisions of the Lithuanian Convocation. In the introduction to the published materials I stress the significance of the ruler’s response to the resolutions of the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. With few exceptions, the approval of the monarch was necessary to make tax resolutions and legal standards valid law. Therefore, the final process of the legislative procedure of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania needs to be taken into consideration in the context of historical and legal research.

* Edycja źródłowa powstała w ramach projektu badawczego Narodowego Centrum Nauki SONATA, nr 2016/23/D/HS3/03210 pt. „Rewolucja militarna jako czynnik modernizacyjny skarbowości i organizacji państwa polsko-litewskiego na tle europejskim”.

The Siege and Capture of the Polatsk Fortress by the His Majesty Stephen, the King of Poland – the Use of Cartography in Tactical Planning

The siege of Polatsk is not the first example of the application of cartographic plans in siege operations conducted by the Crown or Lithuanian armies. We should mention the capture of Uła in 1568 or the battle at Latarnia in 1577. Undoubtedly, however, the situation in 1579 is a model material demonstrating the use of cartography for siege purposes at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries. At first, before launching military camps, the high command meticulously analysed the fortifications. The pictorial, or landscape, manner was not in use any more – the whole establishment was ridden around once or twice. Thus gathered information was captured on paper and, during the first council of war, constituted the basis for developing the tactics of conquering the fortress. At such a meeting, the locations of military camps were chosen and the way and location of siege operations was decided. We should add that cartographic plans were corrected au courant.

The drawing made for the purposes of a print published in Rome in 1580 (Obsidio et expugnatio munitissimae arcis Polocensis per serenissimum Stephanum Poloniae regem) was probably a compilation of several works, not necessarily authored by one person. What is sure, the plan of the Polatsk fortress used at the council of war was made on August 11. Beyond any doubt, the scheme of the tactical formation arranged around Polatsk on August 29 was also created during the same meeting. Possibly, there was also a map showing the surroundings of Polatsk with marked military camps and sites of conducted siege works. Hence Stanisław Pachołowiecki’s print includes as many as four information layers: the location of military camps, the tactical formation arranged on August 29 around Polatsk (ordre de bataille), fortifications, and the plan of the undertaken siege operations.

An Assessment of the Credibility of Cartographic Sources Presenting the Siege of Polatsk in 1579

This paper presents an analysis of cartographic works made in connection with the siege and capture of the Polatsk fortress by the army of Stephen Báthory in 1579. The aim of the study is to recompare the content of cartographic sources concerning the siege of Polatsk with the preserved plans from the middle 16th and early 17th centuries.
The most accurate and credible plan of Polatsk from 1579 is a print made by Stanisław Pachołowiecki. The outline of the fortifications was presented in a fine way, fundamentally consistent with a plan of the same fortress from the mid-17th century. In comparison, a drawing by Paweł Thurn (Czumthurn) is littered with significant mistakes. It is, therefore, most probable that the drawing was not based on the same model as the print; it might have been patterned after sketches made by an Italian engineer, Petrus Francus.
The analysis conducted indicates that the print of Georg Mack the younger cannot be treated as a cartographic source but only as its author’s imagination about the events that took place at the influx of the Palata river to Daugava. It was based on written information and does not seem to have any foundation in plans made at Polatsk. The instance of a woodcut with the siege of the Starodub fortress that was repeated in a work of Aleksander Gwagnin as the representation of the capture of Polatsk shows that it is necessary to perform critical source analysis every single time.
In the article, the author introduced a heretofore largely unknown plan of the extension of Polatsk kept in Riksarkivet in Stockholm. It has been established that the plan was probably made in the years 1647–1654 in consequence of a fire that destroyed the castles. It depicts the former fortifications with planned bastion works marked in red. In his audacious concept, the military engineer resigned from the natural protection provided by Palata and planned to build bastion fortifications on the other bank of the river. This ring would have been the first defence line of a regular shape and was supposed to provide good defence synchronisation with the Lower Castle. A comparison of this plan with a map form 1707 shows that this concept was not realized.

The offensive of the Dutch West India Company in Brazil (1634–1636)

This article presents the offensive of the Dutch West India Company conducted in Brazil in 1634–1636. The conquest by Sigismund von Schkoppe and Krzysztof Arciszewski of one of the biggest cities of the New World – Paraíba and the fortress Arraial Velho do Bom Jesus, as well as the battle carried on 17th and 18th January 1636 were described. The Dutch successes during the war were mostly the result of military reforms carried out by Krzysztof Arciszewski in cooperation with Schkoppe. The Colonel mainly adjusted the organization of the army to the unusual terrain which was Brazil. At first, huge areas were controlled by a small army of several thousand. For this reason, and because of the landform, he reduced the number of companies and introduced military units of 40 or 50 people. He also gave up pikemen formations and increased the number of musketeers instead. Furthemore, the Colonel tried to unite actions of the navy and infantry.
 

The Origins and Military Usefulness of the Map Descriptio Ducatus Polocensis of Stanisław Pachołowiecki (1580)

The Role of Maps and Plans in the Tactics of Polish and Lithuanian Armies until the Beginning of the Rule of Stephen Báthory

In this paper, the author analyses cartographic activities that directly affected the course of an armed conflict. Classic instances of such activities include the production of documents for the purposes of a siege or the preparation of an army for a battle, as well as plans of setting a military camp or the upbuilding of defence fortifications in a city or a fortress. The author analyses them in the chronological order, beginning with the earliest mentions concerning the use of maps in tactic actions until 1576.

The first theoretician to have connected cartographic activity with military tactics was Szymon Marycjusz of Pilzno. He presented his theses in a work entitled De scholis seu academiis libri duo printed in 1551. The evidence collected indicates that in the first half of the 16th century people did not know how to use cartography for tactical military purposes. Military large scale cartography had different methodological rudiments than medium scale or small scale maps. The fundamental methodological assumption in the creation of plans consisted in leaving the pictorial manner (of landscape topographic accounts) for the sake of making a circuit around the area drawn. This had been previously postulated by Stanisław Grzepski who referred to Albrecht Dürer, while descriptions of such a solution date back as far as to the accounts of Maciej Stryjkowski from the 1570s. The precision of large scale military maps required the use of mathematical knowledge (namely, geometry). A need emerged for a special professional group of people measuring the height, width and depth of objects. The application of mathematics in the army was postulated as early as in 1555 by Albrecht Hohenzollern, while a group of professional military engineers was first described by Stanisław Sarnicki in Księgi hetmańskie (where he refers to them as metator castrorum).

The use of cartography in the conduct of a siege in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began in the 1560s. It was then that Albrecht Hohenzollern made an exemplary isometric projection of a besieged city. The year 1568 brought a plan of the attack on the Uła castle made probably by Maciej Stryjkowski.

Engravings Depicting the Polotsk Campaign in 1579 as a Homogeneous Cartographic Composition

The paper presents seven plans of fortresses (Polotsk, Sokil, Kazyany, Krasne, Turovla, Susza and Sitno) and a map of the principality of Polotsk by Stanisław Pachołowiecki. The analysis indicates that plans of fortifi cations and hydrogeologic conditions were integrated into a previously existing operational map of the principality of Polotsk. Therefore, eight printed maps and plans constitute a joint work that was uniformly finished by one author (Stanisław Pachołowiecki or Giovanni Battista Cavalieri). The map of the principality of Polotsk features Russian fortifications in the form of two-dimensional projections. The strongholds were depicted in a reliable manner, both in terms of shape and the number of towers. Such a representation of settlement symbols was an innovative solution in Renaissance cartography. Not until the 17th century were such means known and they did not appear on a broader scale until the 1730s.

The Use of Maps in Strategic Actions Until 1586 in the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania

The paper presents the oldest instances of applying cartography during strategic actions in the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The promoters and – possibly – also the proponents of using maps in the army were Stanisław Łaski and Jan Tarnowski. Tarnowski not only wrote about the need for the application of cartographic knowledge by the high command, but also modified permanent defence according to the spatial reconnaissance of Tartar routs. They were to be supervised by a specifically appointed Field Crown Guardian. The oldest map used during the defence was Bernard Wapowski’s map of Sarmatia from 1526. It contained a black trail that was the chief route of the Tartar army march. In 1576, a precise rout consisting of three trails used by the Crimean Khanate was made by a committee appointed to lustrate the royal demesne of the Podolian and Ruthenian voivodeships. They were marked on a map of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by Stanisław Sarnicki in the early 1580s. At the beginning of Stephen Báthory’s ruling, the European publishing market suffered from a shortage of printed maps that could significantly aid strategic actions conducted during the war with the Tsardom of Muscovy (Livonia was an exception). The creation of a suitable map that could facilitate strategic planning was entrusted to Marcin Strubicz. The first and second edition was made in 1579–1580. The first version of Strubicz’s map (1579) contained a description of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania entitled Descriptio Lituanie. Strubicz applied in it a solution unknown elsewhere in Europe  consisting in providing military regulations next to the description of Lithuanian lands. Latin versions of Grzegorz Chodkiewicz’s military articles published by Strubicz indicated that the map had a purely military purpose.