Herodotus and other Greek authors about loyalty and betrayal in the besieged city This study attempts to determine the frequency of the betrayal of a besieged city in the world of Herodotus. The Histories is an excellent source of knowledge about the attitude of Greeks towards disloyal fellow citizens opening the city gates to the enemy, at a time when siege machines were not yet known, and betrayal (along with hunger and deception) was practically the only chance to conquer the city. Consequently, the question arises: do broader historical and literary studies (testimonies from subsequent decades and centuries) allow us to see the correlation between the popularity of the phenomenon of city betrayal and the development of siege technique. Was the role of betrayal decreasing with time when tools appeared that could assault the city walls? The article is an attempt to answer the question about the importance of loyalty to the local community in the face of war in the context of changing external conditions.

During the long reign of the Great King Artaxerxes II (404–359 BC) there was a number of events very interesting for the research on the subject of loyalty and betrayal. Shortly after Artaxerxes took the Achaemenid throne, his younger brother Cyrus, called the Younger, revolted against him. Cyrus was the ruler and commander‑in‑chief in Anatolia and it was the region where he revolted. While keeping his revolt secret, he did not reveal his disloyalty towards the King. After gathering the army he marched against Artaxerxes to overthrow him. In the battle fought at Cunaxa, near Babylon, Artaxerxes won the victory while Cyrus died in the battle (401 BC).
Among Cyrus’ followers in his expedition against the King were, among others, Orontas and Ariaeus. Orontas was subordinate of Cyrus, who previously revolted against him in Anatolia and then returned to his favors, while during the expedition against the King was accused of plotting against Cyrus for Artaxerxes. As a result he was executed in Cyrus’ camp. Ariaeus too was Cyrus’ subordinate and he commanded part of his army at Cunaxa. Soon after the battle ended he made an agreement with Tissaphernes, one of the commanders of Artaxerxes’ army, and joined the King’s camp. Tissaphernes, in turn, 52 Michał Podrazik distinguished himself in his invariably loyalty to the King, but some years later (395 BC) was executed by the King’s order.
In the 360s against Artaxerxes revolted a number of commanders and dignitaries in Anatolia. There were Datames, Ariobarzanes and Orontas. During Datames’ warfare, he was betrayed by his father‑in‑law and commander of his cavalry Mithrobarzanes, and then by his oldest son Sysinas, who both joined Artaxerxes’ camp. Ariobarzanes, in turn, was left by his son Mithridates, who betrayed him to the King. As regards Orontas, after he had revolted against Artaxerxes, he betrayed to him those who revolted with him, demonstrating his loyalty to the monarch.
All the abovementioned data, taken together, provide a good insight into the subject of loyalty and betrayal in the Achaemenid Empire, allowing us to better known and understand the subject.

There is no doubt that justifying Caesar’s subsequent military campaigns using the argument of barbarians’ disloyalty is too frequent to treat them in a different way than the immanent part of his literary creations. Valuation of their conduct in terms of loyalty – deception had to be based on a pattern having strong cultural roots, otherwise it would not fulfill its role. Explaining specifics of Caesar’s war narrative solely by the requirements of political propaganda does not appear to be sufficient, so cultural context should be considered as well. The author casts in doubt the possibility of direct transferring the Greek concept of ‘barbarity’ into Caesar’s narration, paying attention to the Roman perception of the ‘other’ as understood by Georg Simmel instead. Consequently, it is possible to explain why some Gauls were described as loyal, while others were portrayed as prone to betrayal, although they belonged to the same cultural circle. The essence of the difference was the attitude towards Roman rule, not only the non‑Roman origin or different lifestyle. Determinants such as the perennial fear of Gauls (metus Gallicus) and the conviction of Rome’s unique destiny can not be also omitted, especially since they are closely related to the first aspect.

Shortly after the liquidation of the Vandal rule in northern Africa and the restoration of the Roman administration, the newly established prefecture was shaken up by a series of military mutinies and rebellions. The revolts in the years 536–545 AD are represented in the contemporary witness accounts (esp. historian Procopius of Caesarea, poet Flavius Cresconius Corippus) as a case of a “civil war” among the Romans in the context of the concurrent conflict with the Berber (“Moor”) tribes. The history of the army mutinies has been depicted in accordance with the literary conventions and the propaganda‑oriented assumptions of the authors, with a striking background picture of the Roman army in a state of continual readiness to rise up in revolt against the emperor’s authority, which is something virtually unknown from any other contemporaneous war theatre, in consideration of a comparable scale. In his analysis of the unfolding events, the Author attempts to address not only the questions of the political intentions of the various rebellion leaders, but also (or even in particular) the motivations which would make the soldiers take part in such precarious undertakings. He points to a number of political, religious, and economic factors which caused the northern African army mutinies to escalate so violently, concluding with a paradoxical observation that in the newly established prefecture, the emperor would have counted on the loyalty of the locally recruited soldiers rather than on the elite troops to whose military skills he owed the re‑conquering of Africa.

Godfryd de Charny is the author of the Book of Chivalry (Livre de chevalerie). The direct context of this work creation were multiple French defeats and the advantage of the Englishmen in the Hundred Years’ War, as well as the foundation of the Order of the Knights with the Red Star in 1352 and positive changes that this foundation triggered. The French knight, seeing multiple abuses, noticed the urgent need of the chivalric state reformation. Undoubtedly, his work is one of the most precious sources of knowledge for the medieval thought and customs.

In the present article, based on the abovementioned work of Godfryd de Charny, the chivalric models have been presented. Those models are vocation and service, and they put on the first place honour, courage and bravery. All knights’ actions are subordinated to the superior principle of honourable conduct. A knight should be of noble birth and godly. He can earn the most considerable glory by the armed acts, heroism on the battlefield and loyalty.

The Sandomierz sedition (Polish: rokosz sandomierski), the revolt of part of the nobility against Sigismund III in the years 1606–1609, was the largest noble movement in the 17th century and one of the most important noble revolts in the history of the Polish‑Lithuanian Commonwealth. The essential rebellion leaders include the voivode of Cracow, Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, and the Lithuanian cup‑bearer, Janusz Radziwiłł. The leaders of the movement, apart from belonging to the elite of the Polish‑Lithuanian state, differed basically in everything: age, political experience, religion, views and a vision of repairing the state. However until losing the battle of Guzów (July 5, 1607) with the royal forces, Zebrzydowski and Radziwiłł represented, with some minor exceptions, a coherent position regarding the methods of activity and goals of the movement. The purpose of this article is to analyze the decomposition of this alliance formed under the influence of specific conditions. Its aim is not to show which of the leaders did not comply with the decisions made earlier (the matter is obvious here, it was Mikołaj Zebrzydowski), but to explain the motives behind the actions of the Cracow voivode and the attitude that Janusz Radziwiłł adopted towards the actions of his former ally. Documents from the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw were attached to the article as an annex.

The present paper discusses the “racial” loyalty and “class” solidarity of black soldiers towards other fugitive black slaves during colonial Brazil. Having sworn loyalty and allegiance to the Portuguese monarchs, those soldiers joined the war against the quilombos located far from major urban centers. This study examines black soldiers’ petitions and official correspondence regarding their military careers. The documents are part of the collection of the Historical Overseas Archive in Lisbon.

In the first half of the 18th century, the Scottish Highlands were a “wild and inaccessible” area, and from London’s perspective, they were at least uncertain as far as local inhabitants’ loyalty was concerned. The Highlands were controlled by clans, who cultivated social and economic traditions dating back to the mediaeval times. Despite it being anachronistic, this system made it possible to gather significant forces, not so well armed, but usually strongly motivated. Although some clan leaders quickly backed William of Orange, and what follows the Hanoverian dynasty, state forces were not able to control the whole area of the Highlands. What is more, strategic territories on the western coast and in Great Glen were occupied by pro‑Jacobean clans. Due to that fact, the authorities were forced to introduce military garrisons into the Highlands that were supposed to force all the inhabitants to be loyal to the government. However, soldiers had to stay in safe conditions so that they could defend themselves in case Scottish Jacobites attacked them, especially if the latter were backed by the regular French military forces. That is why the first fortress started to be built already during the uprising of 1689. Finally, up to 1745, 3 fortress and 4 fortified barrack complexes were erected in the area of the Highlands.

The article describes the evolution of political activities of Otto Hermann von der Howen (1740–1806). He was one of the most influential politicians in the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia in the last decades of the state’s existence. When beginning his political activity he followed values instilled in him by his father and acted in the well‑understood interests of the duchy. He opposed Russian influences in Courland. He was not afraid of taking risks or sacrificing himself for the causes of his homeland and paid for his uncompromising attitude with three years of imprisonment in a Russian citadel. After his release he once more began to participate in the political life of the duchy, yet he discarded the ideals of youth and made politics his source of income. Witnessing the increasing influences of the Russian Empire in Courland he became their greatest advocate and stood at the head of the “Russian party” in the country. He did not follow any moral principles anymore. Not only did he deprive the Duke of Courland of considerable amounts of money, without any scruples, but also denied him his authority in the state. Otto Hermann von der Howen decisively contributed to the unconditional and direct incorporation of the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia to the Russian Empire, after 234 years of its existence. He was hated by his contemporaries and considered an anti‑hero by later generations. The article is the first such comprehensive (although certainly non‑exhaustive) a presentation of political activities of Otto Hermann von der Howen in Polish historiography.

The article deals mainly with the attitudes and choices of Poles during the partitions of 1795–1918. It was a time not only of armed struggle, but primarily everyday struggle with the reality of the time of captivity, because, as Andrzej Chwalba notes, Polish uprisings lasted only about three years in total. In this context, the fundamental question is: What did it mean to be a loyalist, realist, idealist, patriot during the partitions? Where were the boundaries beyond which one could be called a traitor? The very complicated conditions of the captivity period gave these attitudes new, specific dimensions. The article is an attempt to show the scale of the dilemmas faced by Poles of that time, participants of the social and political life, and, at least in part, to understand the motivation of their choices.

Tomasz Łubieński (1784–1870) is a hero of the Napoleonic campaings, active politically and enonomically in the Congress Kingdom. After the November Night, he worked to stop the insurrection movement and reconcile with Russia. His military activity in 1831 raises doubts as to his full involvement. The only member of the November Uprising generalship, after an audience with Nicolas I, was released, and then he continued his opportunist career. The dominant feature of the attitude was calculation, permeating a double betrayal (of the king‑tsar, a revolted nation) and, in accordance with principle of two consciences, double loyalty to the Russian monarch and own fellow countrymen.
Zygmunt Sierakowski (1827–1863), during his penal service on the Orenburg line, decides to take up te career of a tsarist officer in order to use the opportunities thus gained for the benefit of the national irredent. After graduating from the Academy of the General Staff in St. Petersburg, a specialized employee of the Ministry of War tries to be “Wallenrod of the reform of the tsarist empire” as well as “Wallenrod of the Polish independence underground”. Loyalty to the Cause resulted in a “double existence” on the verge of mental exhaustion, and his heroic sacrifice made him a martyr for his countryman, an example of treason, falsehood and hypocrisy for Russians.

In 1885, as a result of the unification of northern and southern Bulgaria without the consent of European powers, the political tensions in the Balkans successively increased. One of the consequences was the outbreak of Serbian‑Bulgarian war. The victory of Bulgarians paradoxically contributed to the deep crisis in the country and led to the abdication of Prince Alexander von Battenberg. A group of officers played an active role in these events. In August 1886 they carried out a coup d’état and the abdication of ruler. Soon a counter‑attack was organized, and the political power fell into the hands of politicians sympathizing with Prince Alexander. The dethroned ruler returned to the country. However, the persisting state of tensions and pressure from Russia forced the prince to abdicate again. The article presents the process of growing crisis of the Bulgarian state and the course of coup d’etat aimed at depriving the Bulgarian ruler of power, its consequences, as well as explaining the motives of conspirators.

This article focuses on the conduct of the soldiers of Polish descent participating in the military action during the American‑Spanish War. The paper begins with the presentation of views on the war expressed in the Polish press published in America and the Polish lands.
The main part of the work analyses soldiers’ accounts published in the Polish press released in America and compare them with the media’s depiction of the war presented in the pages of the Polish newspapers and magazines in America. Additionally, the article attempts to establish the motives behind Polish volunteers’ decision to join the American army. It was possible to find the answers to several important research questions such as how the participants of those events perceived themselves as those who fought for the interests of the United States, how they confronted their expectations with reality and how they recalled the war.

The Battle of Lwów in November 1918 is considered one of the most important events of the Polish‑Ukrainian War, which subject was the possession of the Eastern Galicia. In contrast to most of the existing studies devoted to the conflict, the article attempts to scrutinize the attitudes of the Polish population of Lwów towards street fights. Although in such circumstances, the boundary between civilians and soldiers were often smooth, many sources indicate that a significant part of the city’s Polish community were passive. Such behaviors, though should not be identified with the acceptance of the Ukrainian governments in Lwów, contributed to the extension of the fights and made their result uncertain. It seems that, contrary to the common assessment, the Polish reactions were diverse and subject to the influence of many occurrences. In particular, they were shaped by earlier Polish‑Ukrainian relations, the involvement in the independence movement, the fatigue of the experience of the Great War, the intensity of street skirmishes, the actions of the Ukrainian and the Polish military and political management, the material poverty, the plague of crime and the prolonged expectations for a relief. As a result, it can be considered that the Polish success was a work of, diverse in a social origin, the groups of insurgents and the Polish units, which arrived from the Western Galicia, supported only by the part of the civilian inhabitants of Lwów.

The article analyzes the novel by the Russian writer Ivan Szmielev “The Sun of the Dead” (1923). It was written on the basis of historical events. I analyze the composition of the work, which is based on two symbols – the sun and death. The sun symbolizes the rich and beautiful Crimea, and deathis a symbol of the new power – the power of the Bolsheviks who destroyed this wonderful land of Crimea. The author of the article emphasizes the autobiographical nature of the story “The Sun of the Dead”. Its narration is based on a firstperson story by Ivan Szmielev. This is a feature of lyrical prose. Describing the tragic events of total red terror, hunger and the struggle for survival, Ivan Szmielevs howsthat death affects everyone – people, animals, birds, trees, plants. The author of the article also emphasizes the philosophical and humanistic aspect of the work, which shows the history of humanity and human survival in an extreme situation, when very few are lucky enough to resist and not become victims of brutal murders of the Bolsheviks or starvation. In the process of the story, the image of the desert appears – a metaphor with which the writer emphasizes the scale of the destructive activity of the Bolsheviks.

This article discusses the phenomenon of desertions in the Polish Army in the years 1944–1947. At that time it was a serious problem among soldiers, as the number of deserters can be estimated at around 30,000 people during this period. Of course, many factors influenced on the discipline and morale of the army, including political, economic, social or family conditions. The article describes the causes of desertion, its scale and trend of the phenomenon in the discussed period. The text also presents examples of so‑called collective desertions and actions taken by the communist authorities to limit this phenomenon in the army. With time, discipline began to improve and the number of desertions decreased. However, it was a process lasting several years.

The article describes the activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army unit, which was commanded by second lieutenant Roman Hrobelski (nickname “Brodych”). This unit operated in the years 1945–1947 in the Carpathians and was the westernmost fighter unit of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. In 1947, the unit attempted to escape Czechoslovakia to the American occupation zone in Germany. During the march through Czechoslovakia many partisans were captured by the Czechoslovak army. Roman Hrobelski was also caught. Later, it was issued to the Polish authorities, condemned to death and executed.

The history of the Polish Navy reveals a multitude of events concerning personnel matters, which in turn introduce us to the issues of loyalty and what I referred to as “development” in the title. By and large, we know quite a lot about the training and education of senior officers, although it may be that we look at the process too superficially and fail to see that it is not woven with exclusively positive values. In my article I raise that we are often saddled with misconceptions concerning the officer’s service, which we want to view in the pantheon of national glory, with the officer emerging as the embodiment of the superior soldierly and civic virtues. I referred to the Government Act – Constitution of 3 May 1791, but only to the extent of reiterating that „the army is a force drawn from the people” and stating “like nation, like army”. I attempted to strongly emphasize the principle of loyalty, because I believe that it gets lost in the maze of diverse qualities that we tend, often uncritically, to attribute to officers, and I considered “development” as one of the most serious challenges, because it essentially determines what officers guard our security.

The article introduces several comments and reflections on the tensions between the state power and society in People’s Poland in 1956–1980, in the context of the consolidation of power and loyalty of society. During this period, the party and state authorities, wishing to maximally consolidate their power, did everything to achieve the ability and readiness to use all means necessary to control social behavior, to maintain the loyalty of society. It required total ideological unity of the party political elite and iron discipline in the functioning of its institutions. Such a strategy did not prevent social outbreaks. The emerging protests meant above all a real loss of control over society, social disorganization. Wishing to enjoy the loyalty of a society devoid of political alternatives, in other words its tacit consent, it would have to provide it with a certain level of living conditions. However, this task was very difficult, if at all possible, to be implemented in the realities of the centrally planned economy.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea was carried out as a result of a hybrid operation, combining elements of external aggression and internal rebellion, which was taking place between February 20 and March 26, 2014. The article examines the course and conditions of loyalty crisis in the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stationed when in Crimea. The Ukrainian troops did not put up active military reaction to the aggression, although there were many moving acts of moral and symbolic resistance. After the annexation, 70.01% of the military personnel turned over to the occupant or left the service, and only 29.99% remained faithful to Ukraine. The failure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Crimea to perform its constitutional duty to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state was primarily due to the fact that most of the personnel were mentally unprepared for a confrontation with Russia. Most of the soldiers were Crimean locals and shared the pro‑Russian political and cultural orientation of the majority of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea’s population. At the time of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych in 2010–2014, the Ukrainian defence sector was dismantled and exposed to Russian influence. In February and March 2014, Russia used a whole spectrum of pressure measures against Ukrainian officers: from friendly persuasion, through demonstration of technological and organizational superiority of Russian forces, to the bribes and intimidation. The post‑Maidan Ukrainian authorities realized that most of the Ukrainian soldiers in Crimea were demoralized, and the climate in the Navy Command was almost „treacherous”. Most likely because of what was mentioned above, but also considering the general international situation, the order to defend Crimea was not being issued. The Ukrainian soldiers in Crimea were simply to follow by a „hold on” directive.

The purpose of these considerations is to confront the findings proposed by Cz. Madajczyk and W. Bonusiak concerning the stratification of social attitudes in the conditions of war and occupation, with the realities of the conflict of 2014–2018. The aim of the research is to determine whether the concept of social behavior under the conditions of World War II developed by both professors can be used to interpret social attitudes in the contemporary armed conflict of a hybrid nature. The conducted considerations allowed for the conclusion that it is not possible to directly use above mentioned concepts to describe the situation in the analyzed conflict. However, they can serve as the basis for in-depth comparisons. In the conditions of an undeclared hybrid war, it is impossible to determine what was the formal legal, actual status between the „rebel republics of the DPR and LPR” and Kiev and Moscow. No wonder then that the assessment of social attitudes is all the more complicated and ambiguous.