The author analyzes the course of the elections in Belarus in 2020 and the socio-political protests caused by election fraud. On the basis of the anomalies noted in the activities of the security service of the Republic of Belarus the author puts forward a hypothesis about the possible involvement of the Russian secret services in provoking the post-election crisis in order to reduce the margin of political maneuver for the Lukashenka regime.

The aim of the article is to analyze determinants, standards and principles of co-operation between the Polish Financial Supervision Authority and selected stakeholders of the state security system. This is especially important in the context of the dynamic development of the financial market, challenges resulting from the computerization of this market in the era of pandemics and the geopolitical situation related to the war in Ukraine. Authors accepted the hypothesis that the effectiveness of cooperation of entities responsible for state security depends, on the one hand, on the proper legal basis, and on the other hand, on soft factors such as mutual trust, community of goals and competence of employees of public institutions and officers. The article is a review with a theoretical and empirical component. The doctrine and legal acts were analyzed, and also empirical material collected during the research process was analyzed. For the purposes of the considerations, the dogmatic-legal method and the analysis of source materials of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority were used.

The article discusses administrative regulations relating to the organization of the system for the protection of classified information in the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as presents the criminal laws on crimes against the protection of classified information in force in these countries, along with an interpretation of these laws. The article also presents selected administrative regulations governing the procedure for carrying out security clearances for the issuance of a security clearance allowing access to classified information. In addition, the rationale for classifying information and assigning it a specific classification is discussed. On the basis of an analysis of the provisions in force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 164 § 9 of the Criminal Code) and a comparison with those in force in Poland, among other things, a conclusion was drawn that Polish legislation does not include a countertype that would relieve from criminal liability depositaries of secrets who transfer classified information (without obtaining the consent of the authorities specified by law) in order to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes. The above can be the basis of a legislative de lege ferenda request. The article does not exhaust the topic covered, but merely indicates selected issues of the system of protection of classified information. The exploration that has been initiated may be used to conduct in-depth studies of the issue at hand in the future.

The objective of this article is to bring a closer look into the processes of social radicalisation which are the concomitant of COVID-19 pandemics in Federal Republic of Germany. Furthermore, the author is trying to reconstruct the procedures of recon analytics taken by internal civil counterintelligence services in federal states of Germany. Nascent of grassroots movements united against COVID-19 restrictions, obligatory vaccination and general questioning of COVID-19 pandemic, has led to inscribe mentioned groups onto the official agenda of internal civil intelligence services ditto provide measures of operational reconnaissance related to these groups.

The article presents the history and current status of polygraph examinations in Russia carried out both by the services as part of the recruitment of candidates or thereafter, and in the private sector. The article outlines profiles of the most influential people in the Russian polygraph community and their ties to the special services of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and then the Russian Federation.

The People’s Republic of China has undoubtedly made an unprecedented leap in civilisation over the past 40 years, lifting more than 850 million people out of extreme poverty. However, this tremendous progress has been paid by environmental degradation. In 2012 and 2013, Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of the People’s Republic of China successively. During the subsequent years of his rule, he consolidated in his hands a power that no other politician since Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping possessed. At the same time, he faced the challenge of a national and international climate crisis. According to Xi Jinping, to address this critical situation, it is necessary to make China an ecological civilization. This article characterises the idea of ecological civilisation as well as shows the most important actions taken by Xi Jinping to implement it.

The article is devoted to the characteristics of cybersecurity as a priority of the national economy in the context of global threats to the security of the world economy. Cyber threats are certainly one of the main security threats to the global economy, and thus cybersecurity is becoming a priority for the national economy, also for the Republic of Poland. This thesis is confirmed, among others, by statistics of cyber incidents, which are growing dynamically, and numerous actions taken by states to combat cyber threats.

The author analyzes the course of the elections in Belarus in 2020 and the socio-political protests caused by election fraud. On the basis of the anomalies noted in the activities of the security service of the Republic of Belarus the author puts forward a hypothesis about the possible involvement of the Russian secret services in provoking the post-election crisis in order to reduce the margin of political maneuver for the Lukashenka regime.

The aim of the article is to analyze determinants, standards and principles of co-operation between the Polish Financial Supervision Authority and selected stakeholders of the state security system. This is especially important in the context of the dynamic development of the financial market, challenges resulting from the computerization of this market in the era of pandemics and the geopolitical situation related to the war in Ukraine. Authors accepted the hypothesis that the effectiveness of cooperation of entities responsible for state security depends, on the one hand, on the proper legal basis, and on the other hand, on soft factors such as mutual trust, community of goals and competence of employees of public institutions and officers. The article is a review with a theoretical and empirical component. The doctrine and legal acts were analyzed, and also empirical material collected during the research process was analyzed. For the purposes of the considerations, the dogmatic-legal method and the analysis of source materials of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority were used.

The article discusses administrative regulations relating to the organization of the system for the protection of classified information in the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as presents the criminal laws on crimes against the protection of classified information in force in these countries, along with an interpretation of these laws. The article also presents selected administrative regulations governing the procedure for carrying out security clearances for the issuance of a security clearance allowing access to classified information. In addition, the rationale for classifying information and assigning it a specific classification is discussed. On the basis of an analysis of the provisions in force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 164 § 9 of the Criminal Code) and a comparison with those in force in Poland, among other things, a conclusion was drawn that Polish legislation does not include a countertype that would relieve from criminal liability depositaries of secrets who transfer classified information (without obtaining the consent of the authorities specified by law) in order to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes. The above can be the basis of a legislative de lege ferenda request. The article does not exhaust the topic covered, but merely indicates selected issues of the system of protection of classified information. The exploration that has been initiated may be used to conduct in-depth studies of the issue at hand in the future.

The objective of this article is to bring a closer look into the processes of social radicalisation which are the concomitant of COVID-19 pandemics in Federal Republic of Germany. Furthermore, the author is trying to reconstruct the procedures of recon analytics taken by internal civil counterintelligence services in federal states of Germany. Nascent of grassroots movements united against COVID-19 restrictions, obligatory vaccination and general questioning of COVID-19 pandemic, has led to inscribe mentioned groups onto the official agenda of internal civil intelligence services ditto provide measures of operational reconnaissance related to these groups.

The article presents the history and current status of polygraph examinations in Russia carried out both by the services as part of the recruitment of candidates or thereafter, and in the private sector. The article outlines profiles of the most influential people in the Russian polygraph community and their ties to the special services of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and then the Russian Federation.