Ensuring security in an increasingly complex and uncertain world requires states to address a number of challenges. These include the need to remain cooperative in the international space and the need to pursue their strategic objectives. Often these are followed up by intentional or unintentional threats that can effectively destabilise not only a single state, but also an entire region. Their emergence may be the result of a lack of resilience against hostile actions by state or non-state actors who, in order to achieve their objectives, undertake, among other things, hybrid activities. However, the terms ‘state resilience’ and ‘hybrid activities’ are insufficiently precisely formulated in the literature and described in a conceptual rather than a definitional manner. Both national and NATO documents lack universally accepted definitions of these terms. The aim of this article is to present the concept of building state resilience to hybrid activities.

In this article, the author describes how the mirror principle used in psychology, which is based on finding in other people traits that an individual tries to suppress, can be used to identify potential threats from Russia and Belarus. She puts forward the hypothesis that by analysing the greatest threats mentioned by these countries, e.g. in strategic documents, it is possible to deduce, according to the principle of the mirror, in which spheres they will most actively conduct hostile actions against NATO members. Among other things, the hybrid actions that Russia and cooperating Belarus may take against Western states are indicated, but without an in-depth analysis of these issues. Thus, the article does not exhaust the topic, but merely attempts to signal one method of analysing the threats emanating from Russia and Belarus.

The author analyses the case of the detention of Ukrainian Security Service officer Oleg Kulinich on suspicion of espionage for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. On the basis of the analysis of the tasks posed to this Russian agent, he concludes that the modus operandi of Russian counterintelligence is diametrically opposed to the methods of Western services. The main difference is the shifting of the centre of gravity of operational activities from reconnaissance-information work to attempts at agentic seizure of control over enemy institutions, mainly civilian and military special services, and the realisation of intelligence infiltration by people with the same habitus as recruitment candidates. Drawing on the achievements of cognitive psychology and research in recent history, the author demonstrates that the Russian services have been using and refining these methods for more than 100 years.

The phases of preparation, analysis, integration, initial interpretation of data and intelligence are relatively widely described in the literature. Only the field of assessing the certainty of sources and the reliability of data and intelligence has not kept pace with the development of other elements in the domain of information operations. In view of the increasing intensity of activities carried out by potential adversaries, the methods, techniques and tools currently in use should be critically evaluated and their limitations identified, and attempts should be made to develop and implement new processes and procedures. Above all, the capacity to prepare and communicate increasingly accurate assessments of the certainty of sources and the reliability of data and information must be enhanced. Therefore, it is necessary to: quantify the accuracy of the information, prepare new procedures and software, study the degree of information redundancy, its completeness and level of diagnosticity. Acquisition and analytical apparatus staff must be aware of existing limitations and search for ways to solve problems. Such a search should not focus on one-size-fits-all methods, but on a pragmatic approach to each element.

After regaining its independence in 1918, Poland faced a number of security challenges. The most important of these was survival in the face of revisionist steps taken by aggressive neighbours, including Germany and the USSR. One important aspect of this threat was to determine the risk of the Weimar Republic unleashing chemical warfare against the Second Republic. In order to cope with this intelligence task, the Second Department of Polish General Staff developed a number of instructions whose structure and internal logic is comparable to the indicator analysis technique developed only 60 years later by the American Intelligence Community. On the basis of material preserved in the State Archive in Gdańsk and contemporary textbooks on information analysis techniques, it is shown how officers of Polish military intelligence, decades before the method of indicator analysis was formalised, developed their own way, which is essentially identical to it. This demonstrates the remarkable innovation and organisational capacity of the newly forming intelligence service of the reborn state.

The article is devoted to examining the causes of qualitative and quantitative anomalies in the activity of penetration agents within the security system of the Republic of Latvia and other NATO countries in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The author presents selected cases of espionage within the Republic of Latvia and proposes explanations for the discrepancies between this Baltic country and other NATO countries in the number of detected agents.

The aim of this article is to present the issue of special criminal law protection of the President of the Republic of Poland. With reference to pre-war legislation, Article 134 of the Criminal Code was analysed, which criminalises behaviour constituting an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland, who, perceived not as a specific person but as an entity embodying the majesty of the Republic of Poland, is one of the main guarantors of the efficient and undisturbed functioning of the state organism. An assassination attempt on the holder of this office may be the beginning of both internal and external destabilisation of the state, and the threat to its security appears already at the moment of preparation to commit this crime. While the author of the article does not deny that this provision also strengthens the protection of this person’s life and health, he recognises that this is an incidental object of protection. The article presents arguments in favour of the criminalisation of any behaviour bearing the features of preparation for the crime of an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland, following the example of the authors of the Criminal Code of 1932.

With almost 20% of the world’s natural gas reserves and more than 6% of the world’s oil reserves, Russia’s economic development is based on the production and export of hydrocarbons. This article is an excerpt from a diagnostic and analytical study of Russia’s energy resources, which, with the help of pipelines, shapes the market of consumers, influencing their attitudes and behaviour in line with its interests. The series of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation after 24 February 2022, in connection with the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, poses the question of the future of the Russian energy sector and an alternative to the hydrocarbon market there. The author reconstructed bilateral energy relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation by analysing the history, current situation and making predictions about the potential future of bilateral cooperation in the light of the reduction of Russian energy presence in Europe. The article has been expanded to include an update on the state of bilateral relations in the first half of 2023.

Special forces are the elite of modern armed forces. Both the United States and the Republic of Poland have special operations forces that have repeatedly cooperated with each other in training and combat operations. The aim of this study is to examine and describe the similarities between selected special operations units of the United States and the Special Mission Unit GROM on the basis of comparison of corresponding formations. The units considered by the author as their counterparts were compared based on four categories: 1) purpose, 2) unit’s history and development in the initial period, 3) contemporary organization, 4) selection and training.

Ensuring security in an increasingly complex and uncertain world requires states to address a number of challenges. These include the need to remain cooperative in the international space and the need to pursue their strategic objectives. Often these are followed up by intentional or unintentional threats that can effectively destabilise not only a single state, but also an entire region. Their emergence may be the result of a lack of resilience against hostile actions by state or non-state actors who, in order to achieve their objectives, undertake, among other things, hybrid activities. However, the terms ‘state resilience’ and ‘hybrid activities’ are insufficiently precisely formulated in the literature and described in a conceptual rather than a definitional manner. Both national and NATO documents lack universally accepted definitions of these terms. The aim of this article is to present the concept of building state resilience to hybrid activities.

In this article, the author describes how the mirror principle used in psychology, which is based on finding in other people traits that an individual tries to suppress, can be used to identify potential threats from Russia and Belarus. She puts forward the hypothesis that by analysing the greatest threats mentioned by these countries, e.g. in strategic documents, it is possible to deduce, according to the principle of the mirror, in which spheres they will most actively conduct hostile actions against NATO members. Among other things, the hybrid actions that Russia and cooperating Belarus may take against Western states are indicated, but without an in-depth analysis of these issues. Thus, the article does not exhaust the topic, but merely attempts to signal one method of analysing the threats emanating from Russia and Belarus.

The author analyses the case of the detention of Ukrainian Security Service officer Oleg Kulinich on suspicion of espionage for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. On the basis of the analysis of the tasks posed to this Russian agent, he concludes that the modus operandi of Russian counterintelligence is diametrically opposed to the methods of Western services. The main difference is the shifting of the centre of gravity of operational activities from reconnaissance-information work to attempts at agentic seizure of control over enemy institutions, mainly civilian and military special services, and the realisation of intelligence infiltration by people with the same habitus as recruitment candidates. Drawing on the achievements of cognitive psychology and research in recent history, the author demonstrates that the Russian services have been using and refining these methods for more than 100 years.

The phases of preparation, analysis, integration, initial interpretation of data and intelligence are relatively widely described in the literature. Only the field of assessing the certainty of sources and the reliability of data and intelligence has not kept pace with the development of other elements in the domain of information operations. In view of the increasing intensity of activities carried out by potential adversaries, the methods, techniques and tools currently in use should be critically evaluated and their limitations identified, and attempts should be made to develop and implement new processes and procedures. Above all, the capacity to prepare and communicate increasingly accurate assessments of the certainty of sources and the reliability of data and information must be enhanced. Therefore, it is necessary to: quantify the accuracy of the information, prepare new procedures and software, study the degree of information redundancy, its completeness and level of diagnosticity. Acquisition and analytical apparatus staff must be aware of existing limitations and search for ways to solve problems. Such a search should not focus on one-size-fits-all methods, but on a pragmatic approach to each element.

After regaining its independence in 1918, Poland faced a number of security challenges. The most important of these was survival in the face of revisionist steps taken by aggressive neighbours, including Germany and the USSR. One important aspect of this threat was to determine the risk of the Weimar Republic unleashing chemical warfare against the Second Republic. In order to cope with this intelligence task, the Second Department of Polish General Staff developed a number of instructions whose structure and internal logic is comparable to the indicator analysis technique developed only 60 years later by the American Intelligence Community. On the basis of material preserved in the State Archive in Gdańsk and contemporary textbooks on information analysis techniques, it is shown how officers of Polish military intelligence, decades before the method of indicator analysis was formalised, developed their own way, which is essentially identical to it. This demonstrates the remarkable innovation and organisational capacity of the newly forming intelligence service of the reborn state.

The article is devoted to examining the causes of qualitative and quantitative anomalies in the activity of penetration agents within the security system of the Republic of Latvia and other NATO countries in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The author presents selected cases of espionage within the Republic of Latvia and proposes explanations for the discrepancies between this Baltic country and other NATO countries in the number of detected agents.

The aim of this article is to present the issue of special criminal law protection of the President of the Republic of Poland. With reference to pre-war legislation, Article 134 of the Criminal Code was analysed, which criminalises behaviour constituting an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland, who, perceived not as a specific person but as an entity embodying the majesty of the Republic of Poland, is one of the main guarantors of the efficient and undisturbed functioning of the state organism. An assassination attempt on the holder of this office may be the beginning of both internal and external destabilisation of the state, and the threat to its security appears already at the moment of preparation to commit this crime. While the author of the article does not deny that this provision also strengthens the protection of this person’s life and health, he recognises that this is an incidental object of protection. The article presents arguments in favour of the criminalisation of any behaviour bearing the features of preparation for the crime of an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland, following the example of the authors of the Criminal Code of 1932.