Economic Organization Forms beyond Investor Ownership
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RIS BIB ENDNOTEEconomic Organization Forms beyond Investor Ownership
Data publikacji: 12.10.2016
Rocznik Administracji Publicznej, 2016, 2016 (2), s. 546 - 557
https://doi.org/10.4467/24497800RAP.16.031.5124Autorzy
Economic Organization Forms beyond Investor Ownership
It is argued that the maximization logic, on which classic economic analysis is based disregards the multidimensionality of human desires. Therefore, the arguments for superiority of inverstor ownership, which are based on the maximization logic, are misplaced. Indeed, promising features can be observed among the existing non-investor owned organizations.
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Informacje: Rocznik Administracji Publicznej, 2016, 2016 (2), s. 546 - 557
Typ artykułu: Oryginalny artykuł naukowy
Tytuły:
Economic Organization Forms beyond Investor Ownership
Economic Organization Forms beyond Investor Ownership
Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
Polska
Publikacja: 12.10.2016
Status artykułu: Otwarte
Licencja: Żadna
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