Threat and the State of the EpidemicThe introduction of the state of the epidemic threat in Poland, and then the state of the epidemic, revealed far-reaching violations of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland in the sphere of individual rights and freedoms, which are the result of regulations contained in in the Act on Combating Infectious Diseases of 2008, as well as in the acts that were adopted for its implementation. On the basis of this case, it is worth asking about the responsibility of persons participating in the process of adopting such defective normative acts. In this article, the author considers the potential options for enforcing such responsibil-ity. The conclusions that follow show little chance to draw legal consequences against persons participating in the procedure of adopting those normative acts. Similarly, political responsibility is illusory. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider introducing amendments to the Polish legal system that will allow for effective attribution of the liability to persons who participated in the adoption of normative acts that grossly violated the provisions of the Constitution. Such actions, however, would require not only changes to the existing legislation, and sometimes even the Constitution, but also the political will to do so, which can be considered the main problem.

The paper deals with the so-called shared initiative referendum (le référendum d’initiative partagée) within the framework of the French constitutional system. This type of popular vote was established following the most extensive modifica-tion to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic which took place in 2008. Under the amended Article 11 of the 1958 Constitution, a fifth of members of parlia-ment, supported by a tenth of eligible voters, may submit a bill which, subject to further procedural requirements, may be passed in a nationwide referendum. The author presents the most important features of the referendum before the reform, as well as the constitutional and statutory provisions that may be applied after the reform was conducted. It can be argued that this amendment did not lead to a breakthrough in the role of the referendum in the constitutional system of the Fifth Republic. Although citizens can now participate in its initiation, it is still a tool over which the public authorities have full control. In the case of the shared initiative referendum, however, the emphasis was placed differently on the role of the legislative and executive. The former has been strengthened and the latter weakened. The draft constitutional changes presented in 2019 at the initiative of President Emmanuel Macron are to contribute to the ini-tiation of such referenda, but their purpose is not to introduce fundamental structural reforms.

In view of the constitutional crisis that has been going on since 2015, the issue of locating the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court within the system of State organs seems to be particularly important. One of the questions that should be answered is to what extent the ideas adopted in the 1990s appear to be helpful for the proper positioning of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal within the system. The issue of the origins of the aforementioned ideas should also be examined. Answering these questions enables the identification of essential problems related to the way in which the legislator shaped the rela-tionship between the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court.

The topic of this paper is to present the general assumptions the legislator relied on when setting the position of the Constitutional Tribunal, and the question of whether these assumptions remain fully valid – especially with regard to the possibility of reviewing the interpretation of the Supreme Court.

The article presents critical commentary to the decision of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court concerning the possibility to treat an ECJ judgment in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18 as a prerequisite for reopening the proceedings based on Article 540 § 3 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure (k.p.k.). Disciplinary Chamber stipulates that the afore-mentioned ECJ judgment is not binding in Polish legal order. This follows, according to the commented decision, from two factors. First is the undue omission and, as a consequence, infringement of the Supreme Court Act in case of a prejudicial request to ECJ. The second is the lack of judicial independ-ence of judges in the above case. The author argues that the line of argument taken by the Disciplinary Chamber is against Polish and European Union law. He points out several shortcomings in this Chamber proceedings. Its uncon-stitutional nature, ECJ interim measures, and other issues which the author acknowledges, renders Disciplinary Chamber unable to adjudicate. Regard-ing the author’s sbeliefs, first and foremost, this decision is illegal. Secondly, it shows urgent necessity to suspend the Disciplinary Chamber and, last but not least, proves that the Polish Constitution and European Union Treaties can safeguard the rule of law