Protection of persons of „different” sexual orientation constitutes today one of the prominent fields in the human rights jurisprudence on the supranational as well as on the national level in Europe. The initial stages of this process were focused on de-criminalization of sexual contacts and on the removal of classifications based on sexual orientation. Since the late 1990s, the problem of legal recognition of same-sex couples begun to play a central role. Today, the majority of the European countries (28) allow same-sex marriages or other forms of civil unions (registered partnerships). At the same time, however, Europe remains divided as several post-communist countries are opposing any form of regularization. This article offers a brief presentation of the most interesting judicial decisions on the matter and attempts to define some emerging European standards concerning the legal status of same-sex couples. The legal regularization of same-sex couples is mostly regarded as a legislative matter. Accordingly, the national courts remain deferential to the legislative choices and are not ready to develop the constitutional dimension of the problem. A similar approach is visible in the case-law of both European courts, whereas the Luxembourg Court (CJEU) seems nowadays to be more open to the full recognition of samesex couples than the Strasbourg Court (ECtHR). Nevertheless, there is a visible trend to recognize a positive obligation of all European countries to provide some form of legal recognition to same-sex couples, which may, but not has to, take the form of a regular marriage.

State regulation of independent faith-based schools necessarily involves the balancing of multiple human rights vested in parents and children who identify simultaneously as citizens of a liberal democratic state and practitioners of a religion that rejects straightforward secular education. Ethical pluralism demands that the liberal democratic state respect the diversity of its citizenry and the diversity of their ethical values, for its own survival as well as theirs; yet the survival of the liberal democratic state also depends upon its citizens’ receipt of an education that prepares them for informed participation in a democratic system. This essay examines the attempts of three liberal  democracies – United Kingdom, the United States and Israel – to regulate independent faith-based schools, and so provide a suitable education for religious minority students.

In this gloss, I comment on the pronouncement published as the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal. It concerns an uncontroversial issue of obligatory discontinuation of the proceedings due to the withdrawal of an application. However, this unanimous decision also includes an extensive section marked as a dissenting opinion in which criticism is presented of applicant’s conduct, that is, of the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights (the Polish Ombudsman). It also contains an appraisal that the Commissioner betrayed his oath, which is a statutory condition for the dismissal of the Commissioner. I argue that such a dissenting opinion violates the law. I also provide arguments to show that the statutory condition of the Commissioner’s dismissal by way of betraying his or her oath is constitutionally inadmissible. The statutory oath formula contains idealizations that are impossible to fulfill. Using such a formula in the Sejm (a house of the parliament) as an assessment criterion of the Commissioner’s conduct would subject him or her to political responsibility. It has no basis in the Constitution’s text but also no basis in the constitutional pantext. An exemplary Commissioner should be a figure of eminent legal charisma. In the field of human rights, the Ombudsman serves as a loyal opposition to the political authorities helping to prevent the groupthink. The Ombudsman is also entangled in culture wars as far as human rights are concerned. The acceptance of Commissioner’s early dismissal on the basis of disapproval cloaked in the charge of betrayal of his or her oath would make it impossible for the Commissioner to perform his or her duties effectively and it would undermine the Commissioner’s mandate by motivating to avoid dealing with sensitive issues.

The article analyzes key aspects of the judicial reform in Ukraine. Particular attention is paid to the formation of a new Supreme Court of Ukraine. Thus, numerous changes to the existing national legislation were made and new legal acts were adopted in order to establish new institutions, requirements, and specified regulations for conducting a transparent contest for judicial appointments, in accordance with international and the European legal standards.

It should be noted that the reform of the judiciary system of Ukraine is systemic and aims, inter alia, to ensure the effective functioning of independent and impartial court proceedings, and to guarantee a person the right to a fair trial, which is one of the main requirements for the rule of law and is an integral part of democratic law-governed state.

The article analyzes the procedure of formation and functioning of the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, which are directly involved in the „creation” of the judicial corps.

A comprehensive analysis of the contest for judicial appointments for the new Supreme Court, which began in 2016 and lasted 9 months, is carried out. As a result of the contest, 118 new judges were appointed. In addition, the role and functions of the newly created institution – Public Council of Integrity, which should support the High Qualification Commission of Judges in determining whether the judge (or candidate for a position of the judge) meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity, are determined. The status of a judge, legislative guarantees of judicial activity and the obligation of a judge to complete and file three electronic declarations: the asset declaration, the statement of the integrity of the judge, and the declaration of family ties, are also examined.