Nowadays, the office of public prosecutor is the commonly accepted legal institution in the Western legal culture. Its existence is understood as something taken for granted. This was different in the Middle Ages. At first, the criminal trial proceedings were not distinguished from the civil ones, and therefore they were conducted on the basis of the same fundamental principles. There was no public authority engaged in instituting the criminal trial. The latter had to be instituted by private individuals who were the injured parties. This had an impact on the forming of the concept of crime which was not viewed as an offence against the society or the State but against the injured individual. The paper is concerned with the medieval Kingdom of Hungary and discusses the development of State structures, criminal substitutive law and the criminal procedure.

Laudation of the ceremony renewal of Professor Stanislaw Grodziski’s doctorate after fifty years (Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Hall College Maius, April 11, 2011)

While exercising the state power, the Jagiellons instrumentally exploited the privileges granted to social groups or individuals. The privileges created a new legal state different from that secured by the Polish ius commune. The beneficiaries of the privileges were not only the royal and private towns but also the specific individuals. The latter were frequently the nobles or clergy as well as ecclesiastical institutions. In the towns the liberty-introducing privileges, issued for the possessors of landplots in the town, were detrimental not only to the royal but also to the municipal treasury. In addition these privileges were frequently bound with the court exemption. This meant that the dispute referring to the piece of land was subject to the competence of nobiliary or ecclesiastical courts. From the 15th century on, the royal towns used to obtain the assurance of the King who promised that he would refrain from issuing tax liberties for the benefit of individuals. But since the king excercised the power of issuing leges speciales he was not bound by promises he made. The policy pursued by the Jagiellons vis-a-vis the towns was the resultant of the policy that the kings pursued at home. This policy required efforts designed to construe and maintain political groupings. The royal towns, as a part of royal demesne, were the assets which were expected not so much to bring a pure income to the treasury but were instrumentally exploited for the governing of the country. They were considered to be the tool suitable for rewarding the loyal individuals. The issuing of tax exemption was therefore one of the instruments facilitating the government business. This instrument was obviously of smaller potence then ius distributiva, pledging royal demense, headships of villages as well as legacies on salt mines and customs. Nevertheless, this was the instrument worth noting. It was something what was not ignored either by chancellors or castellans.

The author of the paper tries to identify the basic methodological assumptions of the personal pattern of the ideal ruler as presented by Machiavelli in his Il Principe. While comparing the “mirror of the Principe” elaborated by Machiavelli, with the Galileo’s pendulum that came to being 100 years later, one may observe significant similarity between the manures along which the two devices were construed. They both came to being as a result of some idealization. Both speculum and pendulum is exploited above all in order to demonstrate interrelations between major variables which determine the course followed by the phenomena which arouse interest of both authors. In case of Machiavelli, this is the wish to describe the mechanism that is responsible for the effective – i.e. the one that guarantees the political success – method of ruling. At the same time the selection of the procedure applied for idealization (the one that requires the considering of extreme cases or disregarding the less important ones) causes that the description of the Prince assumes mainly the theoretical and ostentatious values. Thanks to the outlined analogy between pendulum and speculum it is possible to present a hypothesis that the assessment of the factual political radicalism of the methods of controlling the state as proposed in Il Principe should take into consideration not only that content of these methods which pertains to their subject matter but also the methodological nature of the entire concept.

The aim of this paper is to identify and describe basic mutual and different political and administrative characteristics of the lands under the rule of imperial generalissimo Albrecht of Waldstein. This man of Europian importance created in the twenties of the 17th century the Duchy of Frýdlant in north-eastern part of Bohemian Kingdom, moreover he became the ruler of German Duchy of Mecklenburg, as well as Emperor´s vassal in two Silesian Principalities, Sagan (1627) and Glogow (1632). It is quite interesting to learn about his arrangements in individual domains and to see, how some general principles of his reign were combined with specific steps proceeded from older particular traditions. It also shows undoubtedly, that Waldstein was really brilliant organiser, administrator and lawgiver who deserves intensive attention of legal history.

The paper discusses the function of the Seymik Marshall (which was equivalent to the English Speaker) under the reigns of Kings Michał Korybut and Jan III. The author based his analysis on the examples of assemblies convened to debate at Volhynia. The function of tha Marshall of the Seymik came to being after 1572. The significance of this function grew in the course of time but in the discussed period there was no enlargement of the Marshall’s competence despite the phenomenon of “limita” which appeared at that time. In these Seymik sources in which we find more detailed entries there may be encountered the information on both the function of Director and Marshall. The Director was the top-positioned officer of the voivodship. He commenced the debates and suggested who might be the candidate for the position of the Marshall. The Marshall presided over the Seymik. This activity was sometimes referred to as exercising the Directoriate. The formulas that were used on such occasions were, however, not always precise. Therefore, sometimes the Marshall was referred to as the Director. The difference between these two names is not detectable in the material referring to other Seymiks of the Polonia Minor.

Libertas Scribendi – Libertas Philosophandi. Some Remarks On The Method Of Research In The Field Of Legal History In Relation To A Book By Jerzy Kolarzowski "Idea praw jednostki w pismach Braci Polskich. U narodzin nowożytnej noncepcji praw człowieka" ["The Idea of Individual Rights in the Writings of the Polish Brethren. Birth of the Concept of Human Rights"]

Warsaw University Press, Warsaw 2009, pp. 241

In discussion in which there participate almost all intellectuals (including the lawyers) who deal with broadly understood social sciences, the sintagma of human rights has been detectable for centuries. Its understanding however has been and still is ideologically conditioned. The present paper was inspired by Jerzy Kolarzewski’s monograph on Idea praw jednostki w pismach Braci Polskich. U narodzin nowożytniej koncepcji praw człowieka (The idea of rights of an individual as depicted in the papers of Polish Brethren. The genesis of modern concept of human rights) Warszawa 2009. The present contribution, apart from presenting the aforementioned study, tries to make a general reflection on the method of conducting legal history research by those who are engaged in seeking the links of “genetic” characters between the legal history phenomena and the phenomena of contemporary law. In other words the researchers that come into play are those who try to arrive at the moments of “concepts” of contemporary legal concepts, as set in history. These researchers try to juxtapose them upon the “genetic principle”.

In the article the author refers to the critical remarks of his book “Professionalization of governmental administration in Poland 1918–1939: social and cultural condition” placed in the article of Janusz Mierzwa in “Cracow Studies of Consittutional and Legal History” vol. 4. Author points out to the misunderstanding of his book and not taking into account the purpose of the research and purposefully selected sources. Author takes a stance against the objections and states that beliefs expressed by Mierzwa in his article, do not help the cooperation between historians and sociologists.

Chronicle of scholarly events (2011)

• Krzysztof Fokt (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), Legal and constitutional history on the Faculty of Law and Administration of The Jagiellonian University in 2011
• Krzysztof Fokt (Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Kraków),170. posiedzenie naukowe krakowskiego oddziału Polskiego Towarzystwa Heraldycznego z referatem W. Bukowskiego i M. Zdanka pt. „Edycje średniowiecznych krakowskich ksiąg sądowych”
• Jan Šejdl (Charles University in Prague), Legal history in the Czech Republic – reporton Activities and Events in 2011
• Maria Filipiak (University of Göttingen), Legal and constitutional history in Germany in 2011
• Norbert Varga (University of Szeged), Hungarian scholarly events in the field of legal history in 2011
• Roman Shandra (Ivan Franko National University, Lviv), Brief review of scientific eventsin legal history in Ukraine in 2011 .

Stephen Batory ruled the Republic of the Two Nations for almost 11 years. The time of his reign was characterized by specifi c relationships between him and the Polish-Lithuanian General Seym. What was reflective of this specifi cacy were the Seym proceeding practices and the nature of the law-creating process. Since the reign of king Batory was short it is not easy to formulate the rules along which the aforementioned relationships developed.
The criterion that allowed to classify the major legislative acts produced at that time was that of who produced them (the criterion of the Legislator). Other criterion – for instance the traditional one based on the scope of legislative competence of the Seym and the king – would not be possible to apply. The point was that the division of matters into those left for the legislation as made by the king and those left for the legislative activities of the Seym was not dichotomous. In producing legal norms the two entities complemented each other. At the same time they also competed with each other. As a result two interesting phenomena were observable: the interchangeability of the two law-creating agencies, i.e. that of the king and that of the Seym, and also the fl exibility of the forms assumed by the legislative acts.
In the discussed period the legal norms of universally binding force were adopted at the central level either in the form of resolution as made by the General Seym or in the form of acts issued by the king. The act that was expected to be considered the legislative product of the Seym was the one which jointly fulfi lled two requirements. First, it had to be produced at the time and in the place of the Seym debates (therefore in most cases, although not always, there was made in it the allusion of the type: “at the General Seym”, in conventu generalis Regni nostri). The second thing, and simultaneously the most important one, was the information that was placed in the text of the act (unless the tenor of the information could be seen from the content of the act in an obvious way) that the act was produced “while following the advice of our Lords Counsellors and with the consent given by the Seym deputies representing the provinces (de consilio consiliariorum Nostrorum, consensusque omnium ordinum)”. Other legislative acts were qualifi ed as royal acts but the latter were not homogeneous. Thus the monarch could by himself produce universals (these were his own acts). On such occasion he operated as rex solus or cooperated with the senators (de consilio consiliariorum Nostrorum). He could also produce them upon the request and with the consent of the nobles (the so called approved acts), which was distinctly emphasized in the content of the act, the consensus of the nobles (of their representatives) to the specific provision being mentioned. The ruler acted in the capacity of the legislator both during the Seym debates as well as beyond the Seym. However the act published by the king even upon the consent of the Senators and the deputies representing the entire State was not considered to be the Seym-adopted act if it was issued beyond the place and beyond the time of the General Seym’s debates. What occurred sometimes were the combined (mixed) acts like for instance the so called Ekscepta mazowieckie. The Ekscepta were the act issued by the king on request of the Seym deputies representing the Mazovia Province. They were issued by the king beyond the place and time of the Seym debates on the basis of the document prepared in advance and submitted to the monarch, and eventually confirmed by him. One provision of the Ekscepta was however adopted by the Seym but was enclosed later to the entire text of the Ekscepta. Therefore the Ekscepta were of the nature of mixed act. Of similar nature was the Universal on tax collection of 1578. It was published as the king-issued act but, due to the specific history of its formulation, it was – from the perspective of Grand Duchy of Lithuania and almost the entire Crown (i.e. the Polish part of the Respublica) – considered to be the Seym-produced act. Also the so called Constitutions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania seem to be an interesting type of legal acts. They should be classified as the royal ones.
While exploring the legislation of King Batory’s reign, it is possible to arrive at a conclusion that the Seym-adopted statutory law (the so called Seym-produced constitutions) and the king-issued Universals that used to replace the Seym-adopted law, occupied equal position. This equality was due to the fact that in the regular circumstances the provisions contained in the Universals would fi nd themselves in the acts adopted by the Seym. We may say that in the discussed era the provisions that would regulate the law-creating process were absent and consequently accounted for such phenomena as fl exibility of the forms of legal acts and the interchangeability of legislative devices.