The political subjectivity of the first “Solidarity” evolved significantly in the period between the strikes in the summer of 1980 and the martial law announced on December 13, 1981. At the articulation level, there was transition from the supplication stage through aggregated postulates to the mature political program of nation. Occupation strikes became the basis for the Polish nation’s lasting potential of the self-organization. However, the level of organizational multidimensionality was not achieved. The mobilization potential grew from July 1980 until the general warning strike, and then began to systematically decline. The signing of the agreements meant written acceptance of the existence of separate social entity by the former monopolist (ruling party). It was to obtain collective status benefits. This formal recognition was not unconditional and was finally denied by the imposition of martial law. Significant part of the working, student and agricultural circles achieved the level of political subjectivity at the basic level.

The economic crisis, which had been started since the mid-1970s, was one of the main factors in the outbreak of the Solidarity revolution. The birth of Solidarity did not make the problem disappear. The Solidarity delegates were well aware of this. Although political issues aroused most emotion during the debates, economic themes were constantly present.

Most of the delegates for the congress speeches referring to economic reforms were limited to general statements about the necessity of reforms, without specifying how they were to look like. Most of the demands of the delegates were of a leftist and socialist nature. Liberal ideas, such as Stefan Kurowski’s concept, were extremely rare. The analysis of the economic discourse shows very clearly that, as befits a trade union, the Solidarity pushed through the reform ideas which were the least harmful for the poorest part of society, saw the need to introduce aid measures, and often wanted to burden the representatives of the communist nomenclature with the costs of the reforms.

During the “Revolution of Solidarity” (September 1980 – December 1981), some of the magazines of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) became an independent way of local structures PUWP, which had controlled them. One of the example is the editorial office “Gazeta Krakowska” (GK), which during this period, presented often autonomous views towards to PUWP. In this article, the author analyzes the attitude of the authorities of the Krakow Committee PUWP (KC) towards to the content of GK. The attention was paid to the specificity of the reports and the impact of authorities KC on the editorial office of GK, as well as their resonance among journalists. The text also refers to the evolution of these relations and the reasons for their change in the second half of 1981. The author pays particular attention to the view authorities KC towards to specific autonomy of GK. In the article, the author presented in which spheres were allowed for freedom and in which party discipline was demanded. The text also refers to the “common interests” that could have been linked by the liberal-minded authorities of the KC and the editorial staff of GK for example in striving for internal party reforms or fighting the conservative part of PUWP.

From the first days of September to mid-October 1981, the 1st National Congress of Delegates of NSZZ “Solidarność” took place in Gdańsk. The assembly attracted significant public attention. A reliable source of information about the event was the official magazine “Głos Wolny”, published on the occasion of the Congress. So far, the newspaper has not been studied by historians yet, although the magazine contains information worth detailed studies. This work presents the analysis of the Nasza sonda column, one of the forms of a public opinion poll published in the newspaper. This analysis regards the subject of the survey along with its results. Additional attempts to determine the importance and the role of the column are made. The diagnostic survey, content analysis, quantitative and qualitative analyses are the methods used to study all 24 issues of the journal.

As early as August 1980, the GDR authorities were monitoring their communist allies in Poland to see if there were any plans to suppress the ongoing strikes and later to pacify the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarność”. Reports on this topic were provided by the Ministry for State Security (Stasi), military intelligence and the embassy in Warsaw, among others. Initially, such information was coming in only sporadically. With time – and especially since September 1981 – more regularly and more in-depth. Specific undertakings were reported: prepared lists of arrests, plans for a military takeover of the mass media and the dissolution of all political parties. Still, these signals were underestimated by the East German analysts. They ignored General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s growing readiness to confront the opposition and preferred to trust these voices in the Polish United Workers’ Party that expressed doubts about the ability of the First Secretary to use force.

The article discusses the fate of “Solidarność” activists from Piła voivodeship interned during the martial law. In the period from 96 Wolność i Solidarność | nr 13 JAROSŁAW WĄSOWICZ 13 Dec 1981 to 1 Nov 1982 on the area of this voivodeship, 50 “Solidarność” activists were interned, who were kept in Wronki, Gębarzów, Kwidzyn and Wierzchowo Pomorskie. In this group there were also two women: Elżbieta Kaczmarek from Chodzież and Barbara Oroń from Wałcz. Among the internees there were 25 activists from Piła, 7 from Chodzież, 6 from Wałcz, 4 from Trzcianka, 1 from Złotów, 1 from Szamocin, 1 from Walkowice, 1 from Wągrowiec. They were a part of three regions within the Union: Piła Voivodeship, West Pomerania (Wałcz), Greater Poland (Wągrowiec).

On 29th September 1982 Stanisław Wałęsa visited his brother Lech Wałęsa (the leader od NSZZ Solidarność) who was interneed in Arłamów. The excuse of this visit was Lech’s birthday, but the real aim was the recording of a short interview for the western media. It was very top secret. Both brothers were celebrating Lech’s 39th birthday, drinking alcohol and having a dispute. It was registered by the SB officers; what is more, it was the beginning of one of the loudest actions in the 1980s against “Solidarność” and its leader – Lech Wałęsa. The conversation itself, initially its “transcripts” and then the edited recording was used several times. The circle of recipients was also gradually expanded. For the first time, the transcript of the interview was used even before the leader of “Solidarność” was released from internment. He was introduced to the priest Alojzy Orszulik who at that time was visiting Wałęsa as the representative of the Polish Episcopate. At last on 27th September 1983, the prepared material was emitted on TVP at prime-time. It was titled Pieniądze. The entire operation did not bring the expected results – it was not possible to compromise Lech Wałęsa.

After martial law was imposed, strikes broke out all over Poland. The cradle of Solidarity in Szczecin—the Adolf Warski Shipyard, was the key centre of resistance in Western Pomerania and one of significance in all of Poland. After 13 December 1981, the Inter- -Enterprise Strike Committee was established there, spearheaded by Mieczysław Ustasiak and Andrzej Milczanowski. The authorities wanted to suppress the protests as quickly as possible. On the night of 14–15 December, army troops and police (MO) units entered the plant; several dozen people were arrested. The members of the strike leadership were subsequently brought before a military court in Bydgoszcz. In a show trial in March 1982, some of them were sentenced to imprisonment (the highest sentence was five years) and loss of civil rights. Although deprived of leadership, the strike at the Shipyard continued in shifts until 18 December, when the authorities, unable to cope with how the situation unfolded, suspended the plant’s operations and began to lay off and vet the workforce.

A presentation of the career of Jerzy Holzer, historian and Solidarity activist, author of the first monographic study of the Solidarity movement. The book Solidarność 1980–1981. Geneza i historia [Solidarity 1980–1981. Origin and History] was published by the Krąg underground publishing house already in 1983. Subsequently, it was reprinted several times, with a German translation published as well. For years, it was the primary compendium of knowledge about the history of Solidarity. The article focuses on the themes of Holzer’s intellectual biography, ranging from his participation in the communist movement to his engagement in democratic opposition circles, and on the various stages of his research career.

Jiří Lederer (1922–1983), a journalist and writer, has left a permanent mark on the history of Czech culture and democratic opposition in Central and Eastern Europe. In the 1960s he became one of the spokespersons of the Polish-Czech agreement and an expert on Polish affairs. From the 1967 he was already a dissident, he secretly collaborated with the centres of Czech emigration in the West (Free Europe Radio Station, “Svědectví”). He was one of the champions of the Prague Spring and one of the first victims of the so called normalization (deprived of the possibility of publishing and removed from public life). A signatory to Charter77, he was condemned in 1977 for three years jail. The focus of the article is the analyse of the texts concerning the Polish independent trade union Solidarity, which were written by Lederer after 1980, when he lived in exile in Germany. During his forced stay abroad the journalist was trying to integrate Czech, Polish and Slovak political émigré centres.

The aim of the study is to describe the different political and social conditions of opposition activity in Hungary and Poland between 1956 and 1989, and to map the relations between the various Hungarian and Polish opposition groups. The author starts from the premise that after 1956 radically different political, economic and social conditions developed in the two countries. While in Poland the situation was relatively favourable for opposition activity, in Hungary the possibilities were limited and only in the late 1970s, and especially after the birth of the Polish Solidarity movement, did the scope for action increase. On the other hand, the author argues that activity in opposition was not sufficient for the development of Hungarian-Polish relations, but that the political, ideological and generational differences of Hungarian opposition groups had a decisive influence on the relations. Thus, for the Hungarians, the worldview and political strategy of the opposition in Poland were more important than the only opposition’s behaviour.