We present the model theoretic concepts that allow mathematics to be developed with the notion of the potential infinite instead of the actual infinite. The potential infinite is understood as a dynamic notion, being an indefinitely extensible finite. The main adoption is the interpretation of the universal quantifier, which has an implicit reection principle. Each universal quantification refers to an indefinitely large, but finite set. The quantified sets may increase, so after a reference by quantification, a further reference typically uses a larger, still finite set. We present the concepts for classical first-order logic and show that these dynamic models are sound and complete with respect to the usual inference rules. Moreover, a finite set of formulas requires a finite part of the increasing model for a correct interpretation.

Contrary to the finitary case, the set Γ(A) of all the non-generators of an infinitary algebra A is not necessarily a subalgebra of A. We show that the phenomenon is ubiquitous: every algebra with at least one infinitary operation can be embedded into some algebra B such that Γ(B) is not a subalgebra of B. As far as expansions are concerned, there are examples of infinite algebras A such that in every expansion B of A the set Γ(B) is a subalgebra of B. However, under relatively weak assumptions on A, it is possible to get some expansion B of A such that Γ(B) fails to be a subalgebra of B.

Menger's graph theorem equates the minimum size of a separating set for non-adjacent vertices a and b with the maximum number of disjoint paths between a and b. By capturing separating sets as models of an entailment relation, we take a formal approach to Menger's result. Upon showing that inconsistency is characterised by the existence of suficiently many disjoint paths, we recover Menger's theorem by way of completeness.

Let pbe a prime number, Fp a finite field with pelements, Fan algebraic extension of Fp and z a variable. We consider the structure of addition and the Frobenius map (i.e., x →x^p) in the polynomial rings F[z] and in fields F(z) of rational functions. We prove that any question about F[z] in the structure of addition and Frobenius map may be effectively reduced to questions about the similar structure of the field F. Furthermore, we provide an example which shows that a fact which is true for addition and the Frobenius map in the polynomial rings F[z] fails to be true in F(z). As a consequence, certain methods used to prove model completeness for polynomials do not suffice to prove model completeness for similar structures for fields of rational functions F(z), a problem that remains open even for F= Fp.

In this paper we prove a Lindström like theorem for the logic consisting of arbitrary Boolean combinations of first order sentences. Specifically we show the logic obtained by taking arbitrary, possibly infinite, Boolean combinations of first order sentences in countable languages is the unique maximal abstract logic which is closed under finitary Boolean operations, has occurrence number ω1, has the downward Lüowenheim-Skolem property to ωand the upward Lüowenheim-Skolem property to uncountability, and contains all complete first order theories in countable languages as sentences of the abstract logic. We will also show a similar result holds in the continuous logic framework of [5], i.e. we prove a Lindström like theorem for the abstract continuous logic consisting of Boolean combinations of first order closed conditions. Specifically we show the abstract continuous logic consisting of arbitrary Boolean combinations of closed conditions is the unique maximal abstract continuous logic which is closed under approximate isomorphisms on countable structures, is closed under finitary Boolean operations, has occurrence number ω1, has the downward Lüowenheim-Skolem property toω, the upward Lüowenheim-Skolem property to uncountability and contains all first order theories in countable languages as sentences of the abstract logic.