Jan Halberda

The article discusses the problem of evolution and the premises used in applying the English concept known as promissory estoppel. The birth of this legal concept has been discussed on the example of the most important court cases, the so called leading cases, such as, among others, that of High Trees (1947) and Combe v. Combe (1951), in which it was lord Denning who adjudicated. In the article, the author also analyzes the general principles of invoking promissory estoppel. He indicates that in the course of a court trial it is necessary to prove the existence of a promise, on the basis of which the person who was promised something, while acting in accordance with the common sense, decided to withdraw and by undertaking certain definite steps ultimately suffered a loss, whereas withdrawal on the part of the person making a promise would be unjustified. The author of the paper made an effort to try to answer the question whether the abuse of right clause mentioned in Art. 5 of the Civil Code may be regarded as the Polish equivalent of promissory estoppel.

Pursuant to the maxim that actio personalis moritur cum persona, the claims and debts of the party become extinct on the day of its death. That is the reason why in English common law the successors could not sue their predecessor’s debtors; on the other hand, they were protected against the creditors of the deceased. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of doctrine for the legal relations, especially within the scope of contract law.
In the early years (12th–13th centuries) of the functioning of the doctrine nearly all personal actions came into play. However, lawyers began to create more and more exceptions that narrowed the maxim’s impact. As a result, at the beginning of the 17th century (the Pynchon’s case, 1611) the court had in fact transformed the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona into the exception.
It is worthwhile to note that the maxim’s history may act as an example of the peculiarity of English law and the domination of its procedural rules. Throughout the centuries the most important reason against the transmission of rights and duties was the practical impossibility of the wager of law’s application. In that case lawyers could only modify rules of evidence. Instead, in England it was decided to treat the claims and debts of the deceased as extinct. As a result, the consequences of the actio personalis moritur cum persona doctrine went much too far.

This review presents a book recently authored by Łukasz Jan Korporowicz on the presence of Roman law in eighteenth century England. The book is divided into five chapters that deal with following issues: 1) teaching of ius civile in Oxbridge, 2) teaching of ius civile outside the universities, 3) the study of Roman law and obtaining formal degrees, 4) the impact of civil lawyers on the socio-political environment of England, and finally, 5) literature on Roman law.