Adam Putko
Psychologia Rozwojowa, Tom 25, Numer 1, 2020, s. 49 - 67
https://doi.org/10.4467/20843879PR.20.003.12000Exposure to Narrative Fiction and Spontaneous versus Explicit Mentalization
The main objective of the study was to check for the existence of the effect of short-term exposure to fiction in the area of mentalization abilities (Kidd, Castano, 2013), taking into account the spontaneous versus explicit aspect of these abilities. An additional aim was to verify the hypothesis that at the root of this phenomenon lies the process of imaginary simulation. In the first part of the study, participants (N = 103, aged 18 to 25) were randomly assigned to one of four groups: (1) reading literary fiction, (2) listening to the same story as the first group, and at the same time imagining the events presented in it, (3) reading popular fiction, and (4) not reading any story. In the second part of the study, all participants completed mentalization tests, a test checking familiarity with fiction, and the questionnaire on practices of reading books, magazines and watching television. The study showed no significant differences between the groups in the results of mentalization tests, even under conditions conducive to imaginary simulation. Familiarity with fiction proved to be a positive predictor of spontaneous mentalization, and exposure to television was a negative predictor of explicit mentalization. The findings lead to the conclusion that short-term exposure to fiction does not lead to a significant increase in spontaneous or explicit mentalization. However, both aspects of mentalization are connected with more long-term factors that are expressed in familiarity with fiction and exposure to television.
Adam Putko
Psychologia Rozwojowa, Tom 19, Numer 2, 2014, s. 33 - 48
https://doi.org/10.4467/20843879PR.14.010.2288Adam Putko
Psychologia Rozwojowa, Tom 16, Numer 1, 2011, s. 73 - 84
https://doi.org/10.4467/20843879PR.11.005.0178Theory of mind and cold versus hot executive functions in preschool-aged children
The main purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between the ability to represent mental states and the development of cold versus hot executive functions (EF) in preschool-aged children. The participants were a group of 44 children between the ages from 3 to 4 years. There were used false-belief tasks (Gopnik & Astington 1988; Wimmer & Perner 1983) as the measures of theory of mind (ToM) development, Dimensional Change Card Sort (Frye et al. 1995) as a measure of cool EF, and The Children’s Gambling Task (Kerr & Zelazo 2004) as a measure of hot EF. Considering the whole group of children, it was found a stronger relationship between the level of ToM and cold EF comparing to hot EF. But data obtained in the age groups indicated the differences in the pattern of correlations. The level of ToM was stronger connected to the cold EF in the group of 4-year-olds, but in the group of 3-year-olds there was a trend towards the stronger relationship between ToM and hot EF. The implications of the results for the problem of relation between the development of ToM and processes of conscious control of thought and action are discussed.
Adam Putko
Psychologia Rozwojowa, Tom 18, Numer 4, 2013, s. 65 - 82
Cool vs hot executive functions, language and children’s understanding of their own vs others’ mental states
The main purpose of this study has been to verify a hypothesis based on the assumptions of the theories by Russell (1998) and Zelazo et al. (2005), concerning the relation between the development of executive functions (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). It was hypothesized that the level of the hot EF compared to the cool EF would be more strongly connected with children’s understanding of their own mental states than those of others. In the analysis of relationships between selected aspects of the EF and ToM, the level of language development was also considered. The study covered forty-four 3- and 4-year-olds, using false-belief tasks in their “unexpected contents” version (Gopnik & Astington, 1988) as the measures of ToM development, with one question requiring the attribution of a false belief to somebody else, and another question requiring the recognition of one’s own previous belief as false. The cool EF were measured with a version of the Bear-Dragon task (Reed et al., 1984), and the hot EF with the Children’s Gambling Task (Kerr, Zelazo, 2004). Language development was assessed with the Picture Vocabulary Test (OTS-R; Haman et al., 2011). It appeared that children’s understanding of their own mental states in both age groups was related only to the cool EF, while their understanding of other people’s mental states correlated marginally with the cool EF only in 4-year-olds. The level of the hot EF was not connected signifi cantly with any aspect of ToM. Regression analysis revealed that the cool aspect of the EF was a signifi cant language-independent predictor of the understanding of one’s own mental states in 4-year-olds, but not in 3-year-olds. The results are at variance with the predictions based on the theory by Zelazo et al., but consistent with those drawn from Russell’s theory, according to which self-consciousness and self-refl ection underlie the relationship between the EF and ToM.