This article begins with some remarks on the present state of political and legal culture in Poland. The overall picture is of a clearly pessimistic connotation. The society is politically divided, there is almost no dialogue or common respect between two polarized camps, appeals to populistic sentiments and antagonisms became a widespread phenomenon in the political life. The general situation is not without influence on the legal culture. On the one hand, the Constitutional Tribunal, as well as other segments of the judiciary, has already developed a constitutional culture based on judicial interpretation of the Constitution of 1997. On the other hand, within last two years many politicians developed an overly nihilistic approach to law in general and to the Constitution. Constitutional provisions are often seen as obstacles in implementation of political programs, legislative regulations do not follow constitutional requirements, judicial review is regarded as dysfunctional. Consequently, the Constitutional Tribunal’s independence and operational capacity became victim of different political and regulatory measures. This development has a structural nature, and constitutional remedies may not be sufficient to stop the trend. Nevertheless, the judicial branch is not entirely powerless. Although the Constitutional Tribunal may not be able to implement its constitutional tasks in full, other segments of the judiciary may assume, at least in part, some powers of judicial review. The situation, however, remains very dynamic.

The Constitutional Tribunal as co-creator of legal culture in Poland

This article begins with some remarks on the present state of political and legal culture in Poland. The overall picture is of a clearly pessimistic connotation. The society is politically divided, there is almost no dialogue or common respect between two polarized camps, appeals to populistic sentiments and antagonisms became a widespread phenomenon in the political life. The general situation is not without influence on the legal culture. On the one hand, the Constitutional Tribunal, as well as other segments of the judiciary, has already developed a constitutional culture based on judicial interpretation of the Constitution of 1997. On the other hand, within last two years many politicians developed an overly nihilistic approach to law in general and to the Constitution. Constitutional provisions are often seen as obstacles in implementation of political programs, legislative regulations do not follow constitutional requirements, judicial review is regarded as dysfunctional. Consequently, the Constitutional Tribunal’s independence and operational capacity became victim of different political and regulatory measures. This development has a structural nature, and constitutional remedies may not be sufficient to stop the trend. Nevertheless, the judicial branch is not entirely powerless. Although the Constitutional Tribunal may not be able to implement its constitutional tasks in full, other segments of the judiciary may assume, at least in part, some powers of judicial review. The situation, however, remains very dynamic.