Truizmy, heurystyki i pojęcie prawa
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RIS BIB ENDNOTETruisms, Heuristics and the Concept of Law
Data publikacji: 19.12.2018
Principia, 2018, Tom 65, s. 113-143
https://doi.org/10.4467/20843887PI.18.005.9888Autorzy
Truisms, Heuristics and the Concept of Law
Analyses of the concept of law rely on certain self-evident truths: truisms (platitudes) about law that people generally share and which reflect their common understanding of this important social concept. General legal theories are products of such analyses. In this paper I argue that every reference to truisms in the context of legal theory building should also take into account inferential processes by which truisms themselves are coined, namely different types of heuristics about law and related phenomena. Since both truisms and heuristics are unstructured, often inconsistent, and even fallible, conceptual analyses are the main means of transforming such “raw” evidence into rationally structured legal theories.
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Informacje: Principia, 2018, Tom 65, s. 113-143
Typ artykułu: Oryginalny artykuł naukowy
Tytuły:
Truisms, Heuristics and the Concept of Law
Wydział Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, ul. Gołębia 24, 31-007 Kraków
Publikacja: 19.12.2018
Status artykułu: Otwarte
Licencja: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
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Angielski