The Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication from the Perspective of Dual Process Theory
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RIS BIB ENDNOTEThe Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication from the Perspective of Dual Process Theory
Publication date: 19.12.2018
Principia, 2018, Volume 65, pp. 207 - 231
https://doi.org/10.4467/20843887PI.18.009.10868Authors
The Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication from the Perspective of Dual Process Theory
The Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication from the Perspective of Dual Process Theory
Summary
In his theory of adjudication, Aristotle observes that the judicial process should be based on rational and impartial evaluation of the merits of given case and on the application of law. This paper focuses on the bipolar character of the theory of adjudication analyzed from the perspective of the modern dual process theory. It seems that the bounded rationality of judges may create a potential threat to the impartiality and rationality of judgments in complex cases. In this context the hybrid model of categorization adopted from cognitive psychology is to be confronted with the Aristotelian theory of adjudication. The influence of heuristics and biases on judicial decisions is also to be considered. The conclusion refers to the prospects of an Aristotelian virtue-centered model of adjudication following the assumption of bounded rationality.
Keywords: Aristotle, epikeia, dual process theory, hybrid model of categorization, heuristics and biases, bounded rationality
The research on this article was funded by the National Science Centre, Poland, no. 2015/17/B/HS5/00495
Koncepcja orzekania Arystotelesa z perspektywy teorii dwutorowości
Streszczenie: W ramach swojej teorii orzekania Arystoteles zwraca uwagę na to, że proces sądowy powinien być oparty na racjonalnej, bezstronnej ocenie okoliczności danej sprawy, a także na zastosowaniu prawa. Przedmiotem tego artykułu jest dwubiegunowy charakter teorii orzekania analizowany z perspektywy współczesnej teorii dwutorowości. Wydaje się, że ograniczona racjonalność sędziów może potencjalnie stanowić zagrożenie dla bezstronności oraz racjonalności orzeczeń sądowych w złożonych przypadkach. W tym kontekście hybrydowy model kategoryzacji zapożyczony z psychologii kognitywnej zostanie skonfrontowany z teorią orzekania Arystotelesa. Ponadto uwzględniony zostanie wpływ heurystyk poznawczych oraz złudzeń poznawczych na proces orzekania. Konkluzja odnosi się do trafności modelu orzekania wynikającego z filozofii Arystotelesa z zastosowaniem twierdzenia o ograniczonej racjonalności decydentów.
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Information: Principia, 2018, Volume 65, pp. 207 - 231
Article type: Original article
Titles:
The Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication from the Perspective of Dual Process Theory
The Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication from the Perspective of Dual Process Theory
Department of Theory and Philosophy of Law, Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Lodz
Published at: 19.12.2018
Article status: Open
Licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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