Mariusz Jerzy Golecki
Principia, Volume 65, 2018, pp. 207 - 231
https://doi.org/10.4467/20843887PI.18.009.10868In his theory of adjudication, Aristotle observes that the judicial process should be based on rational and impartial evaluation of the merits of given case and on the application of law. This paper focuses on the bipolar character of the theory of adjudication analyzed from the perspective of the modern dual process theory. It seems that the bounded rationality of judges may create a potential threat to the impartiality and rationality of judgments in complex cases. In this context the hybrid model of categorization adopted from cognitive psychology is to be confronted with the Aristotelian theory of adjudication. The influence of heuristics and biases on judicial decisions is also to be considered. The conclusion refers to the prospects of an Aristotelian virtue-centered model of adjudication following the assumption of bounded rationality.
The research on this article was funded by the National Science Centre, Poland, no. 2015/17/B/HS5/00495
Mariusz Jerzy Golecki
Principia, Volume 61-62, 2015, pp. 159 - 176
https://doi.org/10.4467/20843887PI.15.009.5538This paper concerns the relationship between the development of the doctrine of binding precedent in English jurisprudence and the evolution of British legal positivism, with particular focus on the development of judicial practice and the search for the ultimate criteria of validity. Based on examples from English judicial practice, the article explores the dilemmas of imperative legal theory. The proposed hypothesis is based on the assumption that the evolution of the doctrine of binding precedent in English law became an essential factor behind refined legal positivism in general and the concept of the rule of recognition in particular.