Zbigniew Bereszyński

In 1971, the new leadership of the Polish United Workers’ Party, headed by Edward Gierek, introduced a new economic strategy, called the “strategy of dynamic growth”. This strategy brought about positive results, for instance in the sector of mineral construction materials. In the 1970s, this sector underwent intense development and modernization. In the end, the strategy was not consistently implemented, mainly due to the lack of sufficient financing. Over time, its initial success was overshadowed by the intensifying social and economic crisis, which resulted with conflicts in workplaces, among other consequences. In the summer of 1980, workers went on strike also in mineral construction material factories. This was followed by the formation of “Solidarity” branches in individual workplaces and at the national level.

Parliamentary elections of January 1947, rigged by communists, began the process of gradual Sovietization of social life in Poland. It aimed at establishing a totalitarian political system, mo- deled after the Soviet Union. The events which took place in the Opole Silesia region in the years 1947–1950 are a great illustration of this process. Progressive Sovietization of the social life became a major obstacle in the process of achieving social integration in the Opole Silesia. Actions such as a fight with the Catholic Church or creating collective farms resulted with stronger pro-German attitudes among native inhabitants. Communist authorities reacted to manifestations of social resistance among various groups with repressions. However, within a few years, faced 110 Zbigniew Bereszyński with events such as the people’s uprising in Poznań in 1956, they were forced to attenuate their policy toward the society and allow for partial liberalization of social life.

In 1971 the authorities of the Polish People’s Republic implemented a new economic strategy, referred to as the strategy of dynamic growth. The strategy, which assumed rapid industrial growth in combination with an improvement in the living conditions for the general society, resulted in social and economic development, also in the city of Opole. The city grew both in territorial and demographic terms, gaining more housing resources and more jobs. However, this growth was extremely uneven. In the years 1971–1980 and later, enormous amounts of money and materials were wasted on ventures which were significantly delayed or never completed. In hindsight, some decisions regarding new investments turned out to be misguided. On the one hand, investments from the years 1971–1980 benefited the city, but on the other, they caused a number of serious social problems. In many cases, this legacy is still an enormous burden for the city and its residents.

University students’ circles in Opole, which existed from 1954, played an important, yet ambiguous role in the local social life. For communist authorities, the university was one of the most important sources for procuring staff, but it was also a base for anti-government activities. The religious activity of many students was also a constant source of problems for the communist authorities. In October 1956, students in Opole vigorously demonstrated their support for the democratization of political life in Poland. In subsequent years, the communist authorities made efforts to attract as many students as possible to the Polish United Workers’ Party and politically approved youth organizations. Success in this respect did not discourage students in Opole from participating in the national protests of March 1968. As a consequence, students were subjected to repressions. However, the suppression of student protests remained a bitter victory for communists.

In the years 1946–1947, the communist authorities gradually eliminated their legal political opposition gathered in the Polish People’s Party. The amnesty that followed turned out to be a deadly blow to the so-called underground state, whose members continued their activity after the Second World War. Under these circumstances, the opposition of youth, growing up in post-war Poland, gradually gained in significance. The progressing Sovietization of social life in Poland was met with various forms of opposition and resistance in these circles, and prompted spontaneous acts of conspiracy among school-goers. Such initiatives were also born in Greater Poland. They did not pose any real threat for the communist state, but the authorities treated them seriously and responded with acts of repression. This is discussed in the present paper, based on examples from various parts of the region.