Trademark Protection Law

Recently we are facing increasing application of neuroscience in law, however limited to criminal law and crime detection. The idea to implement neuroscience to trademark protection law is quite new and unexplored. There are however experiments that can make us see the problem in a different light. One of them certainly is Morrin/Jacoby experiment which points out how familiar trademarks can confuse consumers brain. Results of this experiment show that judge’s decision can be enriched with the idea of dilution. In connection with the above it seems understandable that pure idea of infringement ceases to be enough. Consequently, a trademark can be both infringed and diluted. Dilution is defined as an unconscious process which occurs when two or more marks use remarkably like logos, or have very similar names. Shall dilution be applied in law? It seems quite an interesting idea, yet it would lead to extreme inflation of law. Moreover, its theoretical bases are quite frail. Taking all the above mentioned doubts it seems reasonable to be reserved about such concepts.

Trademark Protection Law

Recently we are facing increasing application of neuroscience in law, however limited to criminal law and crime detection. The idea to implement neuroscience to trademark protection law is quite new and unexplored. There are however experiments that can make us see the problem in a different light. One of them certainly is Morrin/Jacoby experiment which points out how familiar trademarks can confuse consumers brain. Results of this experiment show that judge’s decision can be enriched with the idea of dilution. In connection with the above it seems understandable that pure idea of infringement ceases to be enough. Consequently, a trademark can be both infringed and diluted. Dilution is defined as an unconscious process which occurs when two or more marks use remarkably like logos, or have very similar names. Shall dilution be applied in law? It seems quite an interesting idea, yet it would lead to extreme inflation of law. Moreover, its theoretical bases are quite frail. Taking all the above mentioned doubts it seems reasonable to be reserved about such concepts.