Tomasz Stryjek
Zoon Politikon, 8/2017, 2017, s. 87 - 125
https://doi.org/10.4467/2543408XZOP.17.004.9263Autor analizuje antagonizujące konsekwencje prowadzonej przez PiS polityki pamięci w stosunkach z Izraelem, Ukrainą, Niemcami, Rosją i międzynarodową opinią publiczną. Wskazuje na narastanie sporu wewnętrznego o prawomocność ustroju III RP po przełomie 1989 r. Sądzi, iż polityka pamięci jest adresowana głównie do partnerów zagranicznych, jednak osiąga skuteczność jedynie w polityce wewnętrznej w postaci konsolidacji elektoratu ugrupowań tradycjonalistycznych i nacjonalistycznych. Wiąże hipertrofię polityki pamięci z odchodzeniem od demokracji liberalnej w kierunku rządów jednostek o silnym autorytecie, wskazując na trzy przypadki poza Polską: Rosję, Węgry i Serbię.
Tomasz Stryjek
Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne, Tom XXXI, 2022, s. 81 - 103
https://doi.org/10.4467/2543733XSSB.22.004.16706The Politics of Memory, Historical Populism and the Crisis of Democracy. Hungary and Poland Against the Backdrop of Central and Eastern Europe
Firstly, the author analyzes those resources of historical memory that distinguish Hungary and Poland from the other states of Central and Eastern Europe. On the one hand, these resources most strongly associate them with the West, and on the other, they allow them to oppose it to justify their alternative development path. Secondly, he analyzes the cases of populists of various types across the region since 1989, highlighting those who campaigned with interpretations of the past to delegitimize political opponents, mainly from the left. Finally, and thirdly, he presents policies of memory of the right-wing governments of Hungary and Poland. In his opinion only they meet the criteria for the definition of historical populism. This term is what he calls a consistent governmental policy aimed at liberal elites and globalization as embodied by the West. It is conducted by changing the sense given to the entire past following the ideology of ethnocentrism and neo-traditionalism. This ideology is addressed to people-nation (lat. populus) to whom it assigns the role of an heir of a unique history and national tradition.
Keywords: politics of memory, historical culture, populism, historical populism, crisis of democracy.
Tomasz Stryjek
Zoon Politikon, Special Issue 2018, 2018, s. 43 - 66
https://doi.org/10.4467/2543408XZOP.18.003.10059Polish authorities have placed so much importance on remembrance policy since the end of 2015 that it has led to the hypertrophy of the phenomenon. From the 1990s, Poland has been at the forefront of shaping the infrastructure of this form of politics in Europe. Admittedly, even before 2015, national remembrance policy referred mainly to martyrologic and heroic experiences from the period 1939-1956, but it was the victory of Law and Justice in the elections in 2015 and the creation of a oneparty government that resulted in the repeated official declarations of the necessity to defend national “dignity”. This has been accompanied by wiping from national memory past crimes committed by Poles, particularly against Jews.
This Article is made in Open Access, available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 license.
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This article is a translated and modified version of the text that was published in the previous issue of “Zoon Politikon”. See:
Tomasz Stryjek, Hipertrofia polityki pamięci w III RP i jej konsekwencje od roku 2015, "Zoon Politikon" (8) 2017, DOI: 10.4467/2543408XZOP.17.004.9263.