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Interpretacja wzorców konstytucyjnych z perspektywy filozofii prawa

Publication date: 2017

Przegląd Konstytucyjny, 2017, Issue 3 (2017), pp. 33 - 49

Authors

Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki
Faculty of Law and Administration Jagiellonian University, ul. Gołębia 24, 31-007 Kraków
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Titles

Interpretation of constitutional standards from the perspective of legal philosophy

Abstract

The provisions contained in the constitution have different characteristics. Specific problems arise in connection with interpretation of those provisions which contain standards. Traditional canons of interpretation (linguistic, systematic and purposive interpretation) fail, since constitutional standards refer to essentially contested concepts. The understanding of such concepts as equality, human dignity or social market economy depends on the accepted political philosophy. A deficit of legitimacy of decisions arises, since decisions based on a particular political philosophy are challenged by adherents of competing political philosophies. Such a deficit may be reduced by reference to the conception of “incompletely theorized agreements”. It may be demonstrated that a dispute relating to an abstract principle or value does not preclude the possibility of reaching a consensus with respect to a particular decision. Such a decision may be differently justified on the basis of different political philosophies.

Information

Information: Przegląd Konstytucyjny, 2017, Issue 3 (2017), pp. 33 - 49

Article type: Original article

Titles:

English:

Interpretation of constitutional standards from the perspective of legal philosophy

Polish:

Interpretacja wzorców konstytucyjnych z perspektywy filozofii prawa

Authors

Faculty of Law and Administration Jagiellonian University, ul. Gołębia 24, 31-007 Kraków

Published at: 2017

Article status: Open

Licence: None

Percentage share of authors:

Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki (Author) - 100%

Article corrections:

-

Publication languages:

Polish

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Number of downloads: 218