Krzysztof Mudyń

First, the author cites several definitions of wilful ignorance and analyzes the concept in relation to related terms such as “voluntary blindness”, “information avoidance” and “negative knowledge”. Then he presents the six groups of motives distinguished by Engel and Hartwig, provoking the occurrence of the phenomenon of deliberate ignorance. The author proposes to reduce this division to three more general motives, i.e. emotional, pragmatic and moral category, and characterizes their specificity. Referring to psychoanalytic tradition and the role attributed by the modern experimental psychology to unconscious processes, he notes that not every type of motivated ignorance is preceded by a “deliberate”, conscious decision. Many manifestations of ignorance are spontaneous (but not accidental) products of the activity of unconscious processes. More or less “deliberate” ignorance is a frequent reason for potential patients to avoid or delay medical examination. The practical problem is how to counteract this unfavorable tendency.

First, the author cites several of wilful ignorance and analyzes the concept in relation to related terms such as “voluntary blindness”, “information avoidance” and “negative knowledge”. Then he presents the six groups of motives distinguished by Engel and Hartwig, which may lead to the phenomenon of deliberate ignorance. The author proposes to reduce The author proposes to reduce this taxonomy to three more general motives, i.e. emotional, pragmatic and moral category, and characterizes their specificity. Referring to psychoanalytic tradition and the role attributed by the modern experimental psychology to unconscious processes, he notes that not every type of motivated ignorance is preceded by a “deliberate”, conscious decision. Many manifestations of ignorance are spontaneous (but not accidental) products of the activity of unconscious processes. More or less “deliberate” ignorance is a frequent reason for potential patients to avoid or delay medical examination. The practical problem is how to counteract this unfavorable tendency.

The author analyzes relation between the expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) and the issue of values. In particular, he points out the difficulties associated with “agreeing on values” in an algorithm vs during a human interaction. The article highlights the obstacles of taking human values into account while designing complex algorithms, which result from the fact that the preferred values are inconsistent, contextual and therefore variable. The values depend on cultural conditions and individual differences as well. In addition, the sentimental values are also difficult to predict and take into account. All this makes it almost impossible to unambiguously define the values to be respected by the algorithm. Currently, an attempt is being made to include “emotional computing” into a design of artificial systems, which, according to many researchers, may turn out to be a breakthrough in the development of AI. There are already advanced attempts being made to model one of the aspects of emotional intelligence, which is to recognise other people’s emotional states based on the analysis of their facial expressions. According to the author, developments in the field of artificial emotional intelligence should rather worry than satisfy the users of the internet. They will contribute to greater control exercised by the institutions that use them, and consequently to further limitation of personal freedom of the individual users. The author suggests that the expansion of digital technology (contrary to the initial hopes) contributes to increased centralization of power and socio-economic inequalities. In the words of Norbert Wiener (1950), the development of digital technology contributes to “the human use of human beings”.

Intuition is understood in the article as the intelligence of the unconscious, taking into account all the information possessed by the subject as well as individual abilities and preferences. Intuition makes itself felt in various ways. It cooperates with consciousness when more important decisions are to be made or directly controls the behavior of an individual (in case of so-called operational intelligence). The author reflects on the role of intuition in the digitalized world and comes to the conclusion that digital technology partially replaces intuition’s function but at the same time limits and blocks its development. He also notes that the concept of intuition in experimental psychology has been wrongly narrowed to spontaneously used heuristics in response to irrelevant questions, which usually leads to biased, inaccurate assessments. Finally, the suggestion appears that there is an analogy between human intuition, treated as the intelligence of the unconscious, and the direction of development of artificial intelligence. The use of the deep machine learning means that we know less and less about the processes taking place in the “black box,” which often leads to spectacular [? disastrous/bad] results. The term digital intuition seems to be an adequate description of this state of affairs. The common denominator of human and digital intuition is that information processing – although it leads to the desired effects – remains inaccessible to both the subject’s consciousness and the user (or even the designer) of the intelligent machine.

Intuition is understood in the article as the intelligence of the unconscious, taking into account all the information possessed by the subject as well as individual abilities and preferences. Intuition makes itself felt in various ways. It cooperates with consciousness when more important decisions are to be made or directly controls the behavior of an individual (in case of so-called operational intelligence). The author reflects on the role of intuition in the digitalized world and comes to the conclusion that digital technology partially replaces intuition’s function but at the same time limits and blocks its development. He also notes that the concept of intuition in experimental psychology has been wrongly narrowed to spontaneously used heuristics in response to irrelevant questions, which usually leads to biased, inaccurate assessments. Finally, the suggestion appears that there is an analogy between human intuition, treated as the intelligence of the unconscious, and the direction of development of artificial intelligence. The use of the deep machine learning means that we know less and less about the processes taking place in the “black box,” which often leads to spectacular [? disastrous/bad] results. The term digital intuition seems to be an adequate description of this state of affairs. The common denominator of human and digital intuition is that information processing – although it leads to the desired effects – remains inaccessible to both the subject’s consciousness and the user (or even the designer) of the intelligent machine.

The author analyzes relation between the expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) and the issue of values. In particular, he points out the difficulties associated with “agreeing on values” in an algorithm vs during a human interaction. The article highlights the obstacles of taking human values into account while designing complex algorithms, which result from the fact that the preferred values are inconsistent, contextual and therefore variable. The values depend on cultural conditions and individual differences as well. In addition, the sentimental values are also difficult to predict and take into account. All this makes it almost impossible to unambiguously define the values to be respected by the algorithm. Currently, an attempt is being made to include “emotional computing” into a design of artificial systems, which, according to many researchers, may turn out to be a breakthrough in the development of AI. There are already advanced attempts being made to model one of the aspects of emotional intelligence, which is to recognise other people’s emotional states based on the analysis of their facial expressions. According to the author, developments in the field of artificial emotional intelligence should rather worry than satisfy the users of the internet. They will contribute to greater control exercised by the institutions that use them, and consequently to further limitation of personal freedom of the individual users. The author suggests that the expansion of digital technology (contrary to the initial hopes) contributes to increased centralization of power and socio-economic inequalities. In the words of Norbert Wiener (1950), the development of digital technology contributes to “the human use of human beings”.