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Czasopismo Techniczne

Emergence of cooperation as a restult of mutation
and inheritance in PD/PG-like game

Data publikacji: 13.01.2016

Czasopismo Techniczne, 2015, Nauki Podstawowe Zeszyt 1-NP (19) 2015, s. 71 - 84

https://doi.org/10.4467/2353737XCT.15.117.4154

Autorzy

,
Tomasz Wójtowicz
Institute of Computer Science, Jagiellonian University, Poland
Wszystkie publikacje autora →
,
Krzysztof Rzecki
Instytut Teleinformatyki, Wydział Fizyki, Matematyki i Informatyki, Politechnika Krakowska
Wszystkie publikacje autora →
,
Paweł Pławiak
Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
Wszystkie publikacje autora →
,
Michał Niedźwiecki
Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
Wszystkie publikacje autora →
,
Tomasz Sośnicki
Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
Wszystkie publikacje autora →
,
Katarzyna Smelcerz
Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
Wszystkie publikacje autora →
,
Tomasz Wojtoń
Institute of Nuclear Physics, Polish Academy of Sciences
Wszystkie publikacje autora →
Zbisław Tabor
Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
Wszystkie publikacje autora →

Abstrakt

The approach of evolutionary games like prisoner’s dilemma, among others, is based on a consistent strategy. We propose an experimentally verified system where cooperation can arise out of two simple factors: mutation and inheritance. This system has a social dilemma property and allows each agent to set its own desired number of participants. There are two essential mechanisms: fluctuation through which mutation leads to cooperation, and natural selection which tends to promote cheaters and therefore disrupts the cooperation. It is shown in numerical simulations that the interplay between both mechanisms leads to an equilibrium and that no intentional strategies are necessary to establish and sustain cooperation. Thus, starting from a population of non-cooperating agents, natural evolution can end with a population composed of cooperating groups with the mean group size determined by the fluctuation rate and the pay-off function. A thorough analytical explanation of numerical results is provided.

Bibliografia


Informacje

Informacje: Czasopismo Techniczne, 2015, s. 71 - 84

Typ artykułu: Oryginalny artykuł naukowy

Tytuły:

Angielski:

Emergence of cooperation as a restult of mutation
and inheritance in PD/PG-like game

Autorzy

Institute of Computer Science, Jagiellonian University, Poland

Instytut Teleinformatyki, Wydział Fizyki, Matematyki i Informatyki, Politechnika Krakowska

Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology

Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology

Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology

Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology

Institute of Nuclear Physics, Polish Academy of Sciences

Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology

Publikacja: 13.01.2016

Status artykułu: Otwarte __T_UNLOCK

Licencja: Żadna

Udział procentowy autorów:

Tomasz Wójtowicz (Autor) - 12%
Krzysztof Rzecki (Autor) - 12%
Paweł Pławiak (Autor) - 12%
Michał Niedźwiecki (Autor) - 12%
Tomasz Sośnicki (Autor) - 12%
Katarzyna Smelcerz (Autor) - 12%
Tomasz Wojtoń (Autor) - 12%
Zbisław Tabor (Autor) - 16%

Korekty artykułu:

-

Języki publikacji:

Angielski

Liczba wyświetleń: 1920

Liczba pobrań: 1305