Józef Łaptos

The Stance of France and Belgium Toward the Polish-Bolshevik War

The article is an attempt to underline the difference in the conduct of foreign policy by two allied countries. One of them – France, had the opinion of the most powerful state in Europe after World War I, and the other – Belgium, was a small country that decided to abandon its neutrality (imposed by the great powers in 1839). Such an alliance, salutary for strengthening the security guarantees towards the former occupant, brought with it fears of domination and instrumental treatment. In matters of eastern policy, both countries were concerned about the loss of numerous investments and capital investments in tsarist Russia. It was through this prism that the Polish-Bolshevik war was assessed. The second factor that distinguished the two countries in their approach to the war was the different composition of the government. While in France the electoral victory of the National Bloc facilitated the conduct of politics, the government of catholic-socialist coalition in Belgium faced serious obstacles from the socialists, which was manifested in the decision concerning the transit of weapons to Poland. French aid in the form of weapons supplies and support for Poland from the diplomatic side led to an alliance with Poland. Belgium took advantage of the end of the war to establish, above all, economic cooperation.

Keywords: the foreign policy of France and Belgium, economic interests, aid for Poland in the Polish-Bolshevik war, public opinion, the role of small states in international politics.

UNRRA, IRO and the French Authorities Towards the Problem of the Transformation of Polish Displaced Persons  Into Political Refugees (1944–1950)

In the postwar world, the problem of refugees, exiles, displaced persons and fugitives – different groups of forced migrants – became one of more important issues. Focusing on just a single aspect of it, which is the fate of the Polish DPs in France and the French occupation zone, we want to show how resignation from returning to their home country influenced this numerous group of people under the pressure of the Yalta policy practiced by particular countries. The hesitation about being repatriated to Poland led to the emergence of highly emotional and uncompromisingly anti-communist attitudes. The manifestation of such a behaviour in the years following the war was incomprehensible for the French, just like the decision to remain in exile. French economy needed hands to work and was eager to see the DPs as economic migrants but not as political refugees. It was not until the 1950s when the progressing Cold War created better conditions for the migrants to settle, to establish their own organizations, and also to gear up for ideological struggle.
 

The Impact of Great Powers on the Structure and Competences of the International Humanitarian Organisation the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)

UNRRA – United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, whose achievements are not sufficiently reflected in the historiography of the post-war period, is an interesting object of research for many reasons. In this article, we have attempted to show the mechanisms which great powers resorted to in order to secure a dominant position not just in terms of prerogatives but also administrative structure. The main task of the UNRRA was to offer aid needed for the economic and moral reconstruction of the countries occupied by the Axis. This was a massive challenge in logistical and theoretical terms. An efficiently functioning aid organisation could serve not just peace building on humanitarian foundations but also be a test for the paradigm of the United Nations the founding of which it preceded. And it was for just those reasons that many countries expressed apprehension as to the US dominance visible in the negotiations while realising that humanitarian assistance without taking account of the economic potential of that power would have been doomed to fail.

All the states of German-occupied Europe had their governments in exile during the Second World War. The main goal of the Central European states was to regain independence, but not to return to status quo ante, as all of them, with the laudable exception of Czechoslovakia, were autocratic before 1939. Acquiring allies required convicting them about the willingness to establish the democratic rule. One of the main arguments was the vision of Central European federation. The federation was not only a synonym of democracy, but also an opportunity to strengthen the entire area. Sikorski’s government was particularly active in this field, acquiring Western allies for its plans, but did not manage to convince Stalin with their help.