Jarosław Zagrodnik

Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza standardu prawa oskarżonego do korzystania z profesjonalnej pomocy prawnej, wypracowanego w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka. Jej celem jest zobrazowanie szerokiego rozumienia tego prawa przez Trybunał, które znajduje oparcie nie tylko w jego esencjonalnych składnikach treściowych, ale również w jego powiązaniu z zasadą rzetelnego procesu. Przybliżeniu w ten sposób podlega zakres podmiotowy i przedmiotowy prawa oskarżonego do korzystania z pomocy obrońcy, kwestia zrzeczenia się tego prawa, przesłanki wyznaczenia obrońcy z urzędu oraz kryteria realizacji standardu gwarancyjnego, który z tego prawa wynika. Puentę stanowi kilka refleksji wynikających z zestawienia „konwencyjnego” standardu prawa do korzystania z pomocy obrońcy z jego uregulowaniem w polskim porządku prawnym.

The right to the assistance of the defense counsel in the light of the European Court of Human Rights case law

The article analyzes the standard of the accused’s right to enjoy professional legal assistance as developed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Its purpose is to illustrate the Court’s broad understanding of this right, which is supported not only by its essential substantive components but also in its connection to the principle of a fair trial. It highlights the subjective and objective scopes of the accused’s right to the assistance of the defense counsel as well as the question of the waiver of this right, the prerequisites for appointment of the public defender, and the criteria for the implementation of the guarantee standard arising from this right. In the conclusion, the author presents several reflections resulting from the juxtaposition of the “conventional” standard of the right to the assistance of the defense counsel with its implementation in the Polish legal order.

The article analyzes the standard of the accused’s right to enjoy professional legal assistance as developed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Its purpose is to illustrate the Court’s broad understanding of this right, which is supported not only by its essential substantive components but also in its connection to the principle of a fair trial. It highlights the subjective and objective scopes of the accused’s right to the assistance of the defense counsel as well as the question of the waiver of this right, the prerequisites for appointment of the public defender, and the criteria for the implementation of the guarantee standard arising from this right. In the conclusion, the author presents several reflections resulting from the juxtaposition of the “conventional” standard of the right to the assistance of the defense counsel with its implementation in the Polish legal order.