This paper is an analysis of Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT). Metzinger claims that beyond the biological organism and its properties, there is no individual and distinct entity that can be regarded as “self”. What really exists is the phenomenal sense of being self, which creates the illusion of the existence of something permanent. Taking the concepts of David Hume and certain early Buddhists thinkers as his starting point, Metzinger claims that during introspection, which is a type of phenomenal experience, we find nothing stable, but only impermanent impressions. As he argues, this hypothesis is supported by empirical neuroscience research, which should be considered when studying human subjectivity. Drawing extensively from the results of science and philosophy of mind, he proposes a concept of a phenomenal self-model (PSM). The PSM integrates information about the whole biological organism and makes it available from the first-person perspective.

The first part of the paper presents the key issues of the SMT and the four aspects of Metzinger’s critique of the concept of the substantial self. The paper also offers a critical analysis of some of Metzinger’s ideas. The second section discusses the common features as well as differences between the SMT and the Buddhist concept of non-self (s. anātman, p. anattā). It also aims to analyse certain problematic issues of the notion of anattā and demonstrate some of the challenges connected with the use of a comparative method.

This paper is an analysis of Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT). Metzinger claims that beyond the biological organism and its properties, there is no individual and distinct entity that can be regarded as “self”. What really exists is the phenomenal sense of being self, which creates the illusion of the existence of something permanent. Taking the concepts of David Hume and certain early Buddhists thinkers as his starting point, Metzinger claims that during introspection, which is a type of phenomenal experience, we find nothing stable, but only impermanent impressions. As he argues, this hypothesis is supported by empirical neuroscience research, which should be considered when studying human subjectivity. Drawing extensively from the results of science and philosophy of mind, he proposes a concept of a phenomenal self-model (PSM). The PSM integrates information about the whole biological organism and makes it available from the first-person perspective.

The first part of the paper presents the key issues of the SMT and the four aspects of Metzinger’s critique of the concept of the substantial self. The paper also offers a critical analysis of some of Metzinger’s ideas. The second section discusses the common features as well as differences between the SMT and the Buddhist concept of non-self (s. anātman, p. anattā). It also aims to analyse certain problematic issues of the notion of anattā and demonstrate some of the challenges connected with the use of a comparative method.