Łukasz Jakubiak

Shared Initiative Referendum in the French Legal Order

The paper deals with the so-called shared initiative referendum (le référendum d’initiative partagée) within the framework of the French constitutional system. This type of popular vote was established following the most extensive modifica-tion to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic which took place in 2008. Under the amended Article 11 of the 1958 Constitution, a fifth of members of parlia-ment, supported by a tenth of eligible voters, may submit a bill which, subject to further procedural requirements, may be passed in a nationwide referendum. The author presents the most important features of the referendum before the reform, as well as the constitutional and statutory provisions that may be applied after the reform was conducted. It can be argued that this amendment did not lead to a breakthrough in the role of the referendum in the constitutional system of the Fifth Republic. Although citizens can now participate in its initiation, it is still a tool over which the public authorities have full control. In the case of the shared initiative referendum, however, the emphasis was placed differently on the role of the legislative and executive. The former has been strengthened and the latter weakened. The draft constitutional changes presented in 2019 at the initiative of President Emmanuel Macron are to contribute to the ini-tiation of such referenda, but their purpose is not to introduce fundamental structural reforms.

The “Grévy Constitution” and the “de Gaulle Constitution”: Two Directions for the Relocation of Presidential Power in the Constitutional History of France

The paper deals with two different political interpretations of presidential power under the Third and Fifth French Republics, which clearly changed the position of the head of state in relation to the letter of constitutional acts that were in force at the time. Both of these interpretations were im- posed by the presidents in office in the first years after the proper structures of the system of gov- ernment had been established. The former (commonly known as the “Grévy constitution”) led to the weakening of presidential power, and the latter (described as the “de Gaulle constitution”) to its strengthening. Particular attention is thus paid to the formation of such particular unwritten norms of constitutional law in rationalized and non-rationalized parliamentary systems. In both cases, their basic feature turned out to be the ability to significantly modify the parliamentary system of gov- ernment. In the last part of the paper, the stability and durability of the above-mentioned political interpretations of the aforementioned constitutions are discussed. It is indicated that in both cases there were attempts to challenge these non-codified standards. Although the causes of such actions were different from each other, neither brought any meaningful success.

The paper deals with two different political interpretations of presidential power under the Third and Fifth French Republics, which clearly changed the position of the head of state in relation to the letter of constitutional acts that were in force at the time. Both of these interpretations were imposed by the presidents in office in the first years after the proper structures of the system of government had been established. The former (commonly known as the “Grévy Constitution”) led to the weakening of presidential power, and the latter (described as the “de Gaulle Constitution”) to its strengthening. Particular attention is thus paid to the formation of such particular unwritten norms of constitutional law in rationalized and non-rationalized parliamentary systems. In both cases, their basic feature turned out to be the ability to significantly modify the parliamentary system of government. In the last part of the paper, the stability and durability of the above-mentioned political interpretations of the aforementioned Constitutions are discussed. It is indicated that, in both cases, there were attempts to challenge these non-codified standards. Although the causes of such actions were different from each other, neither brought any meaningful success.

This article is an English translation of the paper published in Polish in Cracow Studies of Constitutional and Legal History in 2022. See: Jakubiak, “«Konstytucja Grévy’ego»i «konstytucja de Gaulle’a».”