Marcin Michał Wiszowaty

This paper is an extended version of my address at the conference held to summarise the Constitutional Survey on 16 June 2018 at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. It is devoted to proposals for amendments to the Polish Constitution of 1997 contained in the answers to the open questions from the Constitutional Survey we conducted in 2017 among constitutionalists (full professors, doctors habilitated and doctors).

The broad and rich set of proposals for amendments put forward by constitutionalists may lead to the conclusion that such amendments are needed in the Polish Constitution of 1997. Many respondents held that the numerous deficiencies found in Poland’s recent constitutional practice did not result from the contents of the Constitution, but from a certain way in which it was applied, or rather not applied, or even violated. A constitutional amendment cannot remedy problems caused by insufficient legal or political culture. One of the most important conclusions from our survey, supported by the vast majority of respondents, is that whereas the Polish Constitution of 1997 does require amendments, they should, firstly, be only partial amendments, rather than a new constitution, and, secondly, that they should not be introduced in the current political and systemic situation.

Commentary to the resolution of the Supreme Court of May 31st, 2017 (Ref. No. I KZP 4/17). The scope of the presidential power of pardon

The dispute over the scope of the power of pardon, caused by the decision of the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda to apply this power before issuance of a final judgment by the court, is undoubtedly one of the most interesting problems in the field of constitutional law under the Polish Constitution of 1997, with which the courts and the doctrine of law must currently deal with.

I believe that, in its argument concerning the scope of the presidential power of pardon, the Supreme Court did not take into account one important argument which is based on the norm expressed in Art. 99 § 3 of the Polish Constitution.

I believe that the scope of the presidential power of pardon specified in Art. 139 of the Polish Constitution is also determined by the norm expressed in Art. 99 § 3. The application of the power of pardon in the form of the so-called individual abolition against a deputy or senator accused of committing a crime prosecuted by indictment and penalized with deprivation of liberty, impedes the possible execution of the principle contained in Art. 99 § 3 of the Polish Constitution, and thus violates the norm expressed in Art. 7 and Art. 126 § 3 of this Constitution. The nature of presidential pardon, including the scope of its limits, should be determined by way of a joint interpretation of the provisions of the Polish Constitution, also taking into account its Art. 99 § 3.