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EMOTION AND REASON IN CONSTRUCTING A HISTORICAL NARRATIVE: POLYBIUS' STRATEGY OF THE READER'S MORAL ENGAGEMENT

Abstract

The article investigates Polybius' of Megalopolis conception of emotional response of the reader of a historical narrative, and explores the implications of that conception for the structure of selected parts of the *Histories*. The argument falls into three parts. First, Polybius' focus on two particular emotions (pity and anger), the notions of the reasons and purposes, and the implications of their moral qualification are analyzed. The narrative strategy of Polybius is put into theory on the basis of his methodological considerations scattered around the *Histories* (Pol. 2.56.13; 16; 3.6.73; 31.7–11). In the second part the theory is verified on a sample of an account from the *Histories* about the preliminaries to the Hannibalic War (Pol. 3.9–33). It is demonstrated how the strategy of evoking appropriate emotions influences shaping of the narrative of the antecedent events of the War, and how anger and pity, as the pivotal feelings, drive the actions of both the sides of the story, i.e. the Romans and the Carthaginians. The chronological shifts, the position and the emphasis on particular elements in the narrative, plus Polybius' interventions into it, are

explained in terms of the expected emotional and moral impact of the scrutinized text on the prospective recipient. Further, it is argued that in Polybius the idea of the emotional component guiding human choices and actions combined with the expected emotional impact of the narrative on the reader provide the main lines for structuring the account. In this context, it is stressed that Polybius advocates an ethical rather than purely emotional, long-lasting rather than momentary effect of a historical narrative. The last part of the paper discusses the tradition in which such strategy should be situated. Marincola's reading in terms of judicial rhetoric is questioned, and the originality of Polybius' conception, taking the probable expectations of average readers into account, is put forward.

Keywords: Polybius, historical narrative, narrative strategy, emotions, morality, reader's perspective

Polybius of Megalopolis was long read as an author particularly critical of historical narratives aimed at stirring emotions, advocating a purely rational approach to history-writing.¹ In recent years this paradigm began to change, and new studies have suggested that Polybius had not polemicized against stirring emotions as such, but rather stipulated that these have to go together with description of "context", which arouses "appropriate emotions" in the audience.² It seems to have been a step in the right direction. However, little attention has been paid to the consequences of that step for our

¹ Polybius' objection to tragic, sensational or emotional history-writing is a well-known and intensely studied topic (see literature cited below, p. 104 n. 6). The historian was considered as sole Hellenistic true continuator of Thucydides in terms of objectivity and rationalism. As such, he was contrasted with the tendencies in historiography in that time, esp. the "rhetorical" and "tragic" currents. See e.g. SCHADEWALDT 1982, 227: "harte Sachlichkeit" of Polybius as a factor of usefulness and continuation of Thucydides' methodology. Cf. GELZER 1964, 155–156; PETZOLD 1969, 7–8; GENTILI, CERRI 1988, 26–27; HOSE 2009, 189–191; KLOFT 2013, 19. On Polybius' life, education and work still fundamental is ZIEGLER 1952, cols. 1444–1471.

² See MARINCOLA 2013, 73–90, esp. 80; ECKSTEIN 2013, 318. Cf. the idea adumbrated in MARINCOLA 2003, 300 ("context is king"). The notion of context is usually equated with description of causes, cf. below, pp. 106–109.

understanding of the role of emotions in historical narratives as conceived by Polybius and of the relation between emotions and structuring of narrative.

The aim of this paper is to investigate how Polybius conceives of emotional impact of historical account on the audience and how this conception influences, in his theory and practice, the shaping of the narrative. The article also addresses the question of the tradition to which the investigated narrative strategy belongs or makes use of, in particular whether it can be associated with oral forms of delivery or rather should be categorized as depending strictly on the written word.

My point of departure are Polybius' remarks about emotions in a historical narrative, found in the censure of Phylarchus' description of the capture and destruction of Mantinea in book two.³ Polybius criticizes Phylarchus for his sensational descriptions, giving us some indications of how he understands the place of emotions in historical narrative.⁴ Let me cite the relevant *passus* (Pol. 2.56.13; 16 = part of FGrHist 81 T 3):

13. χωρίς τε τούτων τὰς πλείστας ἡμῖν ἐξηγεῖται τῶν περιπετειῶν, οὐχ ὑποτιθεῖς αἰτίαν καὶ τρόπον τοῖς γινομένοις, ὧν χωρὶς οὐτ' ἐλεεῖν εὐλόγως οὐτ' ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατόν

³ A third-century historian Phylarchus of Athens, Polybius' historiographical adversary, described the capture of the Mantinean polis by the Achaean and Macedonian army in the course of the so-called Cleomenean war in 223 BC. Phylarchus – according to Polybius – wrote that the polis suffered greatly because of the actions of the Achaean League and the Macedonians. On these events see: WALBANK 1957, 260–261; MCCASLIN 1989, 77–101; HAGEMANS, KOSMETATOU 2005, 123–139; PRETZLER 2005, 22, 24. General comments on this part of Phylarchus' account see: MEISTER 1975, 98–99; GABBA 1957, 7. All dates in this paper, if not indicated otherwise, refer to the period before Christ.

⁴ For detailed analyses of this critique see: JACOBY 1926a, 132–143; GABBA 1957, 5–13; MEISTER 1975, 93–126; BONCQUET 1982–1983, 277–291; MCCASLIN 1989, 77–101; SCHEPENS 2005, 141–164; ECKSTEIN 2013, 314–338; THORNTON 2013, 353–374; FARRINGTON 2016, 159–182. On Polybius' polemics in general see: KOERNER 1957; WALBANK 1962, 1–12; MARINCOLA 2001, 134–136.

ἐπ' οὐδενὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων. [...] 16. οὕτως ἐν παντὶ τὸ τέλος κεῖται τῆς διαλήψεως ὑπὲρ τούτων οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τελουμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ προαιρέσεσι τῶν πραττόντων καὶ ταῖς τούτων διαφοραῖς.⁵

13. Apart from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger. [...] 16. So in every such case the final criterion of good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes of the doer.

Polybius points to his adversary's improper way of describing the events, which makes it closer to tragedy than history.⁶ As he put it, it is wrong to "simply narrate" (ἐξηγεῖται) historical occurrences. What does it mean? To elucidate that, I shall highlight two elements the cited passage contains: a) The focus on pity and anger as the emotions evoked by the narrative and b) The Polybian understanding and implications of "the different reasons and purposes".

As we can see, Polybius mentions the feelings of "reasonable pity" (ἐλεεῖν εὐλόγως) and "appropriate anger" (ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως);⁷ two particular emotions are thus specified and qualified. Polybius' primary focus on those two passions rather than any other, in the emotional response of

⁵ Greek text of Polybius' *Histories* is Pédech's and DE FOUCAULT'S (Budé edition); translations are those of PATON, with slight alterations where indicated. The more recent translation by WATERFIELD (2010) raises doubts in numerous instances, hence the older translation by Paton is preferred.

⁶ On Polybius' discussion of the differences between historiography and tragedy see: MOHM 1977, 139–144; GIGANTE 1951, 43–45; HAU 2016, 142. On the idea of "tragic history", in large part "created" by the Polybian discussion in question, see: ZEGERS 1959; KEBRIC 1977, 15–17; SACKS 1981, 144–170; FORNARA 1983, 124–134; FROMENTIN 2001, 77–92; ZANGARA 2007, 70–75; MARINCOLA 2009, 445–460. The theory of a distinct "school of tragic historiography" is now widely rejected.

⁷ Precisely: "to feel pity reasonably" and "to be appropriately angry" i.e. Polybius uses verbs in infinitive qualified with adverbs.

the reader, is striking.⁸ Note how often he mentions these feelings in the critique:

2.56.7: σπουδάζων δ' εἰς ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ συμπαθεῖς ποιεῖν

In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers [...]

2.56.14: ὦν χωρὶς οὐτ' ἐλεεῖν εὐλόγως οὐτ' ὀργίζεσθαι καθήκοντως

[...] without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger.

2.58.8–9: πηλίκης ὀργῆς ἐστὶν ἄξιον;

Against such men, one asks oneself, can any indignation be too strong?

2.58.15: φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὀργῆς ἀνάγκη διαφέρουσιν γεγενέσθαι περὶ τούτους

[...] we must evidently infer that there was some exceptional cause for anger against them.

2.59.4–5: καίπερ ὁ συγγραφεὺς βουλόμενος αὖξιν αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καίπαραστήσασθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτῷ συναγανακτεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαθεν οὐ μόνον αὐτόν φησι

Our author, it is true, with the view of magnifying his importance and moving his readers to share his own indignation at his fate, tells us [...]

Therefore, first there are the emotions of the recipients of the narrative. Those feelings are exclusively anger and pity.⁹

⁸ In this article I am using the words reader/listener/recipient interchangeably, since it is not at all certain which form (silent reading/recitation) of reception Polybius thought for historiographical text as the most proper and commendable. This is a problem to be debated, tentatively addressed below pp. 117–120.

⁹ In all the following instances Polybius has in mind emotions of the potential recipients of Phylarchus' text, e.g. Pol. 2.56.7: ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας; cf. 2.56.14; 2.58.8–9; 2.58.15; 2.59.4–5.

Second, they correspond directly with the emotions of the spectators/witnesses “inside” the story in question.¹⁰ We have thus specific emotional relation or connection at work: the emotions of the reader are supposed to be parallel to those of the direct witnesses within the narrated story. These emotions are, on the one hand, at the victims of the narrated story – pity for them, on the other hand at the wrongdoers – anger at them.¹¹

Further, in the paragraph 16 cited above, Polybius mentions what can be called context necessary to produce “appropriate emotions”: it is the reasons and purposes of the agents (working translation of ‘αἰτιαὶ καὶ προαίρεσεις τῶν πραττόντων’). Since the Polybian notions of αἰτία and προαίρεσις seem to be the main qualifier of the “appropriate” emotions produced by the narrative, we shall clarify their sense. To do so, we need to look into the distinction drawn between ἀρχή, αἰτία and πρόφασις in book three (3.6.7):

ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναι φημι τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πρᾶξεις τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων, αἰτίας δὲ τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων· λέγω δ’ ἐπινοίας καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα συλλογισμοὺς καὶ δι’ ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ κρῖναι τι καὶ προθέσθαι παραγινόμεθα.

By the beginning of anything I mean the first attempt to execute and put in action plans on which we have decided, by its causes what is most initiatory in our judgments and opinions, that is to say our notions of things, our state of mind, our reasoning about these, and everything through which we reach decisions and projects.

Therefore, αἰτία is defined as “mental processes” of the person who acts and the circumstances that contribute to these

¹⁰ Pol. 2.56.6: πάντας εἰς ἐπίστασιν καὶ δάκρυα τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀγαγεῖν; 2.58.11: οὐκ ἔλεον εἰκὸς ἦν ... παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων; 2.59.2–3: τοὺς δ’ ἀπιστοῦντας, τοὺς δ’ ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς γινομένοις.

¹¹ Cf. the stress on emotional connection between the reader and the victims by using verbs with the prefix συν- : συμπαθεῖς (“suffer together with”, Pol. 2.56.7); συναγανακτεῖν (“share the anger/indignation with”, 2.59.5).

processes (cf. Pol. 2.38; 3.1; 3.9). In the chapter where emotions in history are discussed, Polybius refers precisely to αἰτία, not to any other of the three terms.¹² As for προαίρεσις, Polybius does not define it explicitly anywhere. This very important notion has been poorly recognized by scholars. From various mentions of the term in the *Histories*, we can assume that it probably should be understood as choice of a given course of action, combined with motivations behind it. As such, it is the chief criterion of moral judgement.¹³ Polybius emphasizes that omission of προαίρεσις of historical figures in a narrative results in false moral judgment of their deeds and ultimately produces inappropriate emotional response of the reader.¹⁴ The concept is crucial in ethical theory of Aristotle, as the proper criterion for assessing moral virtue and revealing individual's ἦθος. For the philosopher, not one's actions in themselves, but προαίρεσις is the proper criterion for assessing moral virtue and ἦθος.¹⁵ The parallel between Polybius' and Aristotle's

¹² See DEROW 1994, 86–90; cf. PEDECH 1964, 204–253, part. p. 86: “la cause est donc un ensemble d’opérations mentales qui précèdent l’action”.

¹³ Rendering of the word as “motivation” is not perfect, but arguably grasps the sense in the context in question. προαίρεσις is a frequent word in Polybius' *Histories*, he tends to use it very frequently (over 160 instances, much more than in any extant ancient text). The word consists of: προ (“before”, “prior to”) + αἶρεσις, from αἰρέω (“take”, “grasp”, “prefer”). See FRISK 1960–1972, 596 (on προ) and 43–44 on αἰρέω. In the LSJ προαίρεσις has 9 groups of meanings, with primary sense of “choosing”, “purpose”, “resolution”. Within the immediate context of the critique (2.56–63), προαίρεσις seems to be the *Leitmotif* and occurs regularly in relation to historical actors' conduct. GLOCKMANN, HELMS 2005, 718 qualify most of the senses of προαίρεσις from that section as indicating purpose or motivation (“Zweck”, “Beweggrund”, “Absicht”). In Polybius, προαίρεσις implies conscious and free choice, contrasted with ἀνάγκη, necessity or constraint (3.63: ἡ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατ' ἀνάγκην). The phrase κατὰ προαίρεσιν is used in the context of deliberate lying, condemned morally (esp. in the critique of Timaeus in book 12). A systematic study of προαίρεσις in Polybius is a desideratum.

¹⁴ Through the critique, Polybius numerous times stresses Phylarchus' alleged omissions of προαίρεσις of a given figure and states what it actually was (2.57; 2.58; 2.59; 2.60; 2.61).

¹⁵ προαίρεσις is a central concept in Aristotle's ethical theory. It is described as the starting point of every action (*Eth. Nic.* 1139a 31: πρῶξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις; full discussion: 1111b 4–1115a 3). προαίρεσις is

understanding of προαίρεσις is remarkable. I shall stress the ethical implication for Polybius' narrative strategy of evoking emotions in the final section of this paper.

To recapitulate, Polybius seems to say that it is not "bare facts", but the reasons and motivations of the agents that should be revealed in the narrative and evoke emotions in the audience. It follows that in Polybius' view historian is supposed to direct his reader towards emotional engagement on the right side. From the use of προαίρεσις in this context we can state that "right" means morally right. But that cannot be achieved by mere description of facts, be them tragic and terrifying *per se*. In the case of Mantinea, Polybius implies, Phylarchus manipulated his narrative in such a way that the reader is likely to feel anger at the Achaeans and pity for the Mantineans, whereas it should be the opposite: he should be rather angry at the Mantineans, and feel no pity for them at all. This is because he neither described the mental processes (reasons, αἰτίαι) nor the motivations (προαίρεσεις) of the agents involved, but "simply narrates" the events, i.e. the destruction of the polis.

How exactly is the historian supposed to display these reasons and motivations to the reader? How does this requirement impact construction of a narrative? It is hard to deduce that from the discussed criticism of Phylarchus, because the conception in question is embedded and implicit in the criticism. Therefore, I shall try to establish a connection of that discussion with certain programmatic statements in book three

the intent generated by conscious deliberation, and as such considered by Aristotle as defining/revealing one's ἦθος, person's moral disposition or character (*Eth. Nic.* 1111b 4–6; *Rh.* 1366 a 15: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἦθη φανερά κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν; cf. *Poet.* 1450b 8–10). See JOACHIM 1954, 107–111; KUHN 1960, 123–140; GRIMALDI 1972, 143–147; CHAMBERLAIN 1984, 147–157; WOTHERER 2005, 89–90; STEIGER 2014, 45–46; 50. On the προαίρεσις – ἦθος connection in the *Rhetoric* see GRIMALDI 1980, 188, 212, 296. On ἦθος in ancient rhetorical theory in general see: SATTLER 1947, 55–65; FANTHAM 1973, 262–275; GILL 1984, 149–166; CAREY 1994, 34–43.

(3.31.1–10). Through reading this passage in interconnection with the one about Phylarchus we are able to hypothesize how – in Polybius’ thinking – the requirements to affect the audience with proper emotions influence the shaping of narrative. Let me cite *in extenso* the part most relevant for my purpose (3.31.7–11):

7. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ παρὸν αἰεὶ πῶς ἀρμοζόμενοι καὶ συνυποκρινόμενοι τοιαῦτα καὶ λέγουσι καὶ πράττουσι πάντες ὥστε δυσθεώρητον εἶναι τὴν ἐκάστου προαίρεσιν καὶ λίαν ἐν πολλοῖς ἐπισκοτεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 8. τὰ δὲ παρεληλυθότα τῶν ἔργων, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβάνοντα τὴν δοκιμασίαν, ἀληθινῶς ἐμφαίνει τὰς ἐκάστων αἰρέσεις καὶ διαλήψεις καὶ δηλοῖ παρ’ οἷς μὲν χάριν, εὐεργεσίαν, βοήθειαν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσιν, παρ’ οἷς δὲ τάναντία τούτων. 9. ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεήσοντα καὶ τὸν συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιοῶσοντα, πολλάκις καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν εὗρειν ἔστιν. 10. ἅπερ ἔχει μεγίστας ἐπικουρίας καὶ κοινὴ καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. 11. διόπερ οὐχ οὕτως ἐστὶ φροντιστέον τῆς αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων ἐξηγήσεως οὔτε τοῖς γράφουσιν οὔτε τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν τὰς ἱστορίας, ὥς τῶν πρότερον καὶ τῶν ἅμα καὶ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἔργοις.

7. For all men are given to adapt themselves to the present and assume a character suited to the times, so that from their words and actions it is difficult to judge of the motivation [προαίρεσιν] of each, and in many cases the truth is quite overcast. 8. But men’s past actions, bringing to bear the test of actual fact, indicate truly the principles and opinions of each, and show us where we may look for gratitude, kindness, and help, and where for the reverse. 9. It is by this means that we shall often and in many circumstances find those who will compassionate our distresses, who will share our anger or join us in being avenged on our enemies. 10. All which is most helpful to life both in public and in private. 11. Therefore both writers and readers of history should not pay so much attention to the actual narrative of events, as to what precedes, what accompanies, and what follows each. transl. by Paton with alterations

In this *passus*, again, two emotions as resulting from historical narrative are specified: anger and pity. We can now firmly state that it is not about “any” emotions; Polybius’ insistence on these two specific feelings is manifest. Further, the idea of knowing the motivation (προαίρεσις) of the doer, as the condition for evoking proper feelings in the reader, is also explicitly stressed.¹⁶ Polybius adds that the narrative of bare facts would not reveal the motivations of the agents, it falsifies these or renders them “imperceptible” (δυσθεώρητον) for the reader. When a reader does not see them clearly, his feelings – roused by such narrative – are inaccurate. They are caused solely by the “view” of the situation in its immediate setting (ἅμα: “at once”). As a result, Polybius implies, the reader can never be sure if what he is experiencing is in proper relation to reality. Hence, Polybius postulates that both the historian and the reader focus not only on the immediate scene, but on its antecedents (the past) and on the consequences (what followed the described events), that they take into account τῶν πρότερον καὶ τῶν ἅμα καὶ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἔργοις. In sum, Polybius is more explicit here on how the imperative to show the true reasons and intentions of the protagonists of a story entails specific construction of the narrative. He suggests a narrative strategy which produces adequate emotions (specifically anger and pity) in the reader. However, how exactly historian is supposed to construe such narrative is not explicated by Polybius either in the cited chapter or anywhere else in the *Histories*.

Lacking explicit discussion, we need to try and enquire into a sample of Polybius’ narrative which arguably puts these principles into practice. This will be a representative piece of

¹⁶ Polybius also uses here the words αἰρέσεις καὶ διαλήψεις. In the opening statement of the critique, Polybius says he will discuss Phylarchus’ προαίρεσις, whereas in 2.56.9 he concludes using the word αἵρεσις. The two terms are probably synonymous for him. See SCHEPENS 2005, 143–144. Cf. MAUERSBERGER 2000, 26–27.

his work, namely the first chapters of book three, to which the above remarks on the narrative strategy in question are a comment. As we know, the third book is actually the beginning of the *History* proper, the entire two preceding books are a “preparation” (προκατασκευή, cf. Pol. 2.71). In book three, after a general introduction and some remarks on method and causality (those analysed above, from Pol. 3.6.), Polybius proceeds to his proper subject, beginning with the Second Punic War (or the Hannibalic War). He criticizes Fabius Pictor for defining the capture of Saguntum by Hannibal as the cause of the War (3.8–3.9.5).¹⁷ Instead, Polybius points to Hamilcar’s anger (θυμός/ὀργή) at the Romans, passed on by him to his son Hannibal, as the primary αἰτία of the conflict (3.9.6–3.15).¹⁸ The true reason of the War is thus psychological and emotional. There is θυμός and ὀργή used interchangeably; θυμός may imply more savage, aggressive and irrational character of the feeling (cf. θυμοῦ βιαίου at 3.15.9). Although the overall sense of both words is anger or wrath, the exact equivalence in English should not be assumed too easily.¹⁹ In the context

¹⁷ Saguntum was a Hellenized Iberian coastal city with diplomatic contacts with Rome. After great tension within the city government, culminating in the assassination of the supporters of Carthage, in 219 Hannibal laid siege to the city. Following a prolonged siege of eight months and a bloody struggle, the Carthaginians finally took control of it. See WALBANK 1957, 319–324.

¹⁸ Pol. 3.9.6: τοῦ γε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων πολέμου ... νομιστέον πρῶτον μὲν αἴτιον γεγονέναι τὸν Ἀμίλκου θυμὸν τοῦ Βάρκα μὲν ἐπικαλουμένου (“To return to the war between Rome and Carthage ... we must regard its first cause as being the indignation of Hamilcar surnamed Barcas”); 3.9.7: ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς, τηρῶν αἰεὶ πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν (“he maintained his resolve and waited for an opportunity to strike”); 3.10.5: Ἀμίλκας γὰρ προσλαβὼν τοῖς ἰδίοις θυμοῖς τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀργὴν τῶν πολιτῶν (“Hamilcar, with the anger felt by all his compatriots at this last outrage added to his old indignation”); 3.15.8–9: καθόλου δ’ ἦν πλήρης ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου· διὸ καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀληθιναῖς αἰτίαις οὐκ ἐχρήτο, κατέφευγε δ’ εἰς προφάσεις ἀλόγους (“[Hannibal] being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent anger, he did not allege the true reasons, but took refuge in groundless pretexts”).

¹⁹ On the interchangeability of the words in Polybius see the excellent paper by ERSKINE 2015, 1–23 (for but one modest improvement needed see below p. 114 n. 20). Cf. ECKSTEIN 1995, 122–123 and 137, for the associations of θυμός with barbaric element and with reckless mob. For the senses

of Polybius' conception discussed above, it is remarkable that anger comes to the fore in the narrative. In an endeavor to make this clear for his reader, Polybius makes great leaps in his narrative: back into the years 244–241 (3.9.6–10), but then into the future (to the year 193; 3.11–12). He relates the story of how Hannibal swore to his father that he would nurture his anger at the Romans forever, and how the Carthaginian recounted that story on the court of Antiochus. There are thus two “extra” stories embedded in the account proper, and the narrative line is shifting chronologically. We can say that, abiding by his principles cited above (at 2.56.13; 16 and 3.31.7–11), Polybius does not “simply narrate” the War, he recounts what happened long before it and long after it as well.

After displaying the proper αἰτία and its roots to the reader, Polybius proceeds to the events leading to the outbreak of the War, which further mounted the anger of the Carthaginians, then to the events in Illyria (3.16). Next, the siege and capture of Saguntum by Hannibal is described (3.17), then again he goes back to Illyria (3.18–19, elimination of Demetrius of Pharos = the second Illyrian War 219/218). The narrative climaxes with the Saguntum case: in chapter 20, the Roman embassy arrives to Carthage with an ultimatum. Polybius sets the scene in the Carthaginian “senate” (συνέδριον). The Carthaginians, although unwilling to choose between two unacceptable proposals of the ambassadors, make their best orator defend their actions in Saguntum. The Carthaginian speaker argues that the former treaty with Hasdrubal is invalid, that Saguntum was no formal ally of the Romans, and bases his defense on a treaty signed after the War of Sicily. He insists that there is no mention of Iberian territory or cities in the treaty, i.e. nothing that could be referred to in the Saguntum case (3.21). The Roman legates – Polybius narrates – refraining from entering

of θυμός from Homer to Galen see CAIRNS 2019. Cf. LYNCH, MILES 1980, 3–9; HARRIS 2001, 53–54.

into argument make only a general brief statement: that it is too late for legal dispute, and that the Carthaginians should hand over to them the ones responsible for the deed, otherwise they admit complicity in the injustice. This equals declaring war on Carthage. Why follow such course of action? Polybius interrupts the account at this juncture, and does not continue it until chapter 33; which gives 11 intervening chapters disrupting the line of the story. As we learn from eight chapters later, the Romans are angry over Saguntum (see below), but before informing his reader about that, Polybius makes an intervention (παρέκβασις), breaking the main narrative thread. What is the function of this *excursus*?

In terms of contents, the intervening chapters 3.22–27 are a survey of the contractual obligations of Rome and Carthage from the earliest times (507–228). Polybius' conclusion that follows (3.28) is that the Romans did not contravene any treaty in taking the army across to Sicily. Polybius then proceeds to a final judgment on which side is to blame for the outbreak of the Hannibalic War. Next comes Polybius' own response to the speech of the Carthaginian speaker in the council (3.28–29), for which the Roman ambassadors then gave no reply, because – we are informed after a long wait – they were too angry at the Carthaginians due to the fate of Saguntum (3.29.1):

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων τότε ῥηθέντα δεδηλώκαμεν, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων λεγόμενα νῦν ἐροῦμεν· οἷς τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο διὰ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ Ζακανθαίων ἀπωλείᾳ θυμόν· λέγεται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς.

I have already stated what the Carthaginians alleged, and will now give the reply of the Romans a reply indeed which they did not make at the time owing to their indignation at the loss of Saguntum, but it has been given on many occasions and by many different people in Rome.

Therefore, it is anger again that underlies the deed, in this case, of the other side: the Romans. It is clear that they

are not free from this emotional motivation from the very onset of the War.²⁰ The Polybian verdict is that Saguntum is definitely a charge against the Carthaginians (3.30), in other words: that Romans' anger was "appropriate" and adequate to the circumstances, and their action i.e. declaring war, is justified. Importantly, that account is followed by the digression on method discussed above (3.31–32). It is only after this additional reflection on method that Polybius returns to the main thread of the narrative (3.33 onwards).

To sum up, in ch. 21 Polybius interrupts the flow of the narrative of the preliminaries of the War and, making a great leap into the past, takes the reader from the immediate situation (the visit of the Roman embassy in Carthage after the capture of Saguntum) to the earliest times of the Roman relations, treaties and oaths with Carthage – from the year 507, through treaties of 348, 279, 241, the end of the Sicilian War, 238 at the end of the Libyan War; lastly the treaty with Hasdrubal in 228. What is this break of the narrative flow in light of the principles of evoking emotions outlined above? Of course, we might call it simply "creating context", but this would explain little in terms of the emotional impact of the text, which, in light of the stress on the Romans' anger, seems to be a vital component of Polybius' narrative strategy. We shall rather understand this digression as an attempt to get the reader closer to the perspective and feeling of the protagonists of the story (i.e. the Romans, especially the ambassadors in the Carthaginian *συνέδριον*). The digression, expounding the background of the Roman-Carthaginian

²⁰ This crucial passage has been somewhat played down by ERSKINE 2015, 4–6, which mentions it only in p. 3 n. 9, but does not discuss it in the main argument and further states: "What is curious, however, is that the Romans only begin to get angry in the latter half of the history. The earliest incident discussed in section 2 above is the Aetolian reaction to Roman anger in book 21." (p. 12). Underrating Polybius' mention of Roman anger in the *passus* in question – which is about the preliminaries to the war starting the proper narrative of the *Histories* – can lead to miscomprehension of our historian's conception of the War in terms of its underlying emotional factors.

relations, can serve as a display of the motivations behind the Romans' behavior in the Carthaginian council. To state this in the Polybian terminology, the intervention in the chapters 3.22–27 explains their προαίρεσις, it makes the reader understand why the Romans are angry at the moment of the meeting in the συνέδριον. Polybius resorts to a digression because it (the Romans' προαίρεσις) was not evident from the course of the narrative as it ran. The potential reader, learning only the Carthaginian speaker's arguments (the Romans did not defend their case!), could have been inclined to follow his line of thought. In consequence, the Roman decision caused by their anger would have seemed incomprehensible, if not entirely wrong to him.

We can now see better how Polybius' psychological concept of causality is inextricably interwoven with the emotional component of human choices and actions, and how it influences his narrative strategy. To put it in Polybius' words of 2.56 and 3.31: had he described the "bare facts" of the moment, i.e. the Roman reaction and behavior in the Carthaginian council as it was, the reader would have got it all wrong and had an inappropriate feeling about the events. He would have been unlikely to understand, not to mention to share, the Roman anger in the moment of the visit in Carthage. As a consequence, Polybius' reader would have gone through the entire subsequent narrative about the Hannibalic War with this feeling initially evoked in him. Perhaps he would have read the rest of the story sharing the Carthaginian anger, rather than the Roman. As it seems, Polybius was aware of that possibility of evoking "inappropriate emotions" in the reader, and intended to prevent it, since he regards the Roman anger rather than the Carthaginian as appropriate given the legal state of affairs at the time. So, in order to make his reader engage emotionally on the right side, he weaves into his narrative the history of legal relations between Carthage and Rome from the end of the sixth century onwards. Owing to this, the reader has the adequate contact with the past

reality, he knows what emotions the historical agents felt and why, and is more likely to share this feeling with them.²¹ As a result of such structuring of the narrative, the reader can feel – in Polybian terms – appropriate anger at the Carthaginians and justified pity for the Saguntians.

We can suppose that Polybius was aware that emotional response of his audiences is inevitable. Hence, instead of attempting to create a purely dispassionate account, which would have been futile, he decides to control the emotions of his reader. In other words, Polybius structures his narrative according to the expected and – from his point of view – desirable emotional response of his audience; that response is probably pre-conceived and defined before the historian begins to write the narrative. This takes me to the final question I would like to pose in this article: In what tradition such narrative strategy could be situated?

J. Marincola has suggested that we should understand such strategy in terms of judicial rhetoric. The focus on anger and pity in the narrative reflects, in his view, a courtroom situation where two conflicting sides endeavor to evoke these emotions in the judges.²² In Marincola's reading, this is the pattern which Polybius follows and the latter has "assumed the role of a prosecutor".²³ Does Polybius' strategy really depend or is based on such "courtroom psychology"? The proposed analogy seems attractive at first glance, but is valid only on a general level. First of all, Marincola seems to rely too much on Quintilian in his argument.²⁴ To be sure, evoking anger and pity in the judges in court is essential. However, emotional impact as conceived by Polybius is to be produced through specific

²¹ Cf. above pp. 106 n. 10, on the parallel between the emotions of the audience and the direct witnesses within the narrative.

²² MARINCOLA 2003, 308.

²³ MARINCOLA 2003, 301–302.

²⁴ Marincola's evidence for the analogy seems scanty; he adduces only LAUSBERG 1998, § 207–208, and does not quote or elaborate on any of the texts itemized there.

means. It is not – as Quintilian recommends in this context – ἐνάργεια resulting from a relatively short piece of a text, evoking momentary πάθος in the audience.²⁵ In this method, emotions are produced through insertion of striking details and use of linguistic fireworks in the narrative, which bring the described events before the listeners' eyes, so that they could participate emotionally in those.²⁶ But as demonstrated above, in the Polybian theory and – even more evidently – in his practice, anger and pity are produced through large textual units, and the source of the feelings is not striking vocabulary or linguistic apparatus, but rather additional information, chronological leaps and other means which lead to understanding of the given protagonist's frame of mind. Feelings aroused in this way should last long, rather than fade away after a brief moment. In sum, for Polybius it is not just about momentary πάθος, even if it is directed at the right side.²⁷

Rather, when Polybius structures his narrative with the aim of evoking anger and pity in his reader, he does so with constant attentiveness to *reason* and *morality*. It is worth reminding how Polybius qualified the feelings in the passage

²⁵ Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.29–36, when discussing the emotions (with emphasis on pity and anger) in the judicial setting, advises to induce them primarily by φαντασῖαι and ἐνάργεια (*evidentia*) i.e. creating suggestive images in the judges' minds. At 6.2.10, Quintilian describes πάθος as momentary in contrast to ἡθος as continuous.

²⁶ Ps.-Dem. *Eloc.* 214: ἐκ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθος; cf. Ps.-Longin. *Subl.* 15.1. On ἐνάργεια and its tools in general see Ps.-Dem. *Eloc.* 209–220. Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3.17; *Lys.* 7. Cf. WALKER 1993, 369; ZANGARA 2007, 61–62; BERARDI 2012, 20, 67–69. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.63–64: ἐνάργεια = *evidentia*; cf. ch. 8.3.79; Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 51: For φαντασία see Ps.-Longin. *Subl.* 15.2, as term describing the image created in the recipient's mind through ἐνάργεια, leading to πάθος. Ps.-Demetrius, which provides the most elaborate analysis of the techniques in producing ἐνάργεια, enumerates e.g. repetitions, description of marginal details, harsh collocations of sound, imitation etc. Ps.-Dem. *Eloc.* 214: ἐκ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθος; Ps.-Longin. *Subl.* 15.1.

²⁷ Hence Polybius' insistence on the lasting character of the effect produced through his strategy (2.56.11; 3.31–32). We can thus ask whether Polybius means πάθος in strict sense at all, as this was conceived as short-lived *ex definitione* (see above, n. 26).

quoted in the opening to this paper: ἐλεεῖν εὐλόγως/ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως ("to feel legitimate pity or proper anger", 2.56.13). These two components: λόγος and τὸ κατῆκον are both vital in the Polybian conception and narrative strategy when it comes to evoking emotions. Emotional response needs to be in harmony with reason and with moral judgment cast on the protagonist of the story. Polybius endeavours to engage his reader morally through adequate emotions which are rooted in intellectual analysis. This is definitely far from the courtroom situation where orator is supposed to strike his audience with fleeting emotion to impair its judgment and induce to a decision based on that confused state of mind. The conceptual framework within which προαίρεσις is crucial shows that for Polybius the emotional experience of the reader has ethical implications. The final aim of exercising the emotions of pity and anger by appropriate means can be conducing to an ethical alignment between the emotions and the reason.²⁸ The result of the Polybian strategy, if correctly applied, is perfect moral and emotional connection between the historian, his reader and the protagonist of the narrated events, particularly the given protagonist's ἦθος.²⁹ In one word, the strategy is focused on ἦθος and ethical-emotional connection rather than simply on "appropriately" created πάθος. Nonetheless, a casual reader – Polybius implies – would be rather seeking for a kind of sensational and brief description, e.g. of the kind Phylarchus allegedly gave about the suffering of the

²⁸ This is not unlike what Halliwell argues for the ultimate goal of tragedy in Aristotle's theory (HALLIWELL 1986, 201). To be sure, Aristotle means fear instead of anger and his framework is different; Halliwell interprets the notion of κάθαρσις. I owe this observation to David Elmer's discussion of the theme of jealousies in Khariton's *Kallirhoe* (forthcoming).

²⁹ If we look closely to the Polybian text, we see that the relation between historian and his reader is fundamental, Pol. 2.56.7: τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας; 2.56.10: τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας; 2.56.11: τοὺς ἀκούοντας [...] τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας; 2.56.12: τῶν θεωμένων [...] τῶν φιλομαθοῦντων. ISNARDI 1955, 102–110, stressed Polybian awareness of relation with his readers, and showed it defines his moral outlook on historical writing.

Mantineans. And he probably is right in such an assumption – here is why.

The standard tool for evoking emotions, ἐνάργεια, was originally developed in and associated with epic poetry, being strictly linked to orality and thereby to the aural dimension of experiencing a text. Importantly, as a direct heir to epics, historiography took over the stylistic apparatus of ἐνάργεια and made constant use of it, which has long-standing tradition from Thucydides onwards.³⁰ This is of crucial importance for our understanding of ancient recipients' perception of a historical narrative in Polybius' time. When he was writing, wide audiences, naturally brought up on epic poetry, were still trained to react to historical narratives along the patterns typical for oral delivery, at least when it came to producing emotional engagement. In other words, an average reader of Polybius' text would expect from his account the usual stylistic devices producing ἐνάργεια, i.e. suggestive images deriving from listening to given passages, rather than long lectures and analysis of the type offered by the historian.

Polybius seems to have been aware how hard the narrative he proposes was to follow for average audience, his work is thus directed primarily at those "eager to learn" (2.56.12: φιλομαθοῦντας) and it "differs to its advantage as much from the works on particular episodes as learning does from listening" (3.32.10). Articulating this stark distinction between learning and listening, Polybius proposes an inventive way of evoking emotions and a completely different function thereof.

³⁰ On the aural character of the experience through ἐνάργεια see the discussion of Ps.-Demetrius quoted in n. 26 above. In that and other treatises, ἐνάργεια is connected strictly with epic and historiography. Ps.-Demetrius proceeds from the definition of ἐνάργεια, through an example from the *Iliad*, to Ctesias the historian, praised for being such a virtuoso that one may call him a ποιητής. See MARINI 2007, 261; ZANGARA 2007, 80–81; NÜNLIST 2011, 198, n. 13; BERARDI 2012, 38–39; 45 n. 142. On historiography as the heir of epic see e.g. NENCI 1955, 17–21; RENGAKOS 2006, 183–209; MONTANARI 2013, 1–32, part. 31–32.

His narrative strategy can be regarded as a challenge to the wide audience's expectations, to their competence, and therewith to the tradition of oral delivery in general. Polybius' narrative demands an educated, patient and investigative reader, rather than a listener waiting to be stricken by sudden emotion. For the latter, the *Histories* – at least in parts where Polybius puts the strategy in question into practice – seems to have been an account unsuitable for recitation, not to mention for an entertaining one.

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