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# Power and Narcists – Ideal Types of States Based on Their Sources of National Power, Extraction Capability and Foreign Policy Behaviour

**Abstract:** This paper aims at problematizing this distinction between *status quo* and revisionist/imperialist states by creating a typology of four kind of states: imperialist, *status quo*, young and old narcissist state. The text will proceed in three sections that: 1) problematizes the contemporary realist theorising; 2) reconstructs Morgenthau's notions of sources of national and political power, ideal types of foreign policy and the character of political community and its interest; 3) presents the four ideal types of states. This typology, based on analyticist metatheory and deeply inspired by Hans Morgenthau's thought, aims at solving problems with neorealist, and neoclassical realist theorising. Based on such non-positivist metatheory, and thus closer to the classical realist roots, it omits the offensive/defensive neorealist assumption about states motivation. By explicitly combining the three historically bound qualities of states – their sources of national power, extraction capability and foreign policy behaviour it transcends the problems with weak causal linkages between state level variables present in neoclassical realism. Hence, it exemplifies the approach to general theory-building that is practically viable for explicitly exerting normative judgement, also from the perspective non great power state actors – the consistent weakness of mainstream, contemporary realist theorising.

**Keywords:** classical realism, neorealism, neoclassical realism, analyticism, ideal types of states, extraction capability, power, sources of power, foreign policy behaviour

“In my view the real reason, true but unacknowledged, which forced the war was the growth of Athenian power and Spartan fear of it”.

Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, I 23.

Real world events have been the source of change within the discipline of International Relations since its inception. The very inception of IR could be traced to

the shock of the Great War and the determination that the horrors of global conflict in the industrial age should be avoided. This was to be achieved by means of social science and its theory as understood by the first generation of IR scholars – liberal idealists. Yet, despite that, another great war happened, which, according to the mainstream historiography of IR, translated to political realism's ascend as the new orthodoxy. The orthodoxy canonized after the end of II World War in the shape of realist theory of international relations. Another two handy examples of the interplay between theoretical knowledge produced within the IR and real-world events would be: the global economic shocks of the early 1970s that led to the establishment of the international political economy as an important subfield of IR and the end of cold war that was used against, then mainstream, structural realist theories that purportedly were unable to predict it. One can only wonder if the present-day Russian invasion of Ukraine will have a similar impact on the discipline and its theories.

In a sense, this text is an affirmative answer to the above question. Living in a state bordering Ukraine and experiencing large influx of war refugees, I struggle with understanding the reasons behind Russian actions. I am amazed by the strength and resilience of Ukrainian nation, which, against the odds, is able to mobilize itself to fight off the invasion. In pessimistic apprehension, I ponder about the consequences of those events for my own political community and more broadly “the west”, the civilization my community is a part of. These are the reasons that bring me to my own theorising effort. In this context, Robert Cox's frequently cited phrase “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (1981, p. 129) is especially true. However, as it will be elaborated further in the text, I do not share Cox's critical theoretical disposition. Still, despite, and maybe even because of my own normative biases, I believe that the use of the term ‘theory’, even non-positivist one, requires some form of departure and abstraction from the singular experiences of an epistemic actor.

The goal of the text is to create four ideal types of states: *status quo*, imperialist, young and old narcissist state, inspired by the classical realist thought of Hans Morgenthau. It will help to solve some problems present in neorealist and neo-classical realist theorising that stems from its positivist underpinnings: lack of ability to explain the behaviour of non-great power actors, weak causal linkages between state level “variables”, difficulty with exercising practical, normative judgements about the world politics.

The article will start by pointing certain deficiencies of realists' theorising in the social scientific manner. Then, there will be an introduction of the classical realist concepts of ideal types of foreign policy, sources of national and political power, as well as political community and its interest. Developed on the basis of Hans Morgenthau's theory, they will be an invaluable point of departure for ideal types of states participating in international politics. This will introduce the categories for ideal typification. Finally, the four ideal types of states that

combine the change in sources of national power, the notion of political community and its interest, states extraction capacity and foreign policy behaviour will be presented. Additionally, there will be a brief discussion of historical states that give some of their qualities to the presented ideal types of states. To conclude I will try to show the empirical and theoretical “road ahead” for the proposed framework along with some basic normative concerns that arise from it.

## Problems with realist theorising

Even though this theorising attempt is made from within realist tradition in IR, there are certain problems with “hard” social scientific variant of realist theory – namely neorealism. Waltz’s theory (1979) is famously general and does not help with understanding the minutiae of day-to-day foreign policy, especially reasons that might lead one state to decide, in a particular context, to invade another. Generally, neorealism, either in international political economy and especially hegemonic stability/regime/power transition variant (Gilpin, 1981; Krasner, 1983) or alliance formation and patterns (Walt, 1987), is not that helpful in understanding the puzzle above. It can give some pointers as to why Ukraine looked for the membership in western international political institutions such as EU or NATO and why it brought about such drastic reaction from Russia. Yet, the particulate of Moscow’s decision or reasons behind Kiev’s staunch resistance to be brought back into Russian sphere of influence are largely unanswerable on the basis of much of the neorealist theory of international relations. Some promise of understanding can be found in the offensive variant of neorealism, namely Mearsheimer’s *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), but as my own intuitions have pointed me to the qualities inside states and not to the level of general international political systems, his theory seemed also “too general”. This generality problem is only excabareted by the defensive/offensive neorealism distinction. One is making the maximization of security as a motivation of all the states, the other the maximisation of power. But what if, in the particular structural circumstances of international system, a state with a particular internal structure would be one, and in other context second? What if it changes dynamically? The discussion about those two exclusive state motivations, within neorealism, have long since seemed to be akin to the debate about the superiority of Easter over Christmas.

Additionally, there was another problem with neorealism that made it doubtful that this branch of realist IR theory would provide relevant answers beside the general anarchic self-help ideal type of international system that is the context of the present conflict in Ukraine. Since neorealist theory is mainly preoccupied with the most powerful units in the state system, it is hard to expect that it

will bring an understanding of the affairs of “lesser” states such as Ukraine, Poland, or even Russia.<sup>1</sup>

This *status quo* (or difficulty with predicting the change) and great power biases present in neorealist, structural theories leads to the bludgeoning literature in neoclassical realism’s (NCR) camp. There are two main reasons for it: one there are NCR works specifically covering the political behaviour of smaller states (Schweller, 2006; Blanchard, Ripsman, 2008) or using the concept of a small state as an analytical device (Toje, 2010) and generally the analysis on the level of the state is one of the distinguishing qualities of NCR as a strand of realist theorising. The term itself coined by Gideon Rose (1998) alludes to both break and continuity of the contemporary realist theorising with its neorealist predecessor. Rose pointed out to the works of new generation of realist scholars (Wohlforth, 1993; Zakaria, 1998; Schweller, 1998), who were distinguished from earlier neorealists by their focus on the qualities of state, as means to supplement the earlier realist structural theories. He interpreted their efforts by referring to the concept of extraction capability<sup>2</sup> of the state that works as a ‘transmission belt’ between the international system’s stimuli and foreign policy behaviour. Another important quality of neoclassical realist approach mentioned by Rose is historicism of their work as their theories arise from wide historical considerations, which in turn, married with their state focus, likens their work with the classical realism of Morgenthau, Wolfers and Aron. What differentiated neoclassical realists from the first generation of realist scholars though is their metatheory which is staunchly positivist, especially the work of contemporary neoclassical realists such as Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro (2009; 2016).

These theories are not without problems though. Let us focus on the two most glaring ones.<sup>3</sup> First, is an argument introduced by Legro and Moravcsik (1999). Authors target the causal logic of fledgling neoclassical realist approach, namely the aforementioned search for clues explaining states foreign policy inside

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<sup>1</sup> There is anecdotal evidence that the case of Poland’s rhetoric toward Russia is a strong anomalous case for Mearsheimer theory, who, when asked for his insight on Polish foreign policy replied with proverbial „Do not poke the bear” (Pugacewicz, 2015). Generally speaking, Mearsheimer’s views on the problem of Ukraine and the reasons for the Russian invasion of thereof highlights the problems of exerting the normative judgements on the basis of neorealist theory, where its classical predecessor was much less ham fisted with its “machievellism” (Chotiner, 2022).

<sup>2</sup> I will use the term “extraction capability” in the general, holistic sense, close to how it was understood by Zakaria in his 1998 book, in contrast with the approach of more contemporary neoclassical realists (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell, 2016), who on the level of state beside the extraction capability propose the variables of state-society relations and perceptions of foreign policy makers.

<sup>3</sup> I have analyzed the problems of scientific progresiveness of NCR in my article written with Magdalena Kozub-Karkut (2022). Here, I will only briefly mention some of them, but we have covered them at length in said article.

the state itself. In short, they claim that the NCR theories using the state's extraction capacity as the transmission belt between system's pressures and its actual foreign policy behaviour, in fact put majority of causation on the level of state's qualities. This reading, in turn, enables these authors to cast doubt on the whole NCR endeavour and call it non-realist. This is so because Moravcsik's own liberal theory looks for the causes of particular foreign policy behaviour inside the state and finds them in the workings of its bureaucracy, societal ideas and operation of pressure groups within it (Moravcsik, 1997). Thus, he and Legro claim that neoclassical realists, when they actually give causal priority to domestic variables, cease to be realists at all, and are, in fact, liberal. One may argue that, causally speaking, NCR scholars give priority to systemic variables first, and then apply intervening variables from the level of state and only then show how these two groups of variables cause the particular state's policy behaviour, their dependent variable. Yet, this is still questionable for some (Narizny, 2017), who bring the logic of Legro and Moravcsik argument to bear on the contemporary iteration of neoclassical realist theories.

This level of analysis and causal order problem leads to the second flaw of NCR theories – their lack of elegance, parsimony and proper explication of causal order of their variables. The former not only between systemic and domestic levels but also within the variables on the level of the state. Just as James Rosenau criticized early theories of foreign policy claiming that they only label certain empirical phenomena as variables but do not delineate causal mechanisms binding them (1966), the same can be said about a large segment of contemporary NCR theories both a little older (respectively, Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro, 2009, and criticism Quinn, 2013) and more recent (respectively, Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell, 2016, and criticism: Sears, 2017, Narizny, 2017, Kozub-Karkut, 2020). There are NCR theories that escape that criticism, especially those that try to explain the origins of revisionist behaviour of states (Schweller, 2006, Davidson, 2006) by carefully linking domestic variables such as foreign policymaking elite's cohesion with other aspects of the state and showing their causal relationship with particular foreign policy choices. Similarly, other NCR theories explain foreign policy behaviour with the help of prospect theory (Taliaferro, 2004) or the ability of the state to withstand the economic pressure from other states (Blanchard, Ripsman, 2008). Yet, those mid-range theories, constructed on the premises of positivist metatheory, still are susceptible to the causal hierarchy argument of Legro and Moravcsik, and they gain their parsimony and elegance at the expense of generality. One can assume that a proper general neoclassical theory with high explanative power is impossible on the basis of positivism, because if it were operationalised in rigorous terms, that would facilitate its precise empirical testing that would generate the sea of anomalies that such theory would drown in. This is basically a re statement of the general critique of realist paradigm made by Guzzini more than 20 years ago (1993) only directed at its new incarnation.

The above issues lead to the parameters of this theoretical endeavour, which aims at creating a framework that is supposed to facilitate the understanding of the contemporary international politics. First thing is the metatheory. The positivist underpinning of NCR theories is a source of certain problems. There is chaos in their causal order and it is susceptible to the criticism that delegitimizes its realist standing. The way forward is to create a theory that is aimed at understanding, not explaining (Hollis, Smith, 1990), foreign policy behaviour of states on the basis of traditional realist terms such as sources of national power, states extraction capability and foreign policy ideal types. A metatheory conducive for such a framework for understanding would be analyticism with its monist social ontology and focus on ideal-typification as a method for theorising (Jackson, 2011). Such a move would not only help with the Legro and Moravcsik criticism as it is aimed at positivistic NCR theories, but also provide a vantage point for the creation of more elegant theory closer to classical realist roots of NCR.

## **The classical points of reference – Morgenthau's ideal types of foreign policy, sources of national and political power, the political community and its interest**

There is a strong claim that Hans Morgenthau in his *Politics among Nations* does not develop a theory of foreign policy (Smith, 1986). It can be argued otherwise (Filary-Szczepanik, 2019) on the basis of two arguments – first, that his category of the statesman actually contained a normative theory of foreign policy based on Weberian ethics of responsibility, second, that he developed three ideal types of foreign policy of some, at least, theoretical importance. As important as Morgenthau's influence is for this attempt at theorising – rearranging some of his core concepts influenced by both understanding of world's political history and recent NCR literature is needed. Moreover, as the following presentation should show Morgenthau's ideal types of foreign policy have their own problems. Chief among them is a blurred line between the goals of the state pursuing a particular foreign policy and means to achieve them which is especially visible in the case of his last ideal type of foreign policy.

Point of departure for Morgenthau creating his ideal types is the following: “All politics, domestic and international, reveals three basic patterns; that is, all political phenomena seek either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power” (Morgenthau, 2006 [1948], p. 50). Hence, the three corresponding foreign policy ideal types are labelled by the author of *Politics among Nations* as, the policy of *status quo*, of imperialism and of prestige. Let us turn our attention to the first type of policy – *status quo*. The following presentation is based on (Morgenthau, 2006 [1948], pp. 50–96 and Filary-Szczepanik, 2019, pp. 271–272).

For Morgenthau, the notion of *status quo ante bellum* is an old diplomatic phrase meaning the territorial state of affairs – how the borders between warring states were set before their war with each other. Thus, the *status quo ante bellum* borders were a landmark to which the changes after the conflict were compared. The intuition that can be derived from the meaning of this phrase pertinent to the ideal type of *status quo* as a foreign policy is then that its main aim is to conserve the present hierarchy (balance) of power, that is, of course, in some way advantageous to the country pursuing it. Historically, one could point out to the policy of United Kingdom after it acquired the hegemony in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the coordinated policies of great powers after the Congress of Vienna, the policy of France after the Treaty of Versailles, or most likely the way US have been acting in the world politics since the beginning of the 1990s, so after they “won” the Cold War at least to the first decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century.

It is important to stress that in Morgenthau’s theory the policy of *status quo* is by no means static. Small adjustments of the distribution of sources of national power are not contrary to it if they do not upset the hierarchy of political power among the participants of international political system in which there is a state pursuing *status quo*. It is also important, that the usual occurrence of the *status quo* is linked with some sort of international climax, be it end of war or some other event that sets the hierarchy of power for the states in the system in at least semi-permanent way. Usually, said climax is the resolution of war between the most powerful actors in the given system, but the presence of nuclear weapons forces us to reconsider how such an event might look in the future. There can be for example a breakthrough in technology giving the advantage to the state that possesses it or some kind of upset in the world economy, be it depression of some sort or conflict over the value of currency, terms of trade or hostile usage of the debt one state owes to another or global financial market, that can in the future supplant the war as a climactic event<sup>4</sup>.

The most typical means of *status quo* foreign policy will be the usage of international organizations and law, preventive wars and defensive alliances, all in the hope of conserving the power hierarchy beneficial to the state pursuing it. The state pursuing the *status quo* policy will probably have also a propensity toward balancing behaviour both by making alliances with other likeminded states and internal by facilitating the growth of the sources of its own power. One could also infer a type of

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<sup>4</sup> There is a very good argument why it might not be the case though from within the NCR camp. Randall Schweller argues that if the war is not a viable way of setting the power hierarchy between international political actors the system, they operate in will drift toward an entropic state (2014). In such a system even the most powerful actors will not have the power to set and enforce the rules of the game. It would be the case due to the fact that their rising competitors, would have much higher capacity to stall rulemaking and enforcement and circumvent any present rules. In short in such a system the power to block and obstruct would be higher than the power to create order.

external balancing behaviour of the *status quo* foreign policy-oriented state involving diminishing sources of national power of other states to prevent them from upsetting the hierarchy of power advantageous for it. Here lies an important intuition that a state pursuing *status quo* foreign policy is at least in the state of stagnation as far as its material capabilities goes. Yet the intuition albeit important blurs the lines between a foreign policy of the state and its means to pursue it.

In case of the next type, Morgenthau reminds that when considering imperialism as a foreign policy, one must be very careful to distinguish between two meanings of imperialism. That is imperialism as “owning” an empire and “trying to establish an empire”. The first notion is in widespread use when one is to express their dissatisfaction with the state of global affairs – the imperialists, in our time the US, maybe China soon, are to be blamed, as they control the world politics and are responsible for hunger, war and ethnic cleansing, all this supposedly happening in the name of their imperial interests. This meaning of imperialism, to a large extent Marxist in origin, is not necessarily misleading when used carefully. What is more, such meaning of imperialism could actually be linked to the *status quo* foreign policy, as usually those states that have an empire in the above sense are interested in the perpetuation of the international order and power hierarchy in which they occupy the top spots.

The author of *Politics* though, uses a different meaning of imperialism. The foreign policy by that name looks to overthrow the hierarchy of power given in the particular international constellation that imperialist state finds itself in, and change it so that it would be beneficial to the actor pursuing such policy. The best-known example is of course the foreign policy of Hitler’s Germany. One might also add how Athens behaved before the outbreak of Peloponnesian War or the US foreign policy after 1898 war with Spain.

Similarly, as in the case of the policy of *status quo*, the roots of imperialistic foreign policy could be traced to the climactic events that shaped the current, from the perspective of imperialist country, hierarchy of power. Hence the states pursuing the imperialist foreign policy would also be dubbed the revisionist states. Yet, more than in the first instance, the policy of imperialism will be determined also in the changes in the sources of power of imperialistic nation. Once again, the blurring between the aims of foreign policy and its means could be pointed out.

Imperialistic type of foreign policy can be pursued on three levels – military conquest, economic penetration and ideological subversion (Morgenthau, 2006 [1948]) – which correspond to kind of thinking resulting in the three types of international society (Bull, 1977) or dimensions of culture of anarchy (Wendt, 1999) – force, profit and belief, “termed” after the names of great philosophers of politics, Hobbes, Locke and Kant by both Bull and Wendt. This paints the picture of imperialist foreign policy as a flexible one using the means taken from the whole spectrum of tools available to the modern state. But is the imperialist

foreign policy a sign of state's power rising or the realization of revisionist goals that a particular state might have and finally have the means to achieve?

The last type of foreign policy present in Morgenthau's thought is the policy of prestige. It might appear spurious at first. The policies of *status quo* and imperialism as well as the historical narration corresponding to them – *status quo* and revisionist powers – are well known in the discipline. The policy of prestige however is not in the sense of the two above.<sup>5</sup> If both above types are self-contained, one may say that propensity to demonstrate power that in essence is aimed at climbing on the international hierarchy of power or trying to retain given position on it, can be, most of the time, considered a tool for conducting policy of *status quo* as well as of imperialism. As such, policy of prestige should not have a meaning on its own and Morgenthau should have stayed with only two ideal types. Here is where the confusion between particular state's goals and means to their achievement is most evident the theory of Morgenthau.

According to him, two most usual ways to conduct the policy of prestige are the display of military force and diplomatic ceremonial, but it is fairly easy to update that, for example, with the display of technological advancement (the most striking example would be the Cold War "space race"), development aid for other countries (as is the case for Nordic states, especially Norway, or Switzerland), and even sport (to point out to the Olympics in China or football World Cup in Russia).

In most historical cases, this presentation of policy of prestige as a means to achieve status quo or imperialist goals of the state is viable. Yet on these occasions where it does not, the country pursuing the policy of prestige, not as a mean to realize policy of either *status quo* or imperialism, but as a goal in itself, can be a force that brings the disorder to the international system that is the stage of such pursuit. I would say that such state is attempting to behave as Narcissus did – enamoured with its own reflection in the water, such state leans toward it and drowns in the river of world politics or, in another variant of the myth, starves to death (expands its power resources) while revelling in its own reflection. In this proper form of Morgenthau's final ideal type of foreign policy, the distinction between means and end becomes hopelessly blurred. As examples of such policy, one can point out to the foreign policy of Napoleon Bonaparte, especially in the later period of his reign, or Wilhelmine Germany (Kissinger, 1994). Obviously III Reich foreign policy would be the case of such foreign policy. One could perceive as such also the decisions of Argentine Junta that lead to Falkland War, the North Korean nuclear programme or some aspects of the current rhetoric of officials in Warsaw on foreign policy of Poland.

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<sup>5</sup> There is growing literature on the status and prestige as a goal of a state (Paul, Welch-Larson, Wholeforth, 2014; Dafoe, Renshon, Huth, 2014; Renshon, 2016; Ward, 2017). The reasons for the pursuit of prestige by particular states are mostly placed on the level of international system and as such are in contrast to the approach presented here that looks for the "spring for action" of the states in their internal qualities. More about it in the section on the ideal types of states.


Despite the problems of Morgenthau's ideal typification of foreign policies, they convey important insights into the nature of international politics. Yet those insights should be rearranged. To do this one needs to switch from the types of foreign policy to the types of the states combining and explicitly melding the states' goals (revisionist and status quo) changes in their power (means of foreign policy) with the way they conduct their foreign policy (foreign policy behaviour – rational and narcissistic). In a sense what is proposed here is the change in optics predicated upon a metatheoretical stance of analyticism. Instead of looking at the above problematique through the (more or less) positivist glasses of a causal chain – state goals – means for their achievement – policy behaviour I will try to idealize states along with changes in their power the corresponding foreign policy behaviour and mirroring goals.

For this task the second point of classical reference – Morgenthau's conception of power is needed. The question of power in IR has a long history and it's hard to find a more contested category as far as its theoretical meaning and practical usage (Guzzini, 1993; Wojciuk, 2010 and bibliography thereof). However tempting it was for some (as discussed by: Waltz, 1979 and exemplified by: Mearsheimer, 2001), one should abstain from treating power as a money reducing its political logic to an economical one. This raises at least two issues, fungibility (whether an actor can use its power from one domain – for instance military – in the other one – let us say trade dispute) and the question of measurement – its precision and practical viability. I will rather link my ideal types of states with the changes in the power of a state – both relative (how it perceives its own power vis à vis other states) and absolute (how its power resources and the capacity to translate them in the political outcomes rises and drops). As far as relative power goes, we will have to deal with the perceptions of political elite, foreign policy making bureaucracy, of a particular country of their own power and the power of other countries in the international system relevant from the perspective of the perceiving country. As to the absolute power, we will have to outline what the power consists of – what kind of resources and capabilities make it up.

This leads to the distinction well known in the IR literature (Guzzini, 1993; Wojciuk, 2010): material conception of power and the relational one. The first deals with the (materialistic and ideational) resources and usually lists these. As such they can also be perceived as qualities of state. A word of caution should be uttered, as it seems to be a common mistake to take the material conception of power for a materialistic (from an ontological perspective) one. The second understands power as a relation in which one political actor can make the other do, or yet even better, think, as the first one pleases. In IR literature, at least from the 1960s up, there is a drive to distinguish both concepts of power (Wojciuk, 2010) analytically. Both have their own assorted problems however – the first with the measurement and how particular resources are used in particular instances; the second with the fact that from the empirical and causal perspective, one can determine if the power to change the

behaviour or thinking of others has been used only post factum (which makes the concept difficult if not impossible to employ for the purpose of real-world predictions in positivistic manner). Curiously enough, in Morgenthau’s thought this distinction is purely made for the sake of the argument and presentation – both dimensions are equally important to him, and what is seen as the aporia that is the terminal weakness to any theory that contains it, is but the two sides of the coin for him.

To address the above concerns, before turning to the creation of the ideal types of states, the problem of catalogue of “power resources” and how they are translated into results – the question of power as a relation needs to be put under scrutiny. As to the material aspect of power let us consider a diagram demonstrating sources of national power as present in Politics (Morgenthau, 2006 [1948]) on two axes: one concerning their ontology (ideational versus materialistic), the other dealing with the propensity of particular “power resource” to change. It will help to update Morgenthau’s conventional list of sources of national power and will need to suffice for the purposes of presenting ideal type framework that is the goal of this article.




**Graph 1.** The sources of national power – material approach

Source: Authors own research inspired by Morgenthau’s sources of national power.

The issue with material-relational distinction of power mentioned earlier is especially severe for positivistic theories, since it introduces the problem where

certain qualities of state are at the same time part of one set of variables (sources of national power as in material approach) and other set of variables (the mechanism that translates the sources of national power into results according to state's objectives – relational approach). This in turn raises serious questions concerning the distinction between power as an actor-oriented concept and power as a result of system's structure (Guzzini, 1993). The solution to this problem presented by Guzzini will be roughly followed here – to treat power as a category related to the state and focus in the ideal types of states on how the changes in the composition of power and relations between its different aspects will shape states foreign policy behavior. Other important aspects of this problematique, the notions of structural power, hierarchy and order, what Guzzini terms governance, need to be left for some other occasion.

Below is a graph showing issue of the relation between concepts of national power extraction capability and political power in a more picturesque form. The more stable and materialistic sources of national power are treated as in material approach and those more changing and ideational as parts of states extraction capability.



**Graph 2.** Sources of national power and the states extraction capability

Source: Authors own research.

The last point of classical reference is Morgenthau's notion of political community, the nation and its institutional extension the state and its interest. For

the author of *Politics*, the political community is a particular set of norms that function as a safeguard against individual lust for power inherent in the members of such community. The political anthropology of Morgenthau's theory (individual lust for power as a part of human nature in politics, which is the starting point of his theorizing) is a subject of much critique from later generations of realist scholars especially on positivist grounds, most famously by Kenneth Waltz (1959). Since I do not share their metatheoretical assumptions, Waltz and his continuators' criticisms delegitimizing scientific status of Morgenthau's theory on the extreme side does not concern me here. These norms are always concrete norms particular for the community and historical context in which they perform their function. The particular set of norms that is political community canalize and disperse the individual lust for power within the community in a way that is conducive to the survival of its particular members. The problem starts with the consequence of this state of affairs – individuals that do not have the ability to fully manifest their lust for power within the borders of their nation, and its institutional extension, the state, seek to project this lust on the sphere of relations between such political communities – international politics.

For Morgenthau, that's the reason why states engage in aggressive behavior towards one another and a source of danger to particular political community's survival. He proposes the normative theory of foreign policy, through the category of statesman and the ethics of responsibility he should follow, as a solution for this problem. Statesmen are responsible for the survival of their political community as a community of norms in the sense presented above.

The survival motive of state is an inherent part of realist theorizing on international politics no matter the stripes of a particular theorist (Waltz, 1979; Dunne, Schmidt, 2014). The peculiar quality of Morgenthau's thought is that he gives the reason for both the defensive behavior of the state, through the moral responsibility of the statesman to conserve the content of the norms that compose his political community, and its offensive behavior by pointing out to the externalization of the individual lust for power, through the apparatus of political community and its organizational extension the state, on the milieu of international politics. The role of this argument should be emphasized, as it will be one of the main focal points of ideal types of states presented in the next section. The only modification that should be made is to shift from the normative focus of statesman and ethics of responsibility categories, to the more tangible apparatus of states extraction capability. This will help to retain in the proposed framework the duality between the understanding of offensive and defensive source of states behavior and reinforce the focus of contemporary NCR theories on the extraction capability of the state.

## Ideal types of states: *status quo*, imperialist, young and old narcissist

After presenting the classical point of reference from Morgenthau's theory, let us turn to the ideal types of states that will facilitate understanding of the puzzles elucidated at the beginning of this article. These types will combine three idealized qualities of states – changes in the sources of their national power, their capability for extraction and their foreign policy behavior. Still, two minor issues need to be covered before. The terminology – the names of particular ideal types created. The second issue presenting historical and contemporary examples of states and their qualities that will be refined into particular ideal types.

As for the first issue the terms rising and declining state will not be used. They are related mostly with the changes in relative and absolute material aspect of their power (Alexandroff, Cooper, 2010; Sun Lee, 2008). Since it is only one aspect of ideal types to be proposed, they are not appropriate. The terms revisionist state and its subcategories such as mild or revolutionary denoting the scope of revisionist state's aims will not be used as well. This is mostly due to the fact that the relevant literature is focused mainly on the systemic consequences of states revisionism (Ward, 2017; Cooley, Nexon, Ward, 2019) or indeed looks for the reasons behind particular type of revisionism in the qualities of international order itself. Since the framework being proposed to understand foreign policy behavior is founded on the basis of intrinsic qualities of states, it makes the term revisionism could be misleading.

Hence, ideal types of imperialist, *status quo*, young narcissist and old narcissist state. In a way, they are a homage to ideal types of foreign policy by Morgenthau. Both ideal types of narcissist states are a reflection of basic dichotomy that produced when a particular, imperialist or *status quo* state, does not possess the extraction capacity that guards it from folly in their foreign policy. It can be argued that, in comparison to Morgenthau's thought, these ideal types substitute category of the statesman's ethics of responsibility, with more general and less moralistic one – state's extraction capability. To use his poetics, the difference between imperialist *vis à vis* young narcissist state and between *status quo* and old narcissist state is in extraction capability that works analogically to statesman ethics of responsibility or lack of it, where it is sufficient it guards from the vein, narcissistic, deontological pursuit of prestige that clouds the judgment and makes states overextend, which in turn, often leads to a catastrophe.

The second issue is the provenience of the qualities attributed to the presented ideal types of states. One general catalogue is taken from the Morgenthau's theory of international politics and NCR literature covering states extraction capability. But for the ideal types to be "relevant utopias" that aid our understanding of social reality they also need to have qualities that we can ostensibly

attribute to real historical phenomena. Since the text is long already, I will not present in depth historical or contemporary cases and show the relevant qualities of real states that compose the ideal types. Instead, pointing to the particular states in particular historical contexts and to contemporary states that, inductively, shape all ideal types constructed will need to suffice. The preliminary character of this text, legitimizes such a move, but I am fully aware that my theory in refined form will need to show this connection in a more extensive way.

**Table 1.** Historical and contemporary states that lend their traits to the ideal types of states

	<b>Imperialist</b>	<b>Young Narcist</b>	<i>Status Quo</i>	<b>Old Narcist</b>
Historical <sup>6</sup>	Athens from the end of Persian wars till Pericles’s death; Bismarck’s Prussia and Germany; USA on the turn of XIX and XX century	Athens after Pericles’ death (Sicilian expedition); King’s Louis the XIV France; Wilhelm’s II Germany ( <i>Weltpolitik</i> )	United Kingdom at the turn of XIX and XX century; Austria form Congress of Vienna to Spring of Nations; Lacedaemon after the Persian Wars	Napoleon’s the III France; Austro-Hungary after Crimean War; Tokugawa Shogunate in XIX century
Contemporary	China; India; Russia (?); Poland (?)	Contemporary Poland (after EU and NATO accession) (?); Iran driving toward regional hegemony; Erdogan’s Turkey (?); Russia (?)	Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, USA (?)	United Kingdom during Brexit; USA during Trump presidency (?)

Source: Authors own research.

<sup>6</sup> Examples of states form ancient Greek history form Thucydides (2009); from classical XIX century European great powers diplomacy Kennedy (1988), Kissinger (1994), and Wandycz (2003); about Louis XIV France Kennedy (1988) and Kissinger (1994) and late Tokugawa Shogunate Kennedy (1988).

Table 2. Four ideal types of states

	Ideal types of states			
	Imperialist	Young Narcist	Status Quo	Old Narcist
Sources of power	Material sources of national power are quickly rising both in absolute and relative terms	Material sources of national power are quickly rising both in absolute and relative terms	Material sources of national power are stagnating in absolute terms or on the relative decline	Material sources of national power are stagnating or declining in absolute terms and on the relative decline
Extraction capability	Extraction capability medium or high and “keeping up” with the rise of material sources of power	Extraction capability low or medium and “not keeping up” with the rise of material sources of power	High and quite stable extraction capacity	Extraction capability trending downwards – medium or low
State’s policy behaviour	The drive toward changing relations of power and prestige both factual and perceived (change or update of international hierarchy within given particular international order). Strategic planning based on “realist” perception of relations of power and its incremental implementation. Low to medium risk propensity	The need to achieve and be seen, and respected. This leads to hyperactive foreign policy, and overreach, in the context of young’s narcist sources of power, in quest of boundless objectives. On the level of grand strategy farfetched strategic goals with underdeveloped objectives on tactical and operational level. High risk propensity	The inclination toward keeping one’s own position in international hierarchy of power and prestige based on the ability to use the normative apparatus of international order and hegemony – status quo legitimization. Grand strategies aimed at weakening material sources of national power of imperialist and young narcist states or co-opting the former or balancing the latter	The feeling of entitlement of one’s own position of power and prestige. The drive toward being great again – the return of the old glory. The formulation of grand strategy out of habit in terms of overarching aims despite the fact that the state no longer possesses the means to archive them (material power and extraction capacity) as it used to have

Source: Authors own research.

Now we can finally turn to the description of the ideal types of states themselves. Imperialist state experiences a rapid growth in sources of national power in relation to other states and its capacity to extract them is at least medium with the tendency to grow. This instance is well depicted by Zakaria and was mentioned before as the case of US rise to power (Zakaria, 1998). What is interesting

in this instance is the normative consideration of the tempo of increase of state's extraction capacity and how it relates to its imperial goals (are they even considered as such by the decision-making elite at the time). One can imagine for instance the situation where the rise in extraction capability is *de facto* creation and proliferation of state institutions that are tasked with translating sources of power into international outcomes. The rivalry between them for the budgetary provisions and prestige among the state's apparatus might for example create positive feedback with the imperialistic policy itself – the state's institutions in this picture would try to be as active “outside of the country”, and hence commit to its imperial drive. On the other, in this type of state, those potential rivalries within its bureaucracy would be curbed by a prudent grand strategy that would guard foreign policy from overextension dangerous from the perspective of its survival. This prudence and self-containment of imperial goals could pay off in the long term perspective. The growth of imperial state's sources of national power, faster than its competitors, could mean that in the end it will reach the tipping point when the preponderance of power will enable it to shape international order and hierarchy at lower cost. To be able to devise such a strategy though would be a mark of very high extraction capability.

We have to do with a young narcissist state when its national power sources are on the rise, but its ability to extract them does not follow fast enough. It would be an instance of what could be called a Wilhelmine Germany syndrome – the state, its decision-making elite is well aware of the rise of their state's sources of national power and attribute to it the uniqueness of their situation. From that arises the pretence to be recognized by other states as a powerful nation, that stresses not fully developed diplomatic capabilities of such state. This in turn, leads to a deontological policy of prestige with its calamitous results. In this instance, the state's collective ‘will to power’ is not restrained by a sufficient extraction capability. It is well exemplified by the transition from imperialist to young narcissist state by both Athens and Prussia/Germany. As long as great individuals (Pericles and Bismarck respectively) were able to compensate for the lack of developed extraction capability with the sheer power of their virtue both states pursued prudent imperialist foreign policy that yielded a steady increase of their power and improved their position in hierarchies of power of their respective historical periods. Once the great individuals were gone (fallen by the plague or ousted from power by envious young monarch), the extraction capability, that was not well institutionally developed, was not able to provide a foundation of prudent foreign policy and both states degenerated to the reckless behaviour best understood along the lines of young narcissist state.

The old narcissist state experienced the decline in absolute terms in both sources of national power and the ability to extract them, while its power (overall) is in the decline in relation to other states. The declining extraction capability married with the past of high status and prestige within international order and

hierarchy of power makes for a dangerous, and possibly self-defining combination. The state feels the entitlement for its position that no longer corresponds with the level of its sources of national power. What is worst, its declining extraction capability is not able to adjust the goals of this polity to the means at its disposal. Hence, on the level of grand strategy, the state will pursue goals that were once attainable for it but without the means to attain them at the present. This could take form of clinging to the old symbols of its great past or undue fixation on the precedence and other typical symbols of prestige. This type of state can be dangerous not only for itself, but also by clinging to empty appearances it can create false image that other states will act upon. If those will not see such a state for an old narcissist, they can depend on its help more than is reasonable.

The *status quo* state will be the one that possesses highly developed ability to extract its sources of national power that is more or less stable, whereas the sources themselves are on the decline in the relation to other states in the system. The well-developed extraction capability enables the state decision-making circles to be well aware of the changes in its own power relative to other states in the system, and act upon them also in the context of creating a relevant grand strategy. In such light it would be interesting to determine the tipping point where the policy of *status quo* unable to attain the goal of staying at the top would require the state to “cut its losses” and resign from its position and in the process change the very *status quo* it was aimed at preserving. Nevertheless, it does not mean that *status quo* state’s foreign policy needs to be passive. It will actively use its position in international order and hierarchy to influence other states in the system, especially imperialist and young narcissist ones, for example targeting the sources of growth of their national power components, so that its position will not be challenged, or the challenge would not be fatal to it.

## In lieu of conclusion – the road ahead

Although the fruitfulness of a theoretical endeavor is best appraised by the quality of the research based upon it, even the preliminary framework presented here can be epistemically helpful. I would hazard a claim that with the taxonomy of the types of states presented, two types of normative judgement could be made. From international perspective, if one can understand a particular state and its actions on the basis of one of the two narcissist ideal types, one knows that they should be weary of such a state, as it can bring disorder to the international system. From the domestic perspective, if a citizen of such state would find it resembling one of the narcissist types, they would know that in the best interest of their political community is to change something or there is a good chance the disaster might struck it.

As far as the possibilities of further research based on the proposed ideal types, I see the following interconnected directions: to further elucidate the conceptual apparatus of state's extraction capability both on the basis of the theoretical research done within the NCR and Foreign Policy Analysis<sup>7</sup>; to use this broaden outlook in connection with the presented ideal types to relate them to the historical cases and check if such a move broadens our understanding of the events past; finally to use the ideal types however reformed and refined by such a process to exert the judgement on the present international politics (the "(?)" in the table 1 signifies such potential analytical interests). Still, even preliminary theoretical propositions are worthwhile if they invite the criticisms, polemics and amendments and those at least as much as the authors own ideas paint the road ahead.

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<sup>7</sup> It would be very interesting, for example, to link the composition of the decisional unit (Pugacewicz, 2017) making the decision on the particular foreign policy with the normative judgement about the extraction capability of the state present in such a policy.

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