



# Classical Sāṃkhya on the Relationship between the Vedic Revelation (śruti) and Its Own Doctrine

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## Abstract

The aim of this research is to clarify the view of classical Sāṃkhya on the relationship between the Vedas and its own teaching. Sāṃkhya is regarded by the Hindu tradition as a school of philosophy which recognizes the authority of the Vedas (*āstika*), but what is the real Sāṃkhya attitude towards the Vedas? My study is based on all the extant texts of classical Sāṃkhya. The textual analysis allowed me to distinguish four different tendencies (lines of thought) that constitute the classical Sāṃkhya view on the status of the Vedic revelation (*śruti*) in relation to its own doctrine: 1) the Vedas are an authoritative source of knowledge, but they do not play an important role in the grounding of the Sāṃkhya doctrine; 2) Sāṃkhya is authoritative because it is based on *śruti*; 3) Sāṃkhya is *śruti*, that is, it is identical to the quintessence (i.e., the highest teaching) of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṣads; 4) Sāṃkhya is higher than the Vedas. Taking into account the results of my analysis, it is possible to say that the Sāṃkhya view on the status of the Vedas is no less ambiguous than the general Hindu attitude to them.

**Keywords:** Sāṃkhya, the Vedas, the Vedic revelation (*śruti*), the Hindu tradition, a school of philosophy which recognizes the authority of the Vedas (*āstika*)

**Słowa kluczowe:** sankhja, Wedy, objawienie wedyjskie (*śruti*), tradycja hinduska, szkoła filozoficzna uznająca autorytet Wed (*āstika*)

It is commonly recognized that the Vedas constitute one of the main roots or sources of Hindu culture and religion. At the same time, scholars pay attention to the ambiguity of the Hindu attitude towards the Vedas. On the one hand, most Hindus revere the Vedas, proclaiming them the highest authority. On the other hand, very often this acknowledgement of the Vedas is selective or only declaratory. But in spite of this ambiguity, as Indologists emphasize, the Vedas have always been the main point of reference and self-identification for most Hindus, and commitment to them has been

considered the criterion of legitimacy of different teaching traditions and branches of knowledge. Such observations on the role of the Vedas in Hindu culture are presented in the works of Louis Renou,<sup>1</sup> Wilhelm Halbfass,<sup>2</sup> Marta Kudelska,<sup>3</sup> Hyoung Seok Ham,<sup>4</sup> and others. To cite Halbfass: “[R]egardless of the highly elusive and ambiguous nature of the historical relationship between the Veda and Hinduism, the Hindu tradition has, for many centuries, defined itself in relation to the Veda. The Veda, or idea of the Veda, has provided the indispensable focus for Hindu self-understanding. [...] We may even say, ‘There would be no Hinduism without the Veda, its identity and reality depends upon the idea, or fiction, of the Veda.’”<sup>5</sup>

My paper is a contribution to studies on the role of the Vedas in Hindu culture. An important sphere of this culture is philosophy, so a competent and exhaustive analysis of this issue is impossible without a study of the attitude to the Vedas of the schools of philosophy that constitute this culture. My paper may form a part of a research project aimed at clarification of the attitude of different Hindu schools of philosophy towards the Vedas. The contribution of earlier scholars, such as George Chemparathy, Wilhelm Halbfass, and others, should be included, but a modern and comprehensive study is badly needed. Chemparathy contributed to a study of the attitude of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā towards the Vedas,<sup>6</sup> and Halbfass – to a study of the attitude of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta, and Bhartṛhari the Grammarian (to the Vedas).<sup>7</sup> As for Sāṃkhya, much has been written about the Vedic roots of this system of philosophy,<sup>8</sup> but I have not found any comprehensive research on the Sāṃkhya (or classical Sāṃkhya) attitude towards the Vedas (these are two different topics, and they should not be confused). One of the main milestones in the study of the Sāṃkhya attitude towards the Vedas is the reconstruction of the Sāṃkhya view on the relationship between the Vedas and its own doctrine undertaken in this paper. It appears that this view has not been the topic of a separate inquiry.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> L. Renou, *Le destin du Veda dans l’Inde, Études védiques et pāṇinéennes*, vol. 6, Paris 1960.

<sup>2</sup> W. Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection. Explorations in Indian Thought*, Delhi 1992, pp. 1–85; *idem*, *India and Europe. An Essay in Philosophical Understanding*, Delhi 1990, pp. 349–368.

<sup>3</sup> M. Kudelska, *Karman i dharma. Wizja świata w filozoficznej myśli Indii*, Kraków 2003, pp. 14–15.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. Ham, *Inclusivism: the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos*, “Critical Review for Buddhist Studies” 2013, no. 13, pp. 9–53.

<sup>5</sup> W. Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection...*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> The contribution of Chemparathy is described by Halbfass: *ibidem*, pp. 23–25.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 1–85; *idem*, *India and Europe...*, pp. 349–368.

<sup>8</sup> Here I have mentioned only a few of many important publications: E.H. Johnston, *Early Sāṃkhya*, London 1937; P. Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, Calcutta 1951, pp. 4–110; G.J. Larson, *The History and Literature of Sāṃkhya* [in:] *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 4: *Sāṃkhya. A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*, G.J. Larson, R.S. Bhattacharya (eds.), Delhi 1987, pp. 3–14; J. Bronkhorst, *Epic Sāṃkhya: Texts, Teachers, Terminology*, “Asiatische Studien” 1999, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 473–490; K. Kanō, *Avyakta and Prakṛtivādīn: A Monistic and Theistic Sāṃkhya*, “Studies in the History of Indian Thought” 2000, vol. 12, pp. 60–81.

<sup>9</sup> A comprehensive study of the Sāṃkhya attitude towards the Vedas requires a careful investigation not only of this view but of other aspects of the Sāṃkhya teaching too – above all of the role of references to the Vedas and quotations from them in the Sāṃkhya texts.

Sāṃkhya, as well as all other schools of Brahmanical philosophy, is often regarded in the Hindu tradition as “orthodox,” or legitimate – *āstika* – on the grounds of its acknowledging the authority of the Vedas, that is, the Vedic revelation (*śruti*). This Sanskrit word – *āstika* – literally means ‘the one who believes that there exists.’ Applied to the schools of philosophy (*darśana*) or their adherents, the term *āstika* means, above all, an affirmer of the authority of the Vedas. The affirmers – *āstikas* – have been contrasted by the Brahmanical tradition with the deniers of the authority of the Vedas – *nāstikas*.<sup>10</sup> It is not clear how to translate the term *āstika* in this context; one of the possible renderings is ‘the one who believes that there exists [what is stated in the Vedas].’ Sāṃkhya is defined as *āstika*, that is, a school of philosophy which recognizes the authority of the Vedas, but what is the real Sāṃkhya attitude towards the Vedas? Does Sāṃkhya consider the Vedas as the highest authority and the source of its teaching, or is the recognition of their authority nothing more than a declaration? In this paper I shall try to clarify this question.

My research is limited to classical Sāṃkhya. It is based on all the available classical Sāṃkhya texts. The extant texts of classical Sāṃkhya embrace the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (SK; ca. 350–450 CE)<sup>11</sup> by Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the following eight commentaries on the SK: the commentary which survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha (P; composed ca. 500 CE; translated into Chinese by Paramārtha between 557 CE and 569 CE),<sup>12</sup> the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* (SVṛ; ca. 500–600 CE), the *Sāṃkhyasaptavṛtti* (SSVṛ; ca. 500–600 CE), the *Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya* (or the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*; GB; ca. 500–600 CE) by Gauḍapāda, the *Yuktidīpikā* (YD; ca. 600–700 CE),<sup>13</sup> the *Jayamaṅgalā* (JM; ca. 700 CE or later), the *Mātharavṛtti* (MV; ca. 800 CE or later) by Māthara, and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* (TK; ca. 841 CE or ca. 976 CE) by Vācaspati Miśra.<sup>14</sup> After the TK, a long period of stagnation in the development of Sāṃkhya begins; it lasts until the appearance of new (postclassical) forms of Sāṃkhya, which takes place in the XIV and XV century.

What is the view of classical Sāṃkhya on the status of the Vedas in relation to its own doctrine? I distinguish four different tendencies that constitute the classical Sāṃkhya view on the relationship between the Vedic revelation and its own teaching.

The first tendency is: Sāṃkhya recognizes that the Vedas are authoritative, but this commitment to the Vedas is declaratory rather than real, for they do not play an important role in the substantiating of the Sāṃkhya doctrine. This tendency can be

<sup>10</sup> On the terms *āstika* and *nāstika*, see, for example, A.I. Nicholson, *Affirmers (āstikas) and Deniers (nāstikas) in Indian History* [in:] *idem, Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History*, New York 2014, pp. 166–184.

<sup>11</sup> Dates and chronological order of the Sāṃkhya texts mentioned in this paper are given according to Larson: G.J. Larson, *op. cit.*, pp. 15–18, 19–22.

<sup>12</sup> The Sanskrit original of this commentary is lost. I have relied on the French translation of J. Takakusu, and N.A. Sastri’s reconstruction into Sanskrit.

<sup>13</sup> On the date of the *Yuktidīpikā*, see also the valuable observations of M. Mejer: M. Mejer, *Some Observations on the Date of the Yuktidīpikā (A Propos of the New Edition)* [in:] *Essays in Indian Philosophy, Religion and Literature*, P. Balcerowicz, M. Mejer (eds.), Delhi 2004, pp. 399–433.

<sup>14</sup> According to the recent and thorough research of D. Acharya, Vācaspati Miśra flourished between 950 and 1000 CE: D. Acharya, *Vācaspati’s Dates and His Contemporaries* [in:] *idem, Vācaspatimiśra’s Tattvasamīkṣā: The Earliest Commentary on Maṅḍanamiśra’s Brahmasiddhi*, Stuttgart 2006, p. XXVIII.

reconstructed on the basis of the commentaries on *kārikās* 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the SK. In these *kārikās*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa presents his conception of the sources of valid knowledge. According to the 4<sup>th</sup> *kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's SK, there are three sources of valid knowledge (*pramāna*): perception (*dr̥ṣṭa*), inference (*anumāna*), and authoritative verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*). In the next, 5<sup>th</sup> *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa gives a definition of each of these sources. He defines authoritative verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*) as 'authoritative *śruti*' (*āpta-śruti*). It is not clear from the SK how this definition should be understood. *Āpta-śruti* can be translated in different ways, for example, as 'authoritative revelation', 'revelation of an authority/authorities', 'that which is heard from an authority/authorities', 'authoritative listening', or 'listening of an authority'. This 'definition' was a genuine riddle for the commentators of the SK; they interpreted it in many different ways. It is not clear from this definition, as well as from the SK in general, whether the Vedas are included in authoritative verbal testimony. Almost all of the classical Sāṃkhya authors, except the author of the JM,<sup>15</sup> when commenting upon Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition of authoritative verbal testimony, state directly that the Vedas are authoritative – that is, they consist of sentences which generate valid knowledge. Besides the Vedas, the commentators also distinguish other sources of authoritative sentences.<sup>16</sup>

In most of the classical Sāṃkhya texts, it is stated directly that the Vedas are an authoritative source of knowledge. Are they an important source of knowledge for the Sāṃkhyas? In the 6<sup>th</sup> *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa determines the scope of validity of authoritative verbal testimony. According to the SK, authoritative verbal testimony has an independent scope of validity, being the source of valid knowledge of those objects which can be known neither by perception nor by inference. Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not say what exactly is known through authoritative verbal testimony, and it is not possible to reconstruct the answer to this question on the basis of his text. Almost all the classical Sāṃkhya commentators (except Vācaspati Miśra) give examples of objects of authoritative verbal testimony (see P 4, 6, SVṛ 4, 6, SSVṛ 4, GB 4, 6, MV 4, YD 6,<sup>17</sup> 7,<sup>18</sup> JM 6).<sup>19</sup> Knowing about most of these things (such as heaven, gods, nymphs, and the like) seems to be unimportant for attaining liberating knowledge. Two commentaries – the YD and the JM (see YD 7<sup>20</sup> and JM 6) – also mention liberation (*apavarga*) as

<sup>15</sup> It is unlikely that the JM denies the authority of the Vedas, though nowhere in this text it is said directly that the Vedas are an authoritative source of knowledge.

<sup>16</sup> These passages of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries are translated and analyzed by me in the article: O. Lutsyshyna, *Classical Sāṃkhya on the Authorship of the Vedas*, "Journal of Indian Philosophy" 2012, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 453–467 [Open Access: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-012-9161-4>, access:16.03.2017].

<sup>17</sup> *Yuktidīpikā. The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*, A. Wezler, S. Motegi (eds.), vol. I, Stuttgart 1998, p. 100, v. 17; p. 101, v. 6–7; p. 104, v. 3; p. 100, v. 9–10. The YD gives more extensive explanations of most of the *kārikās* than other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, and for this reason I have indicated, besides the number of the *kārikā*, the page and the verse number of the edition of the YD.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 99, v. 12; p. 98, v. 9.

<sup>19</sup> These examples are considered in my article: O. Łucyszyna, *Przedmiot autorytatywnej wypowiedzi (āpta-vacana) w klasycznej sankhji (na podstawie komentarzy do karik 4–7 Sankhjakariki)*, "Studia Indologiczne" 2010, vol. 17, pp. 68–97. In this article I deal with the issue of the object of authoritative verbal testimony in classical Sāṃkhya.

<sup>20</sup> *Yuktidīpikā...*, *op. cit.*, p. 99, v. 12.

belonging to the (category of) objects of authoritative verbal testimony, but it is clear from other Sāṃkhya passages that liberation can be known through inference. It is possible to reconstruct these inferences on the basis of *kārikās* 2, 44, 11–13, 19, 20, 52–68 and the commentaries on these *kārikās*.<sup>21</sup> An analysis of the commentaries on *kārikās* 4, 5, 6, and 7,<sup>22</sup> in which classical Sāṃkhya authors present their conception of the sources of valid knowledge, reveals that authoritative verbal testimony does not play an important role in Sāṃkhya. Unlike perception and inference, authoritative verbal testimony is not in fact used for proving the main structural principles of Sāṃkhya ontology, that is, its 25 entities (*tattva*), as well as other basic premises of the Sāṃkhya system. The classical Sāṃkhya texts in general corroborate the conclusion of this analysis – that authoritative verbal testimony did not play a significant role in the grounding of the Sāṃkhya teaching. In fact, Sāṃkhya did not need this source of valid knowledge for substantiation of its doctrine. Sāṃkhya proved it mainly with the help of inference. In the introduction to the YD, Sāṃkhya is called an elephant whose two tusks are the two kinds of inference.<sup>23</sup>

The second tendency I distinguish in the classical Sāṃkhya view on the status of the Vedas in relation to its own doctrine is: Sāṃkhya is authoritative because it is based on the Vedas. This line of thought is expressed in the TK. Vācaspati Miśra says in his commentary on the 5<sup>th</sup> *kārikā*:

And that [knowledge from authoritative verbal testimony] is intrinsically valid (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*). It is true (*yukta*), because it is entirely free from suspicion of [any] defectiveness – inasmuch as it is born by the sentences of the authorless (*apauruṣeya*) Vedas. Thus the knowledge born by the sentences of the *smṛtis*,<sup>24</sup> *itihāsas*, and *purāṇas* which are rooted in the Vedas (*veda-mūla*) is also true (*yukta*). And the primeval sage Kapila at the beginning of the *kalpa* remembers *śruti* studied [by him] during the [previous] *kalpas*, ...<sup>25</sup>

In this passage, which is probably influenced by Mīmāṃsā and/or Advaita, Vācaspati Miśra says that the authoritativeness of the texts which have an author lies in their being based on the authorless Vedas. He adds that Kapila, who is identified by Sāṃkhya as its founder, at the beginning of the world cycle (*kalpa*) remembers the Vedas studied by him before the cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*). In this way he suggests that Sāṃkhya is authoritative too, for it is based on *śruti*.

Let us turn now to the third tendency in the classical Sāṃkhya view on the relationship between the Vedic revelation and the Sāṃkhya doctrine. According to this tendency, Sāṃkhya is *śruti*. This line of thought can be reconstructed on the basis of the YD, the most extensive and profound commentary of classical Sāṃkhya. The main passage for the reconstruction of this tendency is contained in the introduction to the YD.<sup>26</sup> It

<sup>21</sup> See O. Łuczyszyna, *Przedmiot autorytatywnej wypowiedzi...*, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

<sup>22</sup> This analysis is presented in the article: *ibidem*, pp. 68–97.

<sup>23</sup> *Yuktidīpikā...*, *op. cit.*, p. 1, v. 3–4.

<sup>24</sup> By *smṛtis* Vācaspati Miśra means *dharmaśāstras*.

<sup>25</sup> *tac ca svataḥ-pramāṇam apauruṣeya-veda-vākya-janitatvena sakala-doṣa-āśaṅkā-vinirmukta-tvena yuktaṃ bhavati evaṃ veda-mūla-smṛti-itihāsa-purāṇa-vākya-janitam api jñānaṃ yuktaṃ ādi-viduṣaś ca kapilasya kalpa-ādau kalpa-antara-adhīta-śruti-smaraṇa-sambhavaḥ ... /*

<sup>26</sup> *Yuktidīpikā...*, *op. cit.*, p. 7, v. 16–27.

follows from this passage that Kapila establishes the primary linguistic convention. Kapila creates names for the basic structural principles of reality (*tattva*) and probably creates the other special terms of the Sāṃkhya system. He creates them on the basis of direct insight into the nature of all the 25 *tattvas*.<sup>27</sup> According to Sāṃkhya, 25 *tattvas* embrace everything that exists. The role of all-knowing Kapila, who is characterized in other passages of the YD as “born at the beginning of the world” (*viśva-agra-ja*) (see YD 1<sup>28</sup> and 69<sup>29</sup>), is similar here to the role of Īśvara (God) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, omniscient God creates names and the Vedas at the beginning of each cycle of existence of the world. Kapila, appearing at the beginning of the world cycle, creates Sāṃkhya, which is identical with *śruti*, that is, with the highest science of *śruti*. According to the YD (see the commentary on the 2<sup>nd</sup> *kārikā*),<sup>30</sup> the highest goal of man and the path to its realization prescribed in Sāṃkhya are the same as the highest goal and the path to its realization prescribed in the Upaniṣads, which contain the quintessence of the Vedas. From this it follows that the special Sāṃkhya terms and the concepts based on these terms are the same as the terms and concepts of the highest science of the Vedas, that is, of the Vedic science of liberation through knowledge set forth in the Upaniṣads. It is possible to conclude that in the passage of the introduction to the YD mentioned above, Sāṃkhya is understood as *śruti*, or, to be more exact, as the highest teaching of *śruti*. This identification of Sāṃkhya with *śruti* is confirmed by YD 69 in which Sāṃkhya is called the Veda. Commenting upon the word *guhya* (‘secret’) applied to the Sāṃkhya doctrine in the SK, the author of the YD asks the rhetorical question, “How might the Veda not be secret?”<sup>31</sup>

The next and last tendency I distinguish in the view of classical Sāṃkhya on the relationship between the Vedas and its own teaching is: Sāṃkhya, which is the supreme teaching, is higher than the four existing Vedas. In SK 2, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that the Sāṃkhya means of elimination of suffering (*duḥkha*) are better than the Vedic means. Īśvarakṛṣṇa and all the commentators say that the Sāṃkhya means of elimination of suffering through the discriminative knowledge (*vijñāna*) of *prakṛti*, its products, and *puruṣa* are superior to the Vedic (*ānuśravika*) ones, because the Sāṃkhya means lead to complete and permanent elimination of all kinds of suffering, whereas by performing Vedic ritual a human being continues to stay in *saṃsāra* and experience suffering (see *kārikās* 1 and 2 together with the commentaries on them). Most commentators (except the author of the YD and Vācaspati Mīśra)<sup>32</sup> do not note that

<sup>27</sup> A translation and detailed analysis of this passage of the YD are presented in my article: O. Łucyszyna, *Classical Sāṃkhya on the Relationship between a Word and Its Meaning*, “Journal of Indian Philosophy” 2016, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 303–323 [Open Access: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-014-9264-1>, access: 16.03.2017].

<sup>28</sup> *Yuktidīpikā...*, *op. cit.*, p. 8, v. 20.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 267, v. 14.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 50, v. 13–p. 54, v. 16.

<sup>31</sup> *katham vedaṃ guhyaṃ na syāt / (ibidem, p. 267, v. 18).*

<sup>32</sup> Only two commentators – the author of the YD and Vācaspati Mīśra – say that the Vedic revelation also contains those parts which teach the path of liberation through knowledge. See YD 2 (*ibidem*, p. 35, v. 9–p. 38, v. 7; p. 41, v. 3–p. 42, v. 7; p. 50, v. 12–p. 54, v. 16) and TK 2. These two commentaries do not diminish the Vedas, differing in this respect from other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries.

*śruti* contains both ritual parts and parts which prescribe the path of knowledge, and hence this distinction between the Sāṃkhya means and Vedic means suggests that Sāṃkhya and *śruti* conflict with each other, and implies recognition of the superiority of Sāṃkhya over *śruti* as such.

The idea of the superiority of Sāṃkhya over the Vedas as such is expressed in explicit form in most of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries on the 70<sup>th</sup> *kārikā* (see P 69,<sup>33</sup> SVṛ 70, SSVṛ 70, JM 70, and MV 70). In this *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa calls Sāṃkhya the foremost (*agrya*) doctrine (*tantra*). The commentators express the idea of the superiority of Sāṃkhya over the Vedas when they explain the word *agrya* – ‘foremost.’ According to the SSVṛ and MV, Sāṃkhya is higher even than the Vedas, *purāṇas*, the *Story of Bharatas (bhārata)*,<sup>34</sup> the *Laws of Manu* and other *dharmaśāstras*. According to the P, the Vedas and all other doctrines (*mata*) are based on Sāṃkhya, which is earlier than them. According to the SVṛ, Sāṃkhya is earlier than all the knowledge contained in the Vedas and other texts (*veda-ādi*). The author of the JM says that Sāṃkhya existed before all the “divisions” (*bheda*),<sup>35</sup> by which is probably meant the division of the single, primary, initial Veda into the four Vedas, as well as the arising of different branches of interpretation of the Vedas and different doctrines based on them. In these five commentaries, Sāṃkhya is probably understood as the primeval Veda, which is the highest knowledge and the source of the four Vedas, as well as all authoritative texts and doctrines based on them.

To sum up, it is possible to reconstruct four different tendencies constituting the view of classical Sāṃkhya on the relationship between the Vedic revelation and its own doctrine. The first tendency is: Sāṃkhya recognizes that the Vedas are authoritative – namely, the sentences of the Vedas generate valid knowledge (*pramā*), but this knowledge cannot be called an important part of the Sāṃkhya teaching. This tendency is expressed explicitly in almost all the extant classical Sāṃkhya commentaries (with the exception of the JM). According to the second tendency, Sāṃkhya is authoritative because it is based on *śruti*. This tendency is apparent in the TK by Vācaspati Miśra. According to the third tendency, Sāṃkhya is *śruti* – that is, the Sāṃkhya teaching is the same as the quintessence of the Vedic teaching set forth in the Upaniṣads. This line of thought can be reconstructed on the basis of the YD. The fourth tendency is: Sāṃkhya is higher than the four Vedas (i.e., the present *śruti*); it is the highest teaching and the source of the four Vedas and all other authoritative texts and doctrines. This tendency is expressed in explicit form in most of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, namely, the P, the SVṛ, the SSVṛ, the JM, and the MV. My analysis shows that the classical Sāṃkhya view on the status of the Vedas is no less ambiguous than the general Hindu attitude to them mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

<sup>33</sup> *Kārikā* 69 in the commentary which survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha corresponds to *kārikā* 70 in all the other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries.

<sup>34</sup> That is, *Mahābhārata*.

<sup>35</sup> R.S. Bhattacharya notes, “The import of the word *bheda* is obscure. It may be *veda*” (*Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 4: *Sāṃkhya. A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*, G.J. Larson, R.S. Bhattacharya (eds.), Delhi 1987, p. 649, note 43).

## References and Abbreviations

### Sāṃkhya Sanskrit Texts and Abbreviations

- GB = *Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya*, or *Gauḍapādabhāṣya: The Sāṃkhya Kārikā with an Exposition Called Candrikā by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, and Gauḍapādācārya's Commentary*, Becanarāma Tripāṭhī (ed.), Benares 1883.
- JM = *Jayamaṅgalā: Sāṃkhyakārikā of Śrīmad Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the Māṭharavṛtti of Māṭharācārya and the Jayamaṅgalā of Śrī Śaṅkara*, Viṣṇuprasāda Śarmā [MV], Satkāriśarmā Vaṅgīya [JM] (eds.), Varanasi 1970.
- MV = *Māṭharavṛtti* – see JM.
- P = The commentary translated into Chinese by Paramārtha: (1) *La Sāṃkhyakārikā étudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise (II). Traité sur les «Septante d'or» (Suvarṇasaptati) ou Traité sur la philosophie Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhyasāstra) traduit par Paramārtha*, J. Takakusu (trans.), “Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient” 1904, no. 4, pp. 978–1064; (2) *Suvarṇasaptati Śāstra. Sāṃkhya-Kārikā-Saptati of Īśvara-Kṛṣṇa with a Commentary*, N.A. Sastri (reconstruction into Sanskrit from Chinese), Tirupati 1944.
- SK = *Sāṃkhyakārikā: Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Sāṃkhyakārikā*, F. Ruzsa (ed.), 1998, [http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1\\_sanskrit/6\\_sastra/3\\_phil/samkhya/isvskaru.htm](http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskrit/6_sastra/3_phil/samkhya/isvskaru.htm) [access: 5.12.2011].
- SSVṛ = *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti: Sāṃkhya-Saptati-Vṛtti (V1)*, E.A. Solomon (ed.), Ahmedabad 1973.
- SVṛ = *Sāṃkhyavṛtti: Sāṃkhya-Vṛtti (V2)*, E.A. Solomon (ed.), Ahmedabad 1973.
- TK = *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī: Saṅkhyatattva Koumudī by Bachaspati Misra*, Taranatha Tarkavachaspati (ed.), Calcutta 1871.
- YD = *Yuktidīpikā: Yuktidīpikā. The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*, A. Wezler, S. Motegi (eds.), vol. I, Stuttgart 1998.

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